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2 Abstract
This thesis is composed of three papers all regarding research funding. The first one,
in close collaboration with Prof. Dr. Hendrik Hakenes, theoretically analyzes privately
funded academic research being a mixture between academic and industry research. We
develop a theoretical framework in which private research funding (PRF) transfers infor-
mation on the value of a research project from the private sector into academia, in an
incentive compatible way. Thereby, the introduction of private funding reduces the rela-
tive desirability of academia. Once, private research funds are obtained, a project leaves
academia faster than without them. Besides, we are able to present different sequences
research can be conducted as well as the optimal amount of private research funds, find-
ing that it possibly exceed the aggregate bill in academia. In the end, we deduce some
political implications about the funding of academic research.
The second paper empirically seeks to determine the type of research strategy that best
responds to new conditions based on reformations of higher education systems. Also
due to them, research funding has become an increasingly significant concern and the
standards of efficient scholarship have risen. To this end, we examine access to public
and private external funding and the compositions of university research budgets, which
are determined by research focus. Moreover, we consider the relationship between public
and private funding and find that they complement each other, independently of research
strategy. This relationship is particularly strong if a pure strategy (either basic or applied)
is chosen.
The last paper contributes to international mobility of researchers that is important be-
cause it enhances the benefits ”for sending and receiving countries, as well as for the
global economy”(Ivancheva and Gourova, 2011, p. 189), as it is ”commonly believed to
diffuse knowledge and, consequently, to support innovativeness and competitiveness”(Inzelt,
2011, p. 5). This issue, called brain circulation, has induced European countries in recent
decades to develop their higher education and research funding systems to create condi-
tions and research environments that attract both domestic and foreign scholars. However,
the question remains as to whether this objective is met by all countries within the Eu-
ropean Research Area (ERA). Because the ability to obtain external research funds is an
important concern in this regard, we analyze whether foreign researchers in the ERA face
the same access to public and private funding compared with their national colleagues.
Unfortunately, we must conclude that there are differences regarding the allocation of
research funds between national and foreign researchers. In particular, the Continental
and Southern European countries discriminate against foreign researchers, whereas the
Scandinavian countries treat both equally.
Keywords: Research Funding, University Finance, R&D
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Zusammenfassung
Diese kumulative Dissertation besteht aus drei Teilen, die sich mit der Finanzierung bzw.
Fo¨rderung von (universita¨rer) Forschung befassen. Den ersten Teil, der in Zusammen-
arbeit mit Prof. Dr. Hendrik Hakenes entstanden ist, bildet ein theoretisches Modell,
welches drittmittelfinanzierte Forschung als Zwischenform zwischen universita¨rer und
privater Forschung untersucht. In unserem Modellrahmen dienen die Drittmittel, die
ausschließlich aus dem privaten Sektor stammen, als Qualita¨tssignal fu¨r die Vermarkt-
barkeit eines universita¨ren Forschungsprojekts. Die Einwerbung von Drittmitteln in-
duziert dabei, dass Forschungsprojekte fru¨her den akademischen Sektor verlassen bzw. an
die Industrie u¨bergeben werden als ohne dieses Signal. Zudem ko¨nnen wir aus dem Mo-
dell heraus verschiedene Sequenzen, die ein Forschungsprojekt durchla¨uft, identifizieren
und den optimalen Betrag an Drittmitteln bestimmen. Interessanterweise kann dieser das
Gesamtbudget sogar u¨bersteigen. Schlussendlich werden politische Implikationen fu¨r die
Forschungsfo¨rderung abgeleitet.
Der zweite Teil, eine empirische Analyse, befasst sich mit der Frage, ob es eine Forschungs-
ausrichtung (Grundlagenforschung, angewandte Forschung oder Mischformen) gibt, die
besonders erfolgversprechend hinsichtlich der Einwerbung von Drittmitteln ist. Diese Art
der Forschungsfo¨rderung gewinnt immer mehr an Bedeutung, nicht zuletzt angesichts der
Reformen der Hochschulsysteme in der Europa¨ischen Forschungsregion (ERA). U¨berdies
wird der Erfolg eines Wissenschaftlers heutzutage auch an seiner Erfahrung im Umgang
mit Drittmitteln festgemacht. Aus diesem Grund wird in diesem Forschungsansatz der
Zugang zu o¨ffentlichen und privaten Drittmiteln sowie die Zusammensetzung des in-
dividuellen Etats aus Universita¨ts- und Drittmitteln abha¨ngig von der Forschungsaus-
richtung untersucht. Im Zuge der Analyse wird ferner der Zusammenhang zwischen
o¨ffentlichen und privaten Drittmitteln betrachtet wobei sich ein komplementa¨res Verha¨ltnis
beider, unabha¨ngig von der Forschungsausrichtung, offenbart. Die Verbindung zwischen
o¨ffentlichen und privaten Drittmitteln ist jedoch besonders eng, wenn die Forschungsaus-
richtung stark fokussiert ist.
Der dritte Teil leistet einen Beitrag zur Literatur, die sich mit der internationalen Mobilita¨t
von Forschern bescha¨ftigt. Der Argumentation folgend, dass diese Mobilita¨t infolge von
Wissenszirkulation positive Effekte fu¨r einzelne La¨nder bzw. die Weltwirtschaft im All-
gemeinen hat, wird untersucht, ob die La¨nder in der Europa¨ischen Forschungsregion
(ERA) hinreichende Rahmenbedingungen geschaffen haben, die in- und fremdla¨ndischen
Forschern denselben Zugang zu Drittmitteln ermo¨glichen und somit die Mobilita¨t be-
gu¨nstigen. Bedauerlicherweise ist dies nicht der Fall, vielmehr sind große Unterschiede
bei der Vergabe von Drittmittel (o¨ffentlich und privat) zwischen in- und ausla¨ndischen
Forschern erkennbar. Dies betrifft vor allem die kontinental- und su¨deuropa¨ischen La¨nder.
Schlagworte: Forschungsfo¨rderung, Forschungsfinanzierung, Forschung & Entwicklung
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Part I
A Theory of private Research Funding
3 Introduction
Why are researchers in academia forced to finance projects, equipment or staff members
with private outside finance? Why are they, that way, distracted from research and teach-
ing? From a financial economics perspective, finance may act as a gatekeeper. Promising
projects receive finance, projects with low value do not. That way, information enters the
academic system from outside. But with this perspective, new questions come up. Should
all research projects be financed privately, at least partially? And what is the optimal
fraction of outside finance? Our paper addresses these questions with a theoretical model.
Therefore, we convert the view that is often used in models examining financial markets
(see e.g. Tirole (2006)) into an approach regarding private research funding (PRF). In the
light of asymmetric information, regardless whether we talk about research or financial
markets, uncertainty about the valuation of projects may lead to inefficient outcomes. The
question arises whether projects should be carried out anyway. Via incentive compatible
contracts the problem of adverse selection is overcome or at least softened. We use this
framing and apply it on research funding assuming that the private sector can gather in-
formation on potential marketable products. By asking the industry, researchers inside
academia get to know if they pursue promising projects. So as to act as a credible signal,
the information must be supported with private research funds.
This procedure is common practice. A striking example is the research conducted in
the David H. Koch Institute for Integrative Cancer Research at the Massachusetts In-
stitute of Technology (MIT) which historically pioneered research collaborations be-
tween academia and industry. We use the development of CML (Chronic myelogenous
leukemia1) drugs for explaining our reasoning. A typical creation of new drugs starts
inside the MIT and is finally transferred to industry. The whole process takes between
10 and 12 years and is highly complex. That is why we rather focus on the main steps
and leave aside previous discoveries, potentially providing the basis for this development
like the critical discovery about what causes CML made by Professor Dr. David Balti-
more (MIT) in the 1980s. First, after gathering information on the need of a new drug,
the researchers inside the MIT discover which protein is altered in CML. Afterwards, the
chemical screen process begins in which 300.000 chemicals are tested to see which one
kills the cancer cells. Thereby, small amounts of thousands of different chemicals are
synthesized. The treated cancer cells are examined to see the effects of the chemicals.
1Cancer of the white blood cells.
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The fourth stage contains the analysis of data on the experiments. By means of computer
programmes, the most promising chemicals are determined. The fifth and sixth steps are
carried out in the chemistry laboratory. In order to generate dose response curves, large
batches of each of the promising chemical are synthesized and analogs of each chemical
are made to measure their potencies. So far, these steps are assigned to be basic research
leading to a discovery of potential drugs followed by the clinical trial, anon divided into
4 phases, to test each potential new treatment. The first phase measures the safety and the
second the efficiency of the treatments. The third phase is rather organizational, whereas
in the fourth the drugs are optimized. Finally, the findings are shared with the scientific
community and the general public by journals, conferences and the World Wide Web and
an approval from the U. S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is sought. After all,
the new drug will be produced, advertised and placed on the market by pharmaceutical
biotechnological firms like Novartis, Dendreon, or Bristol-Myers Squibb2.
As we restrict our analysis up to private research funds, we omit public support which
usually depends on social values being hardly convertible into monetary features. Public
funding is mainly an issue inside academia if the granted scientific freedom leads to re-
search that is not intended to provide implementable results that can be commercialized.
This might happen because of the nonprofit-oriented character of academia yielding to the
possibility that researchers are allowed to pursue a broader range of research (basic and
applied, theoretical and experimental, etc.), respectively to trace various ideas. If rather
concrete and applicable questions are investigated, like the CML drug, and the private sec-
tor is interested, it participates in terms of private research funds. This could be seen as a
beneficial mixture between public and private effort just like (ideally) in a public-private
partnership (PPP).
While the literature on R&D in general, and on PPP in particular, is immense (see, e. g.,
Maskin and Tirole (2007), Hart (2003), and Murray, Aghion, Dewatripont, Kolev, and
Stern (2009)), hardly any work considers private research funding theoretically. We close
this gap by extending the model of Aghion, Dewatripont, and Stein (2008). In their
discrete-time model, Aghion, Dewatripont, and Stein assume that innovation occurs in
a sequence of steps. Each step can be carried out in the private sector, where researchers
are more determined, or in academia, where researchers demand lower wages because
they appreciate academic freedom. With increasing steps of innovation, the product pro-
gresses towards marketability, so research becomes more urgent. A welfare maximizing
policy maker (the dean, or rector, or director, in the following called the research de-
signer) should then transfer the research line from academia to the private sector (in the
following also called industry) in order not to risk the project success.
We consider a continuous-time version of this model. This is done for computational ease
only, without changing any comparative statics. In order to endogenize research funding,
we introduce a delegation problem: The research designer has neither information on the
2For further information, see http://ki.mit.edu/.
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valuation of research projects nor the control over the researchers’ strategy choice. To get
an idea if the researchers work auspiciously, he could ask the private sector. Therefore,
we add one modeling component, assuming that the private sector can gather information
on the marketability of the final product – at a cost. This information is valuable for
the research designer; hence, he wants to implement an incentive-compatible contract
with the private sector to get the information truthfully. One way to do so is by asking
the private firm to contribute to research funding, pledging part of the proceeds at the
final date when the product becomes marketable. In equilibrium, the firm gathers the
information on the product value, and invests if and only if the information is positive.
Thus, the research designer pursues only those research lines that receive PRF – not only
for monetary reasons but also because the research funds serve as a signal for promising
research projects. In summary, the research designer has to decide with the help of the
private sector which kind of research is welfare maximizing. In the end, there are three
research designs: pure academia, privately funded academia, and industry research.
Our model produces a number of qualitative and quantitative results. Qualitatively, projects
typically start in pure academia and are finally handed over to the private sector, where
products reach marketability. Potentially, academia is leapfrogged or the private sector is
not involved, but this order never changes. If there is PRF, it enters right at the beginning
of the projects, when the initial idea is seized (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Possible Sequences of Research Designs
Idea → Pure academia ———————————–— ———————– → Marketable product
Idea ————————–→ Academia with PRF — —————————–→ Marketable product
Idea → Pure academia ———————————–→ Industry research → Marketable product
Idea ————————–→ Academia with PRF → Industry research → Marketable product
Idea ————————–———————————–→ Industry research → Marketable product
Idea → No research → No marketable product
However, not all collaborations work this way and it is imaginable that projects need
some time to be concretized before the private sector is interested in the marketable value.
Hence, the above sequence brings up the question whether it could be optimal to await
until a project is partially developed to apply for PRF. Therefore, we soften our first
assumption and state that parameters are unlikely to remain constant over time and we
consider that the probability that a project fails inside academia decreases as a researcher
gets more experienced. We finally obtain a slightly different design. In this regard it is not
optimal to apply for PRF at the initial stage, but the project starts in pure academia, at an
intermediate date tc, the research designer forces the researcher to obtain private funding
and at a later date, the project is (possibly) transferred to the private sector (see Figure 2).
Quantitatively, we can calculate the optimal date for completely switching to the private
sector (tswitch) which depends, among other things, on the potential value (the more valu-
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Figure 2: Additional Sequences of Research Designs
Idea → Pure academia → Academia with PRF — ———————–→ Marketable product
Idea → Pure academia → Academia with PRF → Industry research → Marketable product
able a final product, the earlier a research line should be handed over to the private sector),
on the wage differential between academia and the private sector (the higher the wage dif-
ferential, the longer a research line should remain in academia) and on the differential of
probabilities of failure between both sectors (the higher the differential, the earlier re-
search should be transferred). Surprisingly, if an information on the marketable value is
gathered and PRF enter into academia, a project is transferred earlier to the private sec-
tor. In that sense, information tells the research designer that the project should either be
stopped completely, or in case of a positive information on the marketability, it switches
earlier.
We can also calculate the optimal amount of private research funds, possibly even ex-
ceeding the academic budget, which itself does not depend on the potential value of the
product but on the probability of marketability. Nevertheless, not all research projects are
privately supported as there is an upper and a lower bound of the value such that either
pure academic or pure private research is conducted from the initial stage to completion.
Likewise it is possible that the final product is unlikely to be marketable. In this case, the
research designer has the possibility to close the research line because it is impossible for
the researcher to raise PRF due to an insufficient compensation for a cooperating firm.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After giving an overview over related
literature, we survey the most important stylized facts concerning research funding. In
section 4, we introduce and solve the basic version of the model, with only an academic
and a private sector. It is deduced from the model of Aghion, Dewatripont, and Stein
(2008) but in a continuous version. We then add the possibility to get an information about
the expected value of a research project, at a cost. Section 6 introduces research funding
as an institutional design to transfer information from the private sector into academia.
Section 7 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
3.1 Related Literature
Our paper combines two strands of literature, innovation and finance. With regard to the
latter, there are several papers focusing on the allocation of capital in the presence of
asymmetric information. In lights of this, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and Meza and Webb
(1987) investigate the required subsidies of entrepreneurs and Boadway and Keen (2006)
conclude that the results depend on the expectations about the project return distributions.
14
In a sense, we jump on this train in order to implement this topic into R&D, but we in-
troduce private research funds as a signal for auspicious research. In line with this, the
work of Leland and Pyle (1977) observe investments in a project by an entrepreneur as
a reliable signal for the quality of a firm. Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1997) also explore en-
trepreneurial finance, but they concentrate on the interaction of informed financiers with
less informed investors in a moral hazard framework. Instead of moral hazard, we rather
focus on adverse selection and a research designer who wants to balance the existing
asymmetry of information. He fulfills the task of the financial intermediary balancing the
incentive problems between borrowers and lenders considered in the monitoring frame-
work of Diamond (1984) and Tirole (2006). In addition, Alam and Walton (1995) and
Hubbard (1998) point out that the problem of asymmetric information yields not only to
financing constraints between entrepreneurs and financiers like Akerlof (1970) elaborate,
but particularly to financial restrictions in R&D.
We also contribute to a thread within innovation literature considering the differences
between academic and private research which are mostly in line with our preliminary
considerations. Sauermann and Stephan (2010) find significant academia-industry dif-
ferences by broadly comparing the nature of science, the organizational characteristics,
characteristics of individual scientists and the disclosing mechanisms. The first issue is
also examined by Aghion, Dewatripont, and Stein (2008), Lacetera (2009b), and Sauer-
mann and Stephan (2013) who argue that ”firms focus on applied research with the goal
of solving concrete problems valued in the market place”, whereas academic research in-
creases ”the stock of knowledge by conducting basic research, i.e. research resulting in
fundamental insights”(Sauermann and Stephan, 2013, p. 7).
The second dimension, the organizational characteristics, represents our core argument.
In line with Aghion, Dewatripont, and Stein (2008), Sauermann and Stephan (2010), and
Sauermann and Stephan (2013), we assume a fundamental tradeoff between academia
and the private sector, respectively a tradeoff between academic freedom, defined as the
granting of control rights to the researchers, versus focus. In detail, ”academic norms al-
low researchers to freely choose projects based on personal interest [. . . ] the commercial
logic, in contrast, limits freedom and subordinates scientists’ choices to the needs and
requirements of their industrial employers”(Sauermann and Stephan, 2013, p. 8). Thus,
the main difference to industrial research is that the researchers employed in the academic
sector are free to establish new research lines and to experimentalize. However, we only
consider implicitly the idea of academic freedom in the sense of delegation of authority
to scientists. Aghion, Dewatripont, Hoxby, Mas-Colell, and Sapir (2009) yet take a step
forward and stress the meaning of openness, the free flow of ideas across academic in-
stitutions, as a central attribute of academia. The recent paper of Hellmann and Perotti
(2006) is a proposal for that intention. It also models research as a multi-stage process and
endogenizes the choice between academic and private research. Furthermore, it contrasts
the free flow of ideas in academia with the more controlled informational exchange that
occurs in private firms.
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The issue of scientific freedom brings about a further review of the characteristics of
the individual scientist as considered by Aghion and Tirole (1997), Dasgupta and David
(1994), Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart (1995), Hart and Moore (1990), Lacetera and
Zirulia (2012), Roach and Sauermann (2010), and Sauermann and Stephan (2010). In ac-
cordance with them, we reconsider that scientists appreciate scientific freedom and value
creative control. ”In particular, scientists are assumed to share a ”taste for science” and
the desire for freedom in their choice of research”(Sauermann and Stephan, 2013, p. 10).
Thereby, we follow the accepted thesis that the wage in the academic sector is less than
in the private sector, where the researchers have to be compensated for the loss of cre-
ative freedom (see e.g. Sauermann and Stephan (2013), and Aghion, Dewatripont, and
Stein (2008)). Hence, we focus rather on monetary arguments and patterns of finance than
on academic freedom in terms of intellectual property rights (IPR) and on non-material
motives, such as reputation as considered by Lacetera and Zirulia (2012).
The last dimension, namely the disclosing mechanisms, is left aside in our approach
as we are rather interested in the development of scientific projects than in publishing
and patenting. The first is mainly assigned to the academic sector because ”applied re-
search loses much of its commercial value if openly disclosed in the form of publica-
tions”(Sauermann and Stephan, 2010, p. 8). The second distinguishes the private sec-
tor as ”knowledge resulting from basic research does not meet the criteria for patentabi-
lity”(Sauermann and Stephan, 2010, p. 8). Lacetera (2009a) examines the choice to com-
mercialize research made by academic researchers and compares their behavior with in-
dustrial scholars. Crespi, D’Este, Fontana, and Geuna (2011) show that academic patent-
ing complements or substitutes publishing dependent on the degree of output. Contrary,
we analyze the interaction between academia and the private sector. Besides, we differ
from Lacetera (2009b) who argues that firms outsource research projects to academia to
commit a valuable research project before completion such that academia conducts com-
missioned research.
Another related papers deal with the subject of asymmetric information in R&D in a
different way. While we focus on private research funds as a mechanism to overcome
asymmetric information with regard to uncertain values of research projects, this function
is assumed by Technology Transfer Offices considered by Macho-Stadler, Pe´rez-Castrillo,
and Veugelers (2007). They conclude that the reputation of Technology Transfer Offices
reduces this asymmetric information. Takalo and Tanayama (2010) study a similar idea of
research funding in the presence of asymmetric information which can be eliminated by
subsidies serving as signals. Opposed, they observe the distinction of private and public
funding with financing restrictions. They argue that under certain conditions, public R&D
subsidies reduce the asymmetric information by dint of reducing financing constraints of
firms.
Overall, we abstract away from any job-designs, priority rules, broader institutional views
of the role of academia like Dasgupta and David (1994), and incentive schemes which are
already implemented in research institutions in reality. The latter issue is considered by
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Geuna and Martin (2003) and Auranen and Nieminen (2010) who examine the advantages
and disadvantages of performance-based funding in comparison with other approaches to
funding. Moreover, Aghion, Dewatripont, Hoxby, Mas-Colell, and Sapir (2009) discover
in a yet another approach that university governance in terms of autonomy and compe-
tition affects inventive research output in a positive way. Alternatively, Banal-Estan˜ol
and Macho-Stadler (2010) propose a framework to analyze the effects of scientific and
commercial incentives in R&D organizations. They show that commercialization incen-
tives influence the choice of research projects and deduce an optimal incentive scheme
respective to the researchers’ characteristics. Macho-Stadler and Pe´rez-Castrillo (2010)
as well as Lacetera (2003) describe the ways academic knowledge is transferred to indus-
try and how incentives can be offered. While Macho-Stadler and Pe´rez-Castrillo (2010)
regard licensing agreements and spin offs, Lacetera (2003) discusses spillovers between
the academic and the private sector. Finally, Choi (1993) develops a model of sequen-
tial innovations with a variety of research lines and compares two alternative systems of
enforcing patent law to provide proper incentives for R&D.
At last and continuative to our approach, there is some literature treating the consequences
of the different kinds of research. Murray, Aghion, Dewatripont, Kolev, and Stern (2009)
corroborate the risk of decreasing innovation by detecting that restrictions of academic
freedom reduce the variety in basic research. Particularly, openness and academic free-
dom may increase the overall flow of research output in basic as well as in applied re-
search. Another approach of Aghion, Dewatripont, Hoxby, Mas-Colell, and Sapir (2009)
investigates the correlation of autonomy and research output of universities and assesses
a positive relation. The authors add by way of explanation that even greater funding is
likely ineffective as measured by research output, if there exist no careful and balanced
commitment to openness as well as to freedom (see Murray, 2007).
3.2 Stylized Facts
In the past three decades, both R&D expenditures and research funding have increased
nearly all over the world, especially in the OECD area (Vincent-Lancrin, 2006, p. 2).
Private research and higher education research (in the sense of academic research) alike
have gained in importance.
Actually, higher education R&D has grown more rapidly in absolute and relative terms
than in any other sector, the expenditures have tripled and the number of researchers
has more than doubled between 1981 and 2008 (Vincent-Lancrin, 2010, p. 4). Despite
the public prominence in the financing structure, more and more funding is provided by
private sources. Indeed, the government performs 80% of basic research and still allocates
the bulk of the funds for academic research (72% in 2008), but its aggregate share is
decreasing (−6% between 1981 and 2006). Meanwhile, the share of the private sector
in academic research funding has doubled since 1981 but is still at a relatively low level.
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Vincent-Lancrin predicts that, should these trends continue, we will see academic research
half privately and half publicly funded within the OECD given the different capitalization
of the business and academic sectors3.
However, as opposed to higher education R&D, the lion’s share of research is still car-
ried out and financed by the private sector. Between 1981 and 2008, the share of R&D
performed by the business sector has yet increased from 65.4% to 70% of the total R&D
effort in the OECD area (Vincent-Lancrin, 2010, p. 2).
With this general information in mind, we present some stylized facts. The first 2 facts
motivate our modeling choices. The other can be related to our empirical hypotheses.
Having said that, please note that the available data is relatively scarce, hence the follow-
ing “facts” should be treated with some caution.
Fact 1 C. p., the expenditures on research in the private sector exceed the ones in the
academic sector.
This fact is mainly driven by the divergent financial compensation of the researchers,
but also by different endowments. However, we will concentrate on the first. As ar-
gued by Sauermann and Stephan (2013) and in line with Aghion, Dewatripont, and Stein
(2008), the prime reason for the gap between academic and private wages dues to different
characteristics of workplaces. ”Industry may be able to pay higher wages because of its
focus on applied research with higher expected returns” as it is only interested in ”know-
ledge that complements existing firm assets and increases profit”(Sauermann and Stephan
(2013)). Furthermore, it seeks ”to maximize financial returns from research, which typ-
ically requires that scientists limit disclosure and forego some of the non-financial re-
wards offered by academia” and therefore it may has ”to share some of the financial
returns from research with their employees, resulting in higher wages in industry than in
academia”Sauermann and Stephan (2013). Walker, Vignoles, and Collins (2010) study
this fact by comparing the salaries of higher education academics in the UK with those of
other comparable professionals. Their findings coincide with the estimation of UK and
U. S. academic wages by Stevens (2004), namely that academic employees earn less than
graduates working in the non-academic sector.
In order to give a first evidence, we present some examples taken from the ”Bureau of La-
bor Statistics4. For instance, academic political scientists earn just about two-thirds of the
wage of private employed researchers. In 2012, a political researcher earned an average
of $69.060 in academia, but $107.340 in the private sector. Employed mathematicians
earned $79.830 in academia versus $122.440 in the private sector in 2012. Biological
scientists are serving as another example. In 2012 they got $65.130 in the academic and
3For details, see OECD (2008).
4www.bls.gov/data
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$90.600 in the private research sector on average. In contrast, there are some research ar-
eas that possess a small wage discrepancy. Consistently, a life scientist working in an U. S.
university earned in 2012 on average $69.540, whereas wages in the amount of $80.980
are paid averaged in U. S. private sector research.
Fact 2 C. p., private research is more likely to be marketable.
This is also associated with the nature of research conducted by the private sector. As pre-
viously discussed in Section 3.1, we assume that ”academic researchers are more heavily
engaged in basic research than their colleagues in industry, who tend to work on applied
questions”(Sauermann and Stephan, 2010, p. 8). This leads to large direct commercial
values rather than to fundamental insights. Hence, because of the profit-orientated char-
acter of private research, basic research projects as less restricted to commercial success
exist entirely in academia. Besides, because of the provided scientific freedom inside
academia, researchers are able to test different ideas, resulting in broader but simultane-
ously more jeopardous research as they are not forced to consider a close issue.
We are able to evidence this feature by the amount of patents announced in the member
states of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT). In 2008, the business sector accounted
for approximately 84% of total PCT filings. However, the share of the business sec-
tor is diverse, ranging from 94.2% in Sweden to 40.9% in South Africa. Front-runner
among these firms was the Chinese company Huawei Technology, employing approxi-
mately 42 000 R&D personnel, with the highest number of PCT filings (1 737), while
Panasonic Corporation and Philips were ranked second and third.
Besides, the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 enabled academic researchers to pursue ownership
of an invention. As a consequence, academic research has undergone a change, and more
and more ideas have been patented. The university sector in the PCT member states
accounted for a significant share of total PCT filings of about 6%. U. S. universities
dominated the list of top PCT applicants. The University of California, occupying 10 700
research employees, filed 345 PCT applications, hence twice as much as the following
MIT. In this respect, the most effective university patented 25% less per R&D employee
than Huawei Technology. In comparison with the total amount of patent filings announced
by the business sector, the quantity of academic patents seems to be just a drop in a bucket
5.
The typical disclosure mechanism inside academia is still international publishing and
thus does not lead to a marketable, although social value. If scientific articles are pulled
up as a measure for the valuation of an innovation, it is accordingly possible to distinguish
between and classify different fields of research. In total, the number of scientific articles
5See World Intellectual Property Organization (2009).
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being published increased by a high degree of 40% between 1988 and 2008 to an amount
of about 700 000 within the OECD area.6 31% thereof are ascribable to clinical medical,
15% to biomedical, 12% to physical, and 10% to chemical articles. Together with other
“hard” sciences and engineering they represent the bulk of academic research articles.
The remaining fields of research, such as psychology, social and health sciences, and
professional fields accounting for about 10% of the OECD article output.
Fact 3 C. p., a higher marketable value of a research project is accompanied by either
an increasing amount of private research funds or by a raised fraction of private research
funding of the academic budget.
Traditionally, the output generated by academic and private researchers differs widely, es-
pecially if basic research is conducted inside academia. On the one hand there is the aca-
demic mission enhancing the stock of public knowledge whereas firms are only interested
in specific knowledge leading to higher profits. However, as universities substantially
care about private research funding as new funding source, we observe a shift from basic
to applied research in universities. On the other hand, the private sector engages in basic
research in order to increase the ”ability to absorb external knowledge, [to] provide a map
for downstream R&D , or [to] result in unexpected commercial applications”(Sauermann
and Stephan, 2013, p. 7). In this regard, industry-university collaborations are increas-
ingly important as firms outsource research projects to academia ”especially for the per-
formance of more general-purpose research”(Lacetera, 2009b, p. 565) and if there is
a ”discrepancy between scientific and economic value of the projects”(Banal-Estan˜ol,
Macho-Stadler, and Pe´rez-Castrillo, 2011, p. 6). This ”allows a firm to commit not to
terminate or alter a scientifically valuable project before completion”(Lacetera, 2009b,
p. 565).
The other way round, academia typically does not conduct commissioned research but
potentially research the industry is interested in. In order to signalize this interest and
furthermore to secure usage or patent rights, the industry participates in terms of research
funds. Hence, if a project predicts to increase the profit exceedingly, it is worth to invest
in the academic project to a great extent. Consequently we should observe high fractions
of private research funds in fields examining primarily applied research as its output is
most valuable for firms.
Taking into account the statistics from the U. S. academic research sector, this reasoning
can be confirmed. One can notice that research funds for life sciences and engineering
exceed the funds for social science, psychology, mathematical and physical sciences.
Particularly, the departments of engineering, mainly chemical, aeronautical-astronautical
and mechanical engineering had an amount at their disposal of $820 million. In other
6Similarly, the number of newly published academic books has increased.
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words 8.2% of the R&D expenditures have been privately funded in 2011. In contrast,
psychology in public U. S. universities had to get along with just a fraction of $16.2 mil-
lion, which is up to a share of only 1.4% of the total expenditures7. A reasonable statement
for that phenomenon will also be executed by our model.
The first 2 stylized facts enter into our set of assumptions, the latter corresponds to results
of our model. We will refer to these facts within the model, and later in the conclusion.
4 Framework
Like Aghion, Dewatripont, and Stein (2008), we consider a step-by-step development of
a valuable product (the CML drug, for instance) in which discoveries generated in one
stage serve as essential inputs into the next. The starting point is a basic idea for a project
at date 0. This project then passes through a number of stages, being refined at each stage.
If one stage is successful, the project continues, otherwise it fails. In contrast to Aghion,
Dewatripont, and Stein, we consider a continuous number of T stages. Hence at each
date t ∈ [0; T ), if research is carried out successfully for dt periods, the next stage at date
t + dt is reached. At the final stage T , the project can be sold. With probability q, it is
worth V , otherwise it is worthless (for example, because the drug is never admitted to the
market).
Each of the required steps to complete a research project can be carried out in two dif-
ferent ways, in academia or in the private sector. As the main difference, researchers
enjoy academic freedom in academia, but are forced to predefined and promising research
strategies in the private sector. To fix ideas, assume that in each logical second, there is a
variety of research strategies (theoretical vs. empirical, exploratory vs. constructive, . . . ).
We suppose that a project can fail anyway with probability λp. On top of that, there is
a probability of failure in academia because of the possibility that the wrong strategy is
chosen, so λa > λp. This assumption is in line with stylized fact 2.
Besides, we suppose that researchers value creative control, i. e., their academic freedom.
Therefore, researchers in the private sector must be compensated for the fact that they
cannot choose their preferred strategy. If the competitive wage in academia is wa, the
wage in the private sector must be wp > wa. This assumption is based on stylized fact 1.
Examining the model in continuous time, a researcher earns dtwa for working in academia
for dt periods, and dtwp for working in the private sector. In academia, the project fails
with probability λa dt; in the private sector, it fails with probability λp dt. Accordingly,
after time t has elapsed, a project in the academic sector has failed with probability
7For further details, see National Science Foundation (2011).
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Fa(t) = 1 − e−λa t. The according density function is fa(t) = λa e−λa t, and the in-
stantaneous failure rate is fa(t)/(1 − Fa(t)) = λa. A project in the private sector has
failed with probability Fp(t) = 1− e−λp t, and the density function is fp(t) = λp e−λp t.
Figure 3 shows the probability that the project is still alive at some date t. The final
date is T = 10. Before tswitch (which will later be endogenized), research is carried
out in academia, hence the probability declines fast (upper picture), but wages are low
(lower picture). After tswitch, the project is continued in the private sector. The probability
declines slower (upper picture), but wages are higher (lower picture). The orange point
at date T marks the final probability of success. It lies below the curve of the survival
probability, because at the final date, the product may turn out to be worthless.
Figure 3: Survival Probabilities and Wages
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4.1 The Basic Tradeoff between Academia and Private Research
Consider now a social planner (the research designer) who wants to maximize the ex-
pected payoff of a research project. In order to do this, he needs to plan at which time to
conduct research in academia, at which time to switch to the private sector, and possibly
switch back to academia. Each research stage can possibly be carried out in academia or
in the private sector. However, we can show that optimally, one switches at most once,
and always from academia to the private sector.
Remark 1 If research is optimally carried out privately at some date, it remains there
until it is finished.
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The proof is in the Appendix. As a consequence, there is a single switching date tswitch
at which the project is handed over to private research. This result is the continuous-time
equivalent of Aghion, Dewatripont, and Stein (2008, Lemma 1). Now given a switching
date tswitch, the probability that the product reaches marketability is (1 − Fa(tswitch))(1 −
Fp(T − tswitch)). Before date tswitch, it fails with instantaneous probability λa. Once it
reaches tswitch, the project is handed over to the private sector and fails with a lower prob-
ability λp. Hence, the expected value itself is (1 − Fa(tswitch))(1 − Fp(T − tswitch)) q V ,
because the product is marketable in the end only with probability q, in which case it
yields a value of V . The expected aggregate wages for research conditioned on the non-
failure of the project are (1− Fa(tswitch))wa dt in the academic and (1− Fa(tswitch)) (1−
Fp(T − tswitch))wp dt in the private sector. Therefore, the expected payoff consists of
q V −wp (T − tswitch)−wa tswitch, weighted with the probability that the project reaches T .
However, even if the project fails in between the initial and the final stage, some wages
must be paid. The aggregate depends on the moment of failure t. Now combining all
terms, the expected payoff from the project is
Π = q (1− Fa(tswitch)) (1− Fp(T − tswitch))V
−
∫ tswitch
0
(1− Fa(t))wa dt−
∫ T
tswitch
(1− Fa(tswitch)) (1− Fp(t− tswitch))wp dt
= q e−tswitch λ−(T−tswitch)λp V − wa
λa
(1− e−tswitch λa)− wp
λp
e−tswitch λa (1− e−(T−tswitch)λp).
(1)
Using the first order condition, ∂Π/∂tswitch = 0, the payoff-maximizing switching date is
t∗switch = T −
1
λp
log
[ λa − λp
wp λa − wa λp (wp + λp q V )
]
. (2)
Due our assumptions wp > wa and λa > λp, some properties follow immediately (with
proof in the Appendix).
Remark 2 The duration of the time in private research T − tswitch does not depend on the
total development length T . Second, the higher the expected value of the final product
q V , the earlier one should switch to the private sector. Third, tswitch depends negatively
on the wage wa and the probability of failure λa inside academia, and positively on the
private wage wp and the probability of failure λp inside the private sector.
The intuition for the first result goes as follows. When a project is very far from com-
pletion, the cost of losing the project is comparably low. Consequently, it is cheaper to
pay the low academic wages. Later, when a project is closer to completion, it should no
longer be put at risk. Hence, one should then switch to the private sector. So to speak, the
project must beef up before it is taken over by the private sector. Now if, c. p., the aggre-
gate duration of development is longer, the time until the project has beefed up enough
23
is accordingly longer. The time spend in the private sector is not affected, though. This
comparative static of the second result will be important in the following sections. Of
course, if the project is more valuable, it should not be put at risk. The third result is
quite intuitive: The higher the academic wage wa and the probability of failure λa, the
earlier the project should be transferred to private sector research. The higher the private
wage, the later one should switch because private sector research becomes relatively more
expensive. The relation between the probability of failure inside the private sector λp and
the switching date is ambiguous at first sight as it crucially depends on the parameter
constellation. But on closer examination we find that more jeopardous research inside the
private sector leads to a later transfer provided that the project is transferred anyway. 8.
We can now calculate the aggregate expected return for optimal t∗switch.
Π =
(
wp + λp q V
)λa
λp
e−λa T
λa
( λa − λp
wp λa − wa λp
)λa−λp
λp − wa
λa
. (3)
Obviously, the expected payoff increases more than proportionally in the expected final
value (q V ). This is due to an adjustment of the switching date tswitch and accordingly a
lower aggregated probability of failure if q V is high.
However, there is no need that a project passes both, academic and private sector. Possibly,
it is optimal to start the project in the private sector right away. Formally,
0 ≥ tswitch = T − 1
λp
log
[ λp − λa
wa λp − wp λa (wp + λp q V )
]
⇐⇒
q V ≥ 1
λp
eλp T (wpλa − waλp) + wp(λp − λa)
λa − λp . (4)
Because a switch to academia cannot occur (Remark 1), this inequality implies that the
complete research is carried out privately. This happens if V , q or both are large and the
final project has a great market value. To the other extreme, it may be optimal to start and
finish a project in academia. Formally,
T ≤ tswitch = T − 1
λp
log
[ λp − λa
wa λp − wp λa (wp + λp q V )
]
⇐⇒
1 ≤ λp − λa
wa λp − wp λa (wp + λp q V ),
q V ≤ wp − wa
λa − λp . (5)
This case occurs if the expected final market value q V is low. There may be two reasons.
First, the probability of a positive information on the marketability (q) is low and the
8The proofs of Remark 2 and the argumentation for the last result are shown in the Appendix.
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project might be classed as rather abstract. Consequently, it is unlikely that the private
sector can benefit from the project in order to sell the outcome. Second, the applicable
value itself is rather small (V ). In this case we could think of a minor improvement of an
already existing invention such that the advantages deceed the additional cost in relation
to the failure markup.
We need to consider one more constraint. If V is very low, the optimal strategy will be to
not pursue any research at all. The expected wage bill would exceed the expected reward
from finishing the project. Both expected aggregate costs and expected final value depend
on the research design. Hence, the optimal t∗switch must be plugged into the expected
profit (1) and it must be checked whether the result is positive. The different conditions
depending on whether the project is carried out only in academia, only in the private
sector, or switches in between, are given at the beginning of the Appendix.
5 Information Acquisition
Until now, we have assumed that in the very end, the product is marketable with probabil-
ity q < 1. With probability 1− q, all effort and costs are sunk. Consequently, it would be
valuable to get an early information on the later value of the product. We now assume that
a firm can spend c in order to find out whether the value of the product will be high (V ,
with probability q) or low (value of 0). If it is high, the switching date tswitch may react. If
it is low, the project will be canceled completely and no more wages will be paid.9
Following Jonbloed (2008), who mentions that ”the growing complexity of our society
strengthens the case for relying on markets to make decisions”, we argue that this in-
formation will typically come from the corporate sector, which may know better how
to possibly market the product, in comparison to a university professor in academia. We
will first assume that gathering the information is observable and verifiable to the research
designer. That way, we find the optimal research strategy, given the possibility of infor-
mation acquisition. In a second subsection, we will weaken this assumption and assume
that an outsider must be incentivized to gather and report the information truthfully. At
that point, research funding becomes relevant: in order to create incentives, the outsider
must be invested in the research project (“skin in the game”).
Observable Information Acquisition Let tc denote the date at which the research de-
signer collects the information at cost c. Possibly, this date can be before tswitch (when
9This may sound very unrealistic, because typically in academia researchers cannot be sacked, and
research strategies cannot be dictated. However, if a researcher finds out that his project will never be
successful, he will discard the old research line for a new one. All following wage costs must thus be
attributed to another project.
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the project is still in academia), at tswitch (when the project is just transferred to the pri-
vate sector), or after tswitch (when the project is already in the private sector). When the
information is negative, the project is stopped immediately, otherwise it is continued.
The following Figure 4 shows the survival probabilities for tc < tswitch (above) and for
tc > tswitch (below). In both pictures, the survival probability drops by the factor q at the
date tc, but there is no further drop at the final date T .
Figure 4: Survival Probabilities
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We now proceed in the following steps. While we for now only deeply discuss the cases
in which there is a transfer to the private sector, we firstly concentrate on the first picture
(case tc ≤ tswitch) and show that it is never optimal to have an interior information date tc.
Either the information is collected right at the start (tc = 0) or at the switching date (tc =
tswitch), but never in between. Second, we focus on the second picture (case tc ≥ tswitch)
and show that an interior information date is never optimal. If the information has not yet
been collected at the switching date, it will never be collected. In other words, there are
just three different possible sequences of research strategies10.
Case tc ≤ tswitch. For the case tc ≤ tswitch, we construct the expected payoff. Having
waited until tc, the cost c are spent to gather the information if the research project is still
alive (probability 1−Fa(tc)). The result is either a negative information (with probability
1 − q), in which case the research line is closed. Or, the information is positive (with
probability q), in which case the project is carried on in academia until date tswitch (which
may now differ from the original switching date). However, in case of non-failure, wages
must be paid inside academia until the information date and with probability q from this
10At the end of Section 5, all regimes are summarized.
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Figure 5: Possible Regimes
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date on to the transfer to the private sector. Remember, the project might even fail despite
the positive information. Therefore, the research line is still alive at date tswitch with prob-
ability q (1− Fa(tswitch)) (1− Fp(t− tswitch)). From this time on, everything is as before.
Consequently, the aggregate expected payoff is
Π = q (1− Fa(tswitch)) (1− Fp(T − tswitch))V − (1− Fa(tc)) c
−
∫ tc
0
(1− Fa(t))wa dt− q
∫ tswitch
tc
(1− Fa(t))wa dt
− q
∫ T
tswitch
(1− Fa(tswitch)) (1− Fp(t− tswitch))wp dt (6)
The derivative with respect to tc is
∂Π
∂tc
= fa(tc) c− (1− Fa(tc))wa + q (1− Fa(tc))wa
= (λa c− (1− q)wa) e−λa tc . (7)
This term is positive if and only if λa c > (1− q)wa, or equivalently
c > (1− q)wa/λa. (8)
In other words, if the weighted cost of information exceeds the cost saving in case of
negative information, the information should be gathered later in order to increase the
expected payoff. Otherwise, the information date should be accelerated. Interestingly, tc
does not enter into the condition at all. Hence, we have shown that there is no interior
solution: either tc = 0, the information is collected immediately (if condition (8) does
not hold), or tc = tswitch, the information is collected when the project is switched to the
industry (if condition (8) does hold). This result even holds if the project is not transferred
to industry, hence if condition (5) is fulfilled.
Besides, it is substantiated by our initial example. Only after identifying if there is a need
for a new CML drug, the research is initiated at the MIT. Conducting research without
any information would potentially lead to an expensive invention of a new drug although
a former one works quite well such that the market does not accept the new one.
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Case tc ≥ tswitch. If tc > tswitch, the expected payoff changes only slightly. With prob-
ability (1− Fa(tswitch)) (1− Fp(tc − tswitch)) the project survives in academia, the infor-
mation date tc inside the private sector is reached and the cost c is spent. Either a positive
or a negative information is gathered. Therefore, the academic wage (with probability
(1 − Fa(tswitch))) until the project is transferred and the private wage (with probability
(1 − Fa(tswitch)) (1 − Fp(tc − tswitch)) until the information date have to be paid if the
project does not fail in between. Once a positive signal is received with probability q, the
project will be pursued inside the private sector and the wage payment continues until the
final stage T in case of non-failure. Thus, the aggregate expected payoff is composed of
Π = q (1− Fa(tswitch)) (1− Fp(T − tswitch))V − (1− Fa(tswitch))(1− Fp(tc − tswitch)) c
−
∫ tswitch
0
(1− Fa(t))wa dt−
∫ tc
tswitch
(1− Fa(tswitch)) (1− Fp(t− tswitch)wp dt
− q
∫ T
tc
(1− Fa(tswitch)) (1− Fp(t− tswitch))wp dt (9)
The derivative with respect to tc is
∂Π
∂tc
= (1− Fa(tswitch)) fp(tc − tswitch) c− (1− Fa(tswitch))(1− Fp(tc − tswitch))wp
+ q (1− Fa(tswitch))(1− Fp(tc − tswitch))wp
= (λp c− (1− q)wp) etswitch(λp−λa)− tcλp . (10)
This term is positive if and only if λp c > (1− q)wp. Again, there is no interior solution.
As a mathematical consequence, only the limiting cases tc = tswitch and tc = T are
possible. But on the other hand, tc = T means that the information is gathered only at
the very last innovation step. This implies that there are no benefits from gathering the
information: it costs c, but the result would become obvious in the next logical second
anyhow. Therefore, tc = T is dominated by not gathering the information at all. Hence,
we are left with three cases, tc = 0, tc = tswitch and tc =∞ (no information at all).
Switching Dates and Expected Profits. We handle the cases in chronological order. If
the information is gathered right away, the expected profit is similar to (7),
Π = q (1− Fa(tswitch)) (1− Fp(T − tswitch))V − c
− q
∫ tswitch
0
(1− Fa(t))wa dt
− q
∫ T
tswitch
(1− Fa(tswitch)) (1− Fp(t− tswitch))wp dt (11)
The expected profit still depends on the switching date tswitch, which is endogenous. The
first order condition with respect to tswitch yields
t∗switch = T −
1
λp
log
[ λa − λp
wp λa − wa λp (wp + λp V )
]
. (12)
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This term is identical to (2), with the only difference that the complete potential value V
enters, instead of the expected value q V . Consequently, the switching date with informa-
tion is earlier than the switching in the absence of information on the project’s viability.
Substituting t∗switch into Π yields the expected profit,
Π∗ = e−λa T q
wp + λp V
λa
( wp λa − wa λp
(λa − λp)(wp + λp V )
)1−λa/λp − q wa
λa
− c. (13)
Now turn to the intermediate case, tc = tswitch. The according expected payoff is
Π = q (1− Fa(tswitch)) (1− Fp(T − tswitch))V − (1− Fa(tswitch)) c
−
∫ tswitch
0
(1− Fa(t))wa dt
− q
∫ T
tswitch
(1− Fa(tswitch)) (1− Fp(t− tswitch))wp dt (14)
The first order condition yields the optimal information, respectively switching date
t∗switch = T −
1
λp
log
[ λa − λp
wp λa − (wa − c λa)λp/q (wp + λp V )
]
. (15)
The endogenous expected profit is then
Π∗ = e−λa T q
wp + λp V
λa
(q wp λa − wa λp + c λa λp
q (λa − λp)(wp + λp V )
)1−λa/λp − wa
λa
. (16)
The final case, tc = ∞, has no information gathering at all. Consequently, the expected
profit is exactly identical to (3).
Comparison of Profits. Figure 6 shows expected profits, depending on the switching
costs c. The green curve stands for expected profits under immediate information acquisi-
tion. It is a straight line with slope−1, this follows immediately from (13). If information
costs c are small, it is obviously optimal to get the information as early as possible. The
amber curve stands for information acquisition at the switching date. It is not a straight
line; this is due to the fact that the switching date is endogenous and not constant; it de-
pends on c. Finally, the red curve stands for expected profits if no information is acquired.
In that case, the marketability of the product becomes apparent only when the final stage
is reached. This curve is a constant. Importantly, each of these regimes can be optimal.
Optimality of Regimes. We first calculate the transition from early information (tc = 0)
to intermediate information (tc = tswitch). This can be done by comparing the expected
profits (13) and (16). Some algebra yields that it is better to switch early if and only if
c ≤ (1 − q)wa/λa, which is identical to (8). This is hardly surprising, because already
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Figure 6: Comparison of Expected Profits
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Parameters are wa = 0.4, wp = 0.8, λa = 0.2, λp = 0.1, V = 20, T = 10, and q = 2/3. We will
use these parameters also in later figures and examples. The green line stands for immediate information
acquisition (tc = 0), amber stands for information acquisition when the project switches into the private
sector (tc = tswitch) and red stands for no information acquisition at all (tc =∞).
(8) was the condition for when it is better so get the information earlier rather than later.
In the numerical example, the transition is at c = (1− 2/3) 0.4/0.2 = 2/3.
Now turn to the transition from intermediate information (tc = tswitch) to no information
at all. We need to compare (16) with (3). The inequality cannot be solved for c explicitly
(nor for any other parameter). We get an implicit inequality: no information acquisition
is better if
q(wp + λp V )
( q(λa − λp)(wp + λp V )
q wp λa − wa λp + c λa λp
)λa−λp
λp
≤ (wp + q λp V )
λa
λp
( λa − λp
wp λa − wa λa
)λa−λp
λp
. (17)
In the numerical example, the transition is at c = 121/96 ≈ 1.26. One more property is
notable: The total project duration T completely drops out of the comparison.
The Switching Date tswitch. The date when the project is switched from academia to
the private sector is endogenous, and it especially depends on the degree of information
that the research planner has about the viability of the project. Let us therefore analyze
this date in some more depth. In the different regimes, we have already calculated the
switching dates in (2), (12), and (15). The following figure 7 shows these switching dates,
depending on c.
The switching date in the absence of information is equal to the red line, where the re-
search planner chooses not to buy the information. Hence, the figure suggests a number
of properties. We summarize them in the following remark (with proof in the appendix).
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Figure 7: Switching Dates and Informations Dates
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Parameters are as in Figure 6. The green line shows the switching date under immediate information
acquisition (tc = 0, which is optimal only for small c), amber stands for information acquisition at the
switching date (tc = tswitch, optimal for intermediate level of c) and red stands for no information acquisition
at all (optimal for large c). The thick black curve follows the optimal switching date tswitch in the according
regime. The dashed blue curve follows the information date tc. Clearly, for small c, we have tc = 0, for
intermediate c, we have tc = tswitch, and for larger c, we have no information until the project ends. The
cost c is then never spent.
Remark 3 The switching date tswitch with information acquisition is always earlier than
that without information. If tswitch = tc, the project switches later than under immediate
information acquisition (tc = 0).
One might have thought that by bringing information from the private sector into academia,
academia always loses one of its disadvantages, and hence the project switches at a later
date. But no! Information tells the research designer that the project should either be
stopped completely, or that it is valuable, in which case the project switches earlier.
Besides, some comparative statics are immediately apparent. As mentioned in the pre-
vious section, a higher potential value V and a higher academic wage wa lead to earlier
switching to the private sector. Not very surprising, higher information cost c as well as
a larger aggregate research time T entail later switching. Like in the case without a qual-
ified information, the duration of the time in private research T − tswitch does not depend
on the total development length T .
Overall, we have detected 5 different scenarios if we expect a research project to start
inside academia: In general, a project can be started and completed inside academia.
Otherwise, it can be conducted in academia and the private sector. In both cases, the
information can be gathered right away just in the second the idea is seized, and can thus
be developed with qualified information in all stages. Alternatively, the whole idea is
processed without any information and either only academia or both sectors suffer from
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uncertainty about the marketable value The interim solution is that the information date
is identical with the transfer to the private sector. Hence, inside academia the project is
carried out without information, whereas the private sector benefits from informed agents.
Finally, the project might fail in between or is stopped if q V is too small, c is too high
or a negative information is gathered (with probability (1 − q)). The following Figure 8
summarizes the different regimes.
Figure 8: Summary of Regimes
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6 Implementation – Private Research Funding
We now want to convert these possible sequences into a model with research funding. For
this reason, we weaken the assumption of an observable and verifiable information and
suppose more realistically that the outsider must be incentivized to gather and report the
information. As a consequence, the research designer (principal) will have to design a
mechanism to get the information. He needs to design a contract such that the outsider
has sufficient incentives to participate, to gather the information at cost c, and to report
the information truthfully.
In Remark 3 we have shown that the information is optimally generated either right away
(tc = 0) or at the switching date (tc = tswitch). In the second case, one needs not think
about incentivizing the firm to acquire the information: the research designer can sell the
project to the firm. In that case, the firm who owns the project will optimally choose to
get the information and spends c. Hence, the only remaining case is that of tc = 0 and the
according t∗switch derived from equation (12).
In principle, the way the contract is written might influence the optimal dates tc respec-
tively tswitch. Since there is no delegation cost connected with a research funding contract,
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tc and tswitch are unaffected. Consequently, one financing contract looks as follows. At
date tc = 0, the firm must invest an endogenous amount I into the project (research fund-
ing). In return, the research designer promises the firm an endogenous fraction γ of the
final return V . For example, if the final product leads to a patent, the research designer
could grant the firm the permission to use the patent for free. By this, financial returns can
be captured singularly without additional costs and other firms are excluded from benefit-
ing directly from the project’s inherent knowledge (see Sauermann and Stephan (2013)).
One could also think of other concessions like cash-flow rights or property rights.
There are two inequalities that must hold, both will bind in equilibrium. First, the firm
must be willing to gather the information. If time tc is reached and the firm spends c,
it will invest I with probability q (only if the information is positive). The project will
then be successful with probability (1 − Fa(tswitch)) (1 − Fp(T − tswitch)), in which case
the firm will collect γ V . If, our of equilibrium, the firm does not gather the information
and always spends I , it gets γ V with probability q (1− Fa(tswitch)) (1− Fp(T − tswitch)).
Hence, incentive compatibility requires
q [(1− Fa(tswitch)) (1− Fp(T − tswitch)) γ V − I]− c ≥
q [(1− Fa(tswitch)) (1− Fp(T − tswitch)) γ V ]− I, (18)
which is equivalent to I ≥ c
1−q . Second, the firm must be willing to participate in the first
place. In other words, the firm must be discouraged from always withholding research
funds and thus sending the negative signal. The participation constraint requires
q [(1− Fa(tswitch)) (1− Fp(T − tswitch)) γ V − I]− c ≥ 0. (19)
In equilibrium, assuming that the research designer holds all market power, he will choose
γ and I such that both inequalities will bind. Solving (18) and (19) yields the optimal
amounts
I =
c
1− q and
γ =
c
q (1− q) (1− Fa(tswitch)) (1− Fp(T − tswitch))V
= etswitch(λa−λp)+T λp
c
q(1− q)V . (20)
These equations only apply if there is research funding, hence if any information is gath-
ered. Otherwise, the project is turned private or stays in academia without any informa-
tion.
Now comes the key part of the paper. If the information comes from private firms, and it
is acquired in an incentive compatible way by making the firm fund the research, then the
different regimes from the previous section can be re-interpreted. The following Figure 9
contains only few changes from Figure 7.
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Figure 9: Switching Dates and Informations Dates
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Parameters are as in Figure 6. The figure is very comparable to figure 7.
For low levels of c, the research planner wants to get the information right away (tc = 0),
but he does not yet want to switch to the private sector entirely. In the numerical example,
for c < 2/3, the project remains in academia until t = tswitch ≈ 1.53. Hence, the academia
in this case is not pure academia, but is funded with private money, at least partially.
For higher levels of c, the research planner does not want the information while the project
is in academia. Consequently, researchers in this case are not forced to obtain private
money.
Comparative Statics. At this point some comparative statics are evident. If V goes up,
the required γ decreases. Accordingly, the fraction of V does not need to be as high as
before to compensate the firm for the investment of I . Increasing cost c result in a higher
I as well as in a higher γ. This is based on the fact that the information cost reduce the
expected payoff of the firm. To be profitable, the firm is forced to invest a higher I in
the project and hence demands a higher fraction of the potential value γ. We have also
shown that I is an increasing function in q. Surprisingly, the value V itself has no direct
influence on the absolute amount of I . Hence, we are able to state the following remark
(with proof in the appendix).
Remark 4 An increasing amount of research funding comes along with an increasing
probability of marketability q.
Besides, there is an interesting phenomenon. For q → 0 respectively q → 1 the fraction
γ becomes infinitely large. The same applies to I if q → 1. As they stand alone, these
extreme results must be redescribed. In reality, γ cannot ever exceed 100% as well as the
research funds will not account for an infinite amount. However, we are able to justify
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these relations. For example, if q → 1, the project is very likely to be highly marketable.
Hence, the incentives for the firm stating a high-quality project are high. To deter the
firm from this behavior, a large I as well as a large γ is needed. For q → 0, the firm
will only invest the minimum, namely c. In return, the required reward must be infinitely
high. Since this is impossible because no marketable output is generated, there will be no
research funding at all.
Anyhow, as private research funding depends crucially on the research design, we have to
consider it in a broader setting. That is why we get to the question of major importance
that is left aside until now: What is the relation of the amount of research funding, I , to
the aggregate bill in academia? Inside academia, we have only the expected expenditures
within one project, so we can compare research funding to them. The total budget in
academia is
B = q
∫ tswitch
0
(1− Fa(t))wa dt = q (wa − e
−tswitch λawa)
λa
. (21)
at least if there is research funding (otherwise, the q drops out). As a consequence, we
can set also tswitch to the optimal value in the regime with research funding, as given by
(12).
B = q
wa
λa
[
1− e−λa T
((λa − λp)(wp + λp V )
wp λa − wa λp
)λa/λp]
. (22)
Furthermore, expected revenues from research funding are q I = q I/(1 − q), if there is
research funding at all, i. e., for c ≤ (1 − q)wa/λa. Figure 10 shows the budget and the
volume of private funding for our numerical example.
Figure 10: Budget B and Private Funding I
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Parameters are as in Figure 6. The purple area shows the volume of private funds in academia. The blue
area shows the total (expected) academic budget.
Some facts are visible right away. First, at the point c = (1−q)wa/λa = 0.67, it becomes
optimal not to have any private funding in academia, hence the funding drops to zero. At
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the same point, the expected academic budget B jumps up. This is due to the fact that
there is no information, hence the researcher must be paid no matter whether the product
will be marketable or not. At c ≈ 1.26, it is optimal to do without the information even in
the private sector. Here, the academic budget jumps up again: it is now optimal to keep
the project in academia for longer.
Second, the private funding can even exceed the total academic budget. This simply im-
plies that it is optimal to collect more money from the industry than necessary to run
the project. This case occurs if it is very expensive for a firm to gather the information.
Hence, it must be incentivized more deeply to spend this cost and the required return of
the final value must be extremely high. In turn, the research funds serving as a credible
signal surpass the effective budget. Conceivably in this regard is a completely new pro-
duct. Then, simply monitoring the market is insufficient and expensive market analyses
have to be done. The surplus arose from the research funds can then be spent on contin-
uative or other projects in academia, or it can be interpreted as overhead costs (academic
administration, . . . ). Proposition 1 gives a short overview.
Proposition 1 Depending on the cost of information, there are 3 different scenarios. If
the cost is relatively low, the amount of private research funds is low even in terms of
the academic budget. An increase of the cost results in higher research funds which may
indeed exceed the academic budget. For high c, there is no funding at all.
Finally, we are also able to refer conclusively to Fact 3 where we stated that a higher
marketable value of a research project is accompanied by either an increasing amount of
private research funds or by a raised fraction of private research funding of the academic
budget. In Remark 4, we have already shown that a higher probability of marketability
leads to a higher amount of private support. Additionally, as proved in the Appendix, the
fraction of private research funds is positively associated with the potential value V . The
following remark shows that this result holds in general.
Remark 5 With an increasing potential value V of the final product, private research
funding increases as a fraction of the academic budget.
This remark is quite intuitive. If the potential value V increases, it should be switched to
the private sector earlier in order not to risk success. Academia spends less time on the
project, and the academic budget shrinks. Hence, as the amount of private research funds
is independent of V , the fraction of research funds increases as V rises. By combining
Remarks 2, 4, and 5, we get to the following Proposition 1 which is perfectly in line with
Fact 3.
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Proposition 2 An increasing expected value of the final product (q V ) comes along with
either an increased fraction of research funding of the academic budget and/or an in-
creased absolute amount of private research funds.
For completeness, we need to check whether expected profits from the research project
are positive at all. This is tedious work with many different possible cases. Therefore,
instead of giving the conditions explicitly, we deliver a plot for our numerical example.
We vary V to look at different parameter constellations. Figure 11 shows the result. Two
properties are evident. First, of course, if V is low, it does not pay to start the project
at all. There is no single value for this minimum V ; rather, it depends on the next-best
research strategy. In academia with research funding (green area), the cut-off value is
comparably low. Second, we see that the border between academia with research funding
(green area) and pure academia (amber area) does not depend on V . We already know
this, as the border is at the point c = (1− q)wa/λa (here, c = 0.67). Finally, we see that,
as V grows, it is optimal to get the information at least in the private sector (orange area,
in comparison to red).
Figure 11: Regimes for Different Parameters
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Parameters are as in Figure 6. The figure shows the different possible regimes. Green stands for “privately
funded academia, later private research,” as before. Amber stands for “pure academia, later informed private
research”, and red stands for “pure academia, later uninformed research.” Gray stands for the case where
V is so low that it does not pay to even start the research project. The dashed line stands for V = 20,
the parameter choice from Figure 6. Hence, at this line, we again find the switching points c = 0.67 and
c = 1.26.
6.1 Modification
One result is striking, and seems very strong. Either a project is started with research
funding right away (tc = 0 for low levels of c), or it remains in pure academia until it is
switched to the private sector. Until now, something that is not possible in the model is
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a project that starts in pure academia, then obtains research funding, and finally switches
into the private sector completely. These first results are inherently consistent and seem
plausible if we think of the invention of a CML drug. Uninformed and consequently
privately funded research would not make any sense in this case. However, as not all
research projects directly dependent on the market needs, they usually need some time to
be concretized before the private sector is interested in them. In order to generalize the
model, we soften our assumption that all parameters are constant over time arguing that
there are indeed many reasons why parameters change dynamically. Let us give a number
of examples.
The researcher in the academic sector may get more experienced over time. In that case,
the probability to fail λa(t) may decrease over time: λ′a(t) < 0. The same may be true
for the private researcher. However, the private researcher may gain experience only once
he starts on the project. In that case, λp would be a function not of t, but of t− tswitch. In
addition, there may be a general increase in knowledge, independent from the researcher’s
personal experience, leading to a decrease of λa and λp.
However, the probabilities to fail may also increase over time. One potential reason might
be that the different steps of innovation are not homogenous, but require very different
research inputs. For example, to develop a new engine, one starts with computer sim-
ulations, then mechatronic technicians construct a basic configuration. After testing it
rudimentally, it is developed concretely, and installed and adapted for different motor ve-
hicles. Finally, a production manager tries to find a production method on a larger scale.
There is no reason to assume that the probability of failure is the same for all steps.
Wages may also evolve over time. Again, there may be a macroeconomic evolution of
wages. More experiences researchers may demand higher wages. Furthermore, different
researchers may be necessary for the different research steps. Also, remember that the
wage bill is the only cost factor for the research project. This implies that other costs of
doing research (laboratories, instruments, . . . ) are implicitly comprised in the wage bill.
These costs may also differ between research steps. In general, these costs may sink over
time. This holds for both the academic and the private sector.
Furthermore, the precision of the information may evolve over time. Far from the final
date of completion, it may be difficult to judge the chances for financial success. Shortly
before completion, this judgment may have become easier. This effect may be expressed
by an increasing precision of the information over time, or by a decreasing cost c of
getting the information.
Summing up, none of the model parameters are likely constant over time. Therefore, the
question of the robustness of results with respect to a model extension is permissible. For
simplicity, let us concentrate on one parameter, and assume that λa is a function of time,
hence we write λa(t). Assume that the project is at date t, and the decision is whether the
information should be gathered right now, or after another logical second at date t + dt.
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The value of the remaining project at date t + dt, net of any costs, is named v. Hence, if
the information is gathered right away, the aggregate value is
−c− q wa dt+ e−λa(t) dt q v,
consisting of the information cost c, the wage payment for the time span dt (which only
needs to be paid with probability q), and the value v (weighted with the probability with
which the project does not fail until t + dt). If the information is gathered at date t + dt
instead, the aggregate value is
−e−λa(t) dt c− wa dt+ e−λa(t) dt q v,
taking into account that the cost c must be spent only if the project has not failed yet, and
the wage must be spent independent from the information outcome. The research planner
is indifferent if both are equal, thus if
c = (1− q)wa 1
1− e−λa(t) dt dt.
Taking into account that dt→ 0, L’Hoˆpital’s rule yields
c = (1− q) wa
λa(t)
, or λa(t) = (1− q)wa
c
.
There are some immediate consequences. Assume that λa(t) is increasing. Then, if it is
not optimal to get the information at some date t, it is neither optimal to get it at some
later date before tswitch. That implies that the information should be acquired right at the
beginning (tc = 0), or not before switching (tc = tswitch). Nothing changes in comparison
to the case with constant λa.
Now assume that λa(t) is decreasing. Then, at time tc with λa(tc) = (1 − q)wa/c, it
is better to get the information immediately rather than in the next second, or any other
future date. Hence, if it is optimal to get the information, then it is optimal to get it at
this date tc. In that case, the project starts in pure academia. At date tc, the research
planner forces the researcher to obtain private funding. The project is continued only if
the researcher is successful. At some other date (possibly), a private firm takes over the
project. In comparison to Figure 8, there are two new regimes.
Some comparative statics follow immediately. A higher information cost c leads to a later
date tc of private funding. A higher academic wage wa leads to an earlier date tc, and
a higher success probability q leads to a later date tc of private funding. These results
lend themselves to interpretation. If the cost in the academic sector wa are high, (early)
private funding is optimal. Hence, expensive experiments should optimally be funded by
private money from early on, as opposed to cheap theoretical research. Furthermore, for
example if a researcher has a reputation to start projects with a high success probability
q, he should not be bothered to acquire private funding .
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Figure 12: Additional Regimes
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7 Conclusions
Academia has a central feature which causes the main advantage compared to the private
sector: scientific freedom. Researchers working within academia have the possibility to
unfold themselves in creative scientific projects. This in turn decreases the potential to
control their research agenda choices and choose the ways in which they allow others to
build on their research discoveries (see Stern, 2004). In this paper, we develop a theo-
retical framework in which private research funding (PRF) transfers information on the
marketable value of a research project from the private sector into academia, in an incen-
tive compatible way. We have placed the model in the context of prior work of Aghion,
Dewatripont, and Stein (2008), but focused rather on monetary arguments than on aca-
demic freedom in terms of intellectual property rights. As a consequence, this paper has
provided predictions about the optimal sequence of research designs, about the optimal
duration of a project within the designs, and about the optimal amount of research funds.
Projects typically start in pure academia and are finally handed over to the private sector,
where products reach marketability. Potentially, academia is leapfrogged or the private
sector is not involved. However, if both sectors occur, this order never changes. If private
research funds enter, they reduce the relative desirability of academia because they tell the
research designer that a project is marketable and consequently should switch earlier than
without private funding in order to prevent the project from failing. When private funds
enter into the academic system depends crucially on the design of academic research
which is implicitly divided into 2 ways by us.
Our first results show that projects are privately funded only right from the start. This is
perfectly in line with our initial example regarding the development of a CML drug at
the MIT. If we interpret this kind of research as market oriented and extremely applied,
this sequence is the most promising one and stands to reason. An uninformed research
without a credible signal from the private sector that the drug is marketable, respectively
that there is a need for it, would potentially lead to expensive and worthless research.
Hence, a later date for inviting private money is neither possible within the model nor
plausible if we think of such a research strategy. Including all other cases (no research
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funds, no academic research, no private research) and following our argumentation in
style of Figure 8 there is a total of six conceivable scenarios .
If we modify our model and allow parameters to change, we get an argument for why
projects should not start with private research funds right away. If a project needs some
time to be made concrete, is relatively jeopardous, or a researcher needs to get experi-
enced, it is optimal to conduct the project initially without private support. This type of
research, possibly rather basic or experimental, is in any case not as market oriented as
the above mentioned research. Therefore, the optimal sequence presented in Figure 12
changes slightly.
As we abstract from any capital constraints inside academia and the private sector and
focus only on the signal effect of PRF, we find that the amount of private research funds
can even exceed the academic budget. If it is very expensive for the private sector to gather
the information on the marketability, it must be compensated with higher returns of the
final product for sharing the information truthfully. In turn, the research funds surpass the
budget and act in this way as a credible signal. Contrary, the absolute amount of private
support does not depend on the potential value of the product, but the switching date tswitch
is accelerated with an increasing value. The private sector does not finance research lines
of limited value at all. It indirectly finances research lines of medium marketability.
In addition to the effects on the patterns of finance, the expected value (q V ) impacts the
amount of private research funds as well as the required return. An increasing probability
of marketability is attended by an increasing amount of research funds and a higher po-
tential value V leads to a higher share of private research funds in the academic budget.
This is consistent with our stylized Fact 3 we assessed. By providing data of funding in
different fields of research, we suggested that the relative amount of funds is positively
correlated with the particular expected valuation of projects.
By dint of the model, we can now explain, why some research projects raise more research
funds than others. That is to say a question of incentive compatibility. Because of profit-
orientation, a firm only provides research funds if it is compensated for this effort to an
adequate extent, which is assured in event of high monetary expectations. Besides, the
higher this effort is, the higher has to be the compensation. Hence, the approached applied
research fields like medical or physical sciences, which produce obviously a high level of
marketable output, are able to raise the vast bulk of research funds and possess the major
fractions of research funds regarding their total budget. Consistently, we detect that fields
of less profitable research show fewer research fund fractions.
As a consequence, our results, mainly Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 have strong im-
plications for the organization of research. A possible policy maker should have in mind
that basic research in terms of either improbably marketable projects should almost al-
ways be subsidized by the government sector. The higher the marketability, the higher
is the amount of acquirable research funds and less dependent is the researcher of public
41
subsidies. Nevertheless, research projects incapable to gain PRF should not always be left
in the lurch. These projects are primarily of basic character and therefore very important
for subsequent research. Even though a quick marketable result does often not succeed
directly, a mass of new research lines could arise from them. More market oriented re-
search is traditionally privately supported to a greater extent or completely done in the
private sector. So, it is first and foremost basic research (but definitely not solely) the
policy maker should focus on regarding on the allocation of public funds. An alternative
solution could be to invest the potential surplus of private research funds into (at least at
first sight) non-market oriented research.
In summary, if basic research suffers from financial problems due to the fact that the
private sector cannot be incentivized to invest, also applied research is eventually hurt. In
that case, the diversity of research would be reduced due to the fact that there would be
only few (if at all) incentives to carry out basic or risky research. More market oriented
and specialized projects would be carried out. Potentially, some research lines and at
worst whole fields of research could become extinct.
8 Appendix
Calculation of the minimal V : In Section 4, we argue that for very low V it might be
the best strategy to not pursue any research at all. Therefore, we give lower limits for V ,
such that the project should be started in the first place. The algebraic expression depends
on the research design. First, consider pure academic research, hence tswitch = T . We
need to check whether (1) remains positive with tswitch = T , obtaining
V ≥ (e
λa T − 1)wa
λa q
No consider pure private research, hence tswitch = 0. Then solving (1) for V ,
V ≥ (e
λp T − 1)wp
λp q
must hold, otherwise the project never starts. If there is switching (0 < tswitch < T ), then
V ≥
eT λawa(
(λa−λp)(wp+q λp V )
wp λa−wa λp )
1−λa
λp − wp
q λp
,
which is the last of the three conditions. As there is no single value for this minimum V ,
it depends on the next-best research strategy. 
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Proof of Remark 1: Assume the project in stage t, so the next stage is t + dt. Further
suppose that v is the aggregated value of the remaining project, including the potential
final V , and net of wages from t + dt onwards. Hence, we concentrate on the period
between t and t + dt only. If research is carried out in the private sector, the aggregate
value is (1 − λp dt)v − dtwp. If carried out in academia, the according value is (1 −
λa dt)v − dtwa. Hence, there is a critical v such that research is better carried out in
academia if and only if v ≥ v, given by
(1− λp dt)v − dtwp = (1− λa dt)v − dtwa ⇒ v = wp − wa
λa − λp . (23)
Now over time, v increases, because the time span T − t decreases, such that less wages
need to be paid until completion of the project. Consequently, if the research designer
prefers private research at some stage, he prefers private research even more at a later
stage. 
Proof of Remark 2: The optimal switching date tswitch depends on several circum-
stances inside academia and the private sector. In order to describe the influences on
it, we take the derivatives of tswitch with respect to the determining factors. This yields
∂ tswitch
∂ q
= − V
wp + q λp V
< 0 (24)
∂ tswitch
∂ V
= − q
wp + q λp V
< 0 (25)
∂ tswitch
∂ wa
=
1
wa λp − wp λa < 0 (26)
∂ tswitch
∂ λa
=
wa − wp
(λa − λp)(wp λa − wa λp) < 0 (27)
∂ tswitch
∂ wp
=
wa + q λa V
(wp + q λp V )(wp λa − wa λp) > 0 (28)
∂ tswitch
∂ λp
=
−1 + wp
wp+q λp V λp
+ λa(
1
λa−λp +
wp
wa λp−wp λa ) + log
[
(λa−λp)(wp+q λp V )
wp λa−wa λp
]
λ2p
.
(29)
The signs of all comparative statics are immediately obvious, bar the last (29). We now
show that the sign is positive provided that there is a transfer to the private sector anyhow.
(29) implies that
−2wp λa − wa λp
wp λa − wa λp <
(2λa − λp)wp + q λa λp V
(wp + q λp V )(λa − λp) + log
[(λa − λp)(wp + q λp V )
wp λa − wa λp
]
.
(30)
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Since the left-hand side is always negative, we need to prove that the right-hand side is
positive. The first term (the fraction) in the right-hand side is positive, and the log is
positive if the numerator is larger than the denominator. We check,
(λa − λp)(wp + q λp V ) > wp λa − wa λp ⇐⇒
q V >
wp − wa
λa − λp . (31)
This is the reversal of condition (5) where we stated that the project will never switch to
the private sector because of an undersized expected market value. Hence, it stays inside
academia and λp does not enter at all. In contrast, if (31) is fulfilled, a project is transferred
to private sector. In this case, ∂ tswitch
∂ λp
> 0 and an increasing probability of failure inside
the private sector leads to later switching. 
Proof of Remark 3: In order to make a statement about the optimal switching dates
with and without information, we must distinguish between the 3 different cases. First,
the change of tswitch if the information is gathered immediately (tc = 0). By comparing
(2) and (12) we get
T − log
[ λa − λp
wp λa − wa λp (wp + q λp V )
]
−
(
T − log
[ λa − λp
wp λa − wa λp (wp + λp V )
])
=
1
λp
(
log
[(λa − λp)(wp + λp V )
wp λa − wa λp
]
− log
[(λa − λp)(wp + q λp V )
wp λa − wa λp
])
> 0
Thus, the switching is accelerated.
Second, we match (2) and (15) (tc = tswitch):
T − log
[ λa − λp
wp λa − wa λp (wp + q λp V )
]
−
(
T − log
[ q(λa − λp)
q wp λa − wa λp + c λa λp (wp + λp V )
])
=
1
λp
(
log
[ q(λa − λp)(wp + λp V )
q wp λa − wa λp + c λa λp
]
− log
[(λa − λp)(wp + q λp V )
wp λa − wa λp
])
> 0
Again, the transfer is earlier than without any information, but later than with tc = 0 as c
is limited to (1− q)wp/λp (see (10)):
1
λp
(
log
[ q(λa − λp)(wp + λp V )
q wp λa − wa λp + c λa λp
]
− log
[(λa − λp)(wp + λp V )
wp λa − wa λp
])
> 0
In the last case (tc =∞), there is no information at all. Hence, tswitch remains unchanged.

Proof of Remark 4: Taking the derivative of I as computed in (18) with respect to c
yields
∂I
∂q
=
c
(1− q)2 > 0.

44
Proof of Proposition 1: In order to examine whether one term exceeds the other, we
need to compare the academic budget and the amount of research funds. Remember, if
there is private research funding, it is received right away (tc = 0). Hence, inserting
tc = 0 and the corresponding tswitch in (21) yields
B = q
wa
λa
[
1− e−λa T
((λa − λp)(wp + λp V )
wp λa − wa λp
)λa/λp]
The private research funds as given by (20) are
I =
c
1− q .
Since we derived from (8) the maximal c for which the information is gathered at date
tc = 0, we can rearrange the formula to
I =
wa
λa
.
Finally, we match both terms against each other
q
(
1− e−T λa((λa − λp)(wp + λp V )
wp λa − wa λp
)λa
λp ≶ 1,
finding that private research funds increase with c and indeed may exceed the academic
budget. However, conditioned by (8), private research funds cannot increase to infinity,
they are limited to
1
q
(
1− e−T λa( (λa−λp)(wp+λp V )
wp λa−wa λp
)λa
λp
times the academic budget. Otherwise, it would be totoo expensive to gather the in-
formation and there will be no private financial support. In the numerical example, the
maximum multiplier is ≈ 5.7. 
Proof of Remark 5: Inserting the optimal switching date from equation (12) and taking
the derivative of B with respect to V yields
∂B
∂V
= −q
e−T λa wa (
q(λa−λp)(wp+V λp)
wp λa−wa λp
λa
λp
wp + λp V
,
which is negative. However, if the information is gathered right away research funding is
I =
c
1− q ,
independent on V . As a direct consequence, research funding as a fraction of the academic
budget is an increasing function, provided that the project is transferred. 
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Part II
Raising Research Funds: Does the
Research Strategy matter?
9 Introduction
The requirements for successful researchers have changed dramatically in recent decades.
In the past, researchers demonstrated success by producing high quality publications, ci-
tations or inventions. Thus, ”bringing research results to market has not been of prime
concern to academic institutions”(Muscio, Quaglione, and Vallanti, 2013, p. 63). Today,
in a time of internationalization and shortages of public funds, researchers must man-
age various scientific partnerships beyond national boundaries and acquire external funds
because ”there is increasing political pressures on universities to raise research funding
from industry and contribute actively to economic development”(Muscio, Quaglione, and
Vallanti, 2013, p. 63). This emphasis ”put on universities to produce research that is valu-
able for industry and to establish closer linkages with the business community in order to
widen the chances of establishing collaborations”(Muscio, Quaglione, and Vallanti, 2013,
p. 63) is omnipresent. Thus, the so-called third mission of universities has gained ground.
Hence, the relationship between universities and industry has become more substantial,
as academia has increasingly contributed to wealth creation, economic growth (Florida
(1995), Romer (1993), Leonard-Barton (1995)) and industrial innovation. Consequently,
the academic sector as a knowledge generating institution is increasingly relevant to the
private sector. In this regard, universities not only concentrate on acquiring new knowl-
edge but also on more practical objectives related to established social and economic
targets (Laredo (2007)) without sacrificing the nature of academic research. This creates
an advantage for both sides: academia acts as an input source for the private sector and en-
larges its external funding options. However, the latter benefit is not always intrinsically
motivated. In particular, the recent expectation that universities apply for private funds
is mainly driven by policy makers. Several European governments, primarily a result
of the Maastricht criteria (So¨rlin (2007)), changed their funding systems and introduced
direct allocating institutions to optimize ”the efficiency of research funds and increase
the accountability of universities as well as the pressure to reduce their costs”(Muscio,
Quaglione, and Vallanti (2013)). Accordingly, not only private but also public competi-
tive funding is involved. As Muscio, Quaglione, and Vallanti (2013) argue, ”this interven-
tion has taken different forms in different countries, but is being driven by similar overall
targets, which are promoting a contractual-oriented approach to university research fund-
ing, aimed at indirect control of the behavior of universities through the introduction of
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(quasi-market) financial incentive schemes”. On a related note, external public funding
sources must not be forgotten. Because of ”the widening and ever more diverse inter-
est in research [...] funding [sic] become the preoccupation of government [...] and the
EU”(So¨rlin, 2007, p. 1).
These developments are seen in recent figures, which show that, although most of the
academic budget continues to be provided by governments, a stepwise decrease can be
observed (for example, in the USA, Japan, Germany, and France)11. While governmental
funds account for 60% to 90% of total funds, it is increasingly necessary to enter into
markets to tap new resources. ”The largest part of university budgets is based on ”ne-
gotiated budgets” and ”funding formulas” (based on the size of staff or the number of
students enrolled), but universities also compete for research funding on the basis of peer-
reviewed project proposals against a set of objectives. [...] Other sources of university
funding such as industry funding is becoming increasingly important for [...] universities’
budgets”(Muscio, Quaglione, and Vallanti, 2013, p. 64).
In light of these arguments, we examine whether the choice of research strategy influ-
ences the ability to acquire external funding. This is a crucial point, in view of all the
renewals, progress, and changes in the funding environment, including not only new fund-
ing sources but also dramatic shifts in the amounts of funds allocated. Moreover, we more
closely examine the composition of the budget in the light of the aforementioned research
focus. Finally, we derive some policy implications for researchers and the academic sec-
tor in general: which research strategy should be pursued? Is a diversified research focus
more promising for raising research funds, or should a researcher concentrate on one
field?
To answer these questions, we survey highly regarded economists, sociologists, and po-
litical scientists, distinguishing solely between private and public funds in general. Sur-
prisingly, our results differ somewhat from our preliminary expectations. We present
significant evidence that a precisely defined research focus positively affects the prospect
of being funded. If research can be described as pure basic or pure applied, the link
between the success rates of applications submitted to public and private institutions is
highly significant, while a more diversified research orientation has a weaker but still sig-
nificant effect on this complementarity. Additionally, we show that the research strategy
chosen has a significant bearing on the composition of the research budget, whereas it is
comparatively less important in accessing research funds.
In this sense, our approach differs from that of earlier studies in various ways. We con-
duct an econometric analysis based on exceptional micro data on individual researchers
primarily in the European Union. By means of these researchers, we test our hypothe-
ses with reference to the influence of research strategy on a researcher’s ability to obtain
funds and the amount of funding obtained. In the course of this research, we examine
11For further details, see OECD (2010).
47
differences between public and private external funds and define the relationship between
them via application success rates.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 9.1 provides an overview of research related
to the present paper, while Section 9.2 deduces our hypotheses from the theoretical back-
ground of such research. Section 10 presents our empirical results with respect to the
determinants of industry funding of universities, including a description of our data, de-
scriptive statistics, the methodology employed, and Logit and Tobit regressions. Sec-
tion 11 addresses specific implications and concludes.
9.1 Related Literature
Admittedly, a large body of literature focuses on ”the issue of the positive direct and indi-
rect effects of public R&D on firms’ productivity and private R&D”(Muscio, Quaglione,
and Vallanti, 2013, p. 65). Additionally, schools have begun to theoretically and empir-
ically examine the allocation and linkage between public and private research funding.
However, while most of these studies have focused on the relationship between differ-
ent types of research funds, we expand the analysis and examine which aspects influence
the awarding of external funds. We analyze in detail whether certain research strate-
gies12 yield better prospects in obtaining the one or the other kind of funding and whether
granted external funds of different types are complements or substitutes.
Within the strand of theoretical literature that focuses on the relationship between public
and private research funds, several papers examine questions similar to ours. For example,
David, Hall, and Toole (2000) ask whether public R&D spending is complementary to or
substitutive of private R&D; David and Hall (2000) study public and private funding as
potential complements, and Garcı´a-Quevedo (2004) consider the relationship between
public funding of R&D and private R&D expenditures, using a meta-regression.
David, Hall, and Toole (2000) presents a summary of econometric studies based on time
series and cross-sectional data from various approaches collected over the past 35 years.
David, Hall, and Toole considers the multiplicity of studies on this question and the inher-
ent problem of comparability between them. The authors conclude that findings regarding
the relationship between public and private R&D are ambiguous and provide suggestions
to enhance future empirical research. Overall, complementarity appears to be appreciably
more incumbent than substitutability, a finding that accords with our preliminary consid-
erations and results.
In the same year, David and Hall further studied the effects of complementarity, using a
simplified two-sector model. In contrast to our study, which mainly focuses on research,
12Basic, applied or both.
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these authors argue that the degree of complementarity depends on the dimensions of
the government R&D sector, the elasticity of scientists’ labor supply, or the characteris-
tics of the marginal product R&D curve, whereas our study explains different degrees of
complementarity by way of distinct research strategies. However, David and Hall (2000)
highlight that complementarities among public and private research funds may originate
from the learning and training effects of publicly subsidized R&D activities employed by
the private sector, cost-saving opportunities for the industry, and the signaling of future
product demand by the public sector .
Another strand of the literature focuses on the possible advantages and disadvantages of a
policy that forces universities to tap alternative funding sources, a type of policy that has
been subject to controversy. Some observers argue that there is great need of more private
funding and thus greater commercialization of research, while others point to the negative
consequences of excessive emphasis on applicability and marketability at the cost of the
core competency of academia. Among those taking the former position are Perkmann
and Walsh (2008) and Gulbrandsen and Smeby (2005), who reason that academia and
industry are likely to benefit from collaboration and that private sector participation in
academia supports scientific output. In contrast, Thursby and Thursby (2011) argue that
cooperation between academia and industry has several negative effects on the activities of
universities. Calvert (2006) and Geuna (2001) go one step further and postulate that a shift
toward private funding negatively affects the generation and dissemination of scientific
knowledge. This argument is also present in Strehl, Reisinger, and Kalatschan (2007),
an international report on funding systems and their effects on higher education systems.
The authors conclude that, due to decreased government funding and repeated tapping of
alternative funding opportunities, basic research has been neglected, and research quality
has decreased.
Among all the studies that have examined the relationship between different sources of
external funding, two most closely resemble our approach. Similarly to Grimpe (2010),
we argue that many studies typically fail to contrast their findings with the variety of fund-
ing opportunities available to public science. Thus, in line with the author, we analyze and
compare different funding sources. While we focus on a sample of approximately 3,800
European researchers, Grimpe (2010) considers a sample of more than 1,000 scientists
at universities and public research institutes in Germany. His paper focuses on the Sixth
Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (FP6), finding that
participation substitutes for other grant programs, which are complementary to each other.
The analysis of Muscio, Quaglione, and Vallanti (2013) not only matches our recent ap-
proach, but its origin is similar to our previous study (see Friedrici and Hakenes (2014b)),
a theoretical investigation of private research funds. This work is based on Aghion, Dewa-
tripont, and Stein (2008), who argue that government funding provides universities with
vital resources needed to conduct research activities, the results of which can be trans-
ferred to industry. While we implemented private research funds as a tool to overcome
information asymmetries that exist between the academic and private sector, so that such
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funding acts as a kind of signal of the marketability of research, Aghion, Dewatripont,
and Stein (2008) omit external funding and develop a model that defines when and under
what conditions a research project is transferred from academia to industry. That study
has an affinity with Tanayama (2010), who examines the effect of asymmetric information
on the quality of research projects, arguing that direct public research funds can reduce
asymmetric information. She also concludes that research funds can serve as a signal to
industry, leading to lower financing constraints.
In addition, Muscio, Quaglione, and Vallanti (2013), using financial data for Italian aca-
demic researchers in the engineering and physical sciences, study the impact of differ-
ent forms of public funding on the ability of universities to raise private funds. The re-
searchers empirically examine whether financial pressures placed on universities motivate
more university-industry interactions and has a substitution effect or leads to increased
access to external funding, thus occasioning a complementarity effect. In line with these
authors, we conclude that publicly funded research conducted in universities strategically
complements private sources of funding. Thus, following Muscio, Quaglione, and Val-
lanti, public funding may incentivize university-industry interactions. Furthermore, the
authors argue that a reduction in public research funds eventually leads to decreasing
opportunities for additional external funding.
Finally, we must acknowledge that information cascades may also account for relation-
ships between public and private funds13. Welch (1992) examines the cascade effect in
financial markets, arguing that ”when IPO14 shares are sold sequentially, later potential in-
vestors can learn from the purchasing decisions of earlier investors. This can lead rapidly
to ”cascades” in which subsequent investors optimally ignore their private information
and imitate earlier investors”. Equally, one could pursue this line of argument under our
approach. In particular, first funding decisions may affect later financiers. Concretely,
early financiers will or will not fund a research project based on the requirements it ful-
fills. A subsequent financier will consider this decision and follow it or not. We call
such a sequence a cascade whenever a subsequent financier relies on the decision of the
first financier in making a financing decision. In the end, we set this argument aside
because information cascades cannot explain why some funds are granted, while others
are rejected. Furthermore, we possess indirect information on the quality of the research
conducted due to the repertory of the survey15.
9.2 Theoretical Background and Motivation
In examining external funding, we must first distinguish between public and private funds.
Although both types of funds imply an additional source of capital for the researcher, the
13For a discussion of information cascades, see, e.g., D’Arcy and Oh (1997).
14Initial Public Offering.
15see Section 10.1
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application process, the motivation, and even the conditions for funding differ widely.
However, there is one factor that both types of funding share: they are only awarded if
the projects have potential. While researchers receive public funds if, among other rea-
sons, their projects have useful social, economic, or other external effects (see Weinberg
(1962)), private funds are mainly awarded in cases of marketability or at least applicabil-
ity. Following Aghion, Dewatripont, and Stein (2008) and Lacetera (2009b) we argue that
firms focus on applied research with the goal of solving specific issues. Hence, from the
perspective of a manager of a firm, he invests money in a project to realize future mone-
tary gains with the help of research results obtained through the project. This is possible
if an idea or proposal is achievable (optimally in the short run) within his firm. However,
basic research ”is commonly thought to refer to research that is directed solely toward ac-
quiring new knowledge rather than any more practical objective”(Calvert, 2006, p. 199).
Specifically, research ”is often thought to produce a certain type of knowledge, and it
is epistemological criteria that may seem the most intuitively obvious to use in defining
it. The most common epistemological features [...] associated with basic research were
unpredictability and generality”(Calvert, 2006, p. 204). Hence, public institutions are
ultimately interested in funding basic research because of the potential value of such re-
search to society (see Calvert (2002)). By contrast, a manager is not interested in general
or unpredictable solutions. He is interested in a specific approach corresponding to his
problem. Furthermore, because of the minor direct commercial value of basic research, it
must be publicly supported (see e.g. Sauermann and Stephan (2013)).
In this regard, another definition refers to the goal of basic research. ”What is signif-
icant about the intentional definition of ”basic research” is that if the intentions behind
the research are to produce something that will result in an application, no matter how
fundamental the research may be in an epistemological sense, the research will no longer
be classified as basic”(Calvert, 2006, p. 204). As a result, a manager will rarely invest in
basic research because he ”would not be able to capture the returns” unless ”the results
of basic research would eventually feed into industry and produce substantial economic
benefits [...]”(Calvert, 2006, p. 206).
In view of such arguments, one must anticipate that the composition of the budget changes,
depending on the justifications given for research. Such arguments lead us to expect that
research strategy is important and has a significant impact on the ability to obtain funding
and the extent of such funding. Consequently, we arrive at our intuitive Hypothesis One:
H1: The fraction of the research budget provided by private sources increases with
the applicability of a research project.
Thus far, we have discussed the overall funding situation broadly and considered both
funding sources separately. However, in reality, funding as well as application decisions
are highly complex. This is likely the case because of continuous changes in the research
landscape and the ongoing appearance of new funding possibilities. Traditionally, basic
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researchers have applied only for public funds because ”governments are ultimately in-
terested in funding basic research because of the benefits that it is perceived to bring to
society”(Calvert and Martin, 2001, p. 15). In any case, public sources cannot be tapped
infinitely. ”As science grows, its demands on our society’s resources grow. It seems in-
evitable that science’s demands will eventually be limited by what society can allocate
to it”(Weinberg, 1962, p. 159). Currently, in view of the existing requirements imposed
on researchers and restricted public budgets, private resources can be tapped. ”The cre-
ation of new channels of university-industry collaboration has gained strategic relevance
to universities primarily because of their potential as sources of external funding”(Muscio,
Quaglione, and Vallanti, 2013, p. 63).
The question that arises for researchers facing multiple funding opportunities is where
and how to apply for funding successfully. Thus, ”the existing relationship between gov-
ernment funding and the funding raised by universities through [...] scientific activities
to order”(Muscio, Quaglione, and Vallanti, 2013, p. 63) should be factored into the de-
cision. Concretely, due to ”the nature of the relationship between public and private
funding to universities, government and industry funding for research within universi-
ties can be strategic substitutes or complements”(Muscio, Quaglione, and Vallanti, 2013,
p. 63). Similarly, Blume-Kohout, Kumar, and Sood (2009) argue that ”there could be a
negative (substitution) effect, either due to crowding out of private investment or because
researchers could stop seeking other sources of funding once they receive federal funding.
On the other hand, federal R&D funding could also have a positive impact due to com-
plementarity or signaling effects”. The authors mirror Connolly (1997), who argues that
external funding may serve as a signal of university quality because ”external sponsors
wish to allocate funding to those universities that do the highest quality research”(Muscio,
Quaglione, and Vallanti, 2013, p. 65).
Consistent with the strand of the literature that traces the relationship between public and
private funding of university research to the issue of complementarity between public and
private R&D (see e.g. Muscio, Quaglione, and Vallanti (2013)), we suppose that the two
types external funds are complements.
Accordingly, we obtain our next hypothesis:
H2: A positive evaluation of a researcher (in the sense of existing research funding)
increases the probability of raising additional research funds.
In this context, we must acknowledge that we would prefer to focus on quasi-complementa-
rity rather than complementarity because there is no pure quality variable in the dataset.
Additionally, the survey was exclusively administered to selected researchers, many of
whom are highly ranked in their research fields and thus exhibit strong potential. Thus,
despite the absence of a distinct quality characteristic, we can examine the relationship
between different external funding sources.
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For convenience, we narrow our focus to cases of private funds complementing public
funds. However, the argument presented below could be used to approach the process
from the opposite perspective.
Recognizing this, we return to our expectation that public and private research funding
are complements. Such complementarity ”would imply that universities need govern-
ment funding to increase [...] their external fundraising options”(Muscio, Quaglione, and
Vallanti, 2013, p. 65)16. If we proceed on this assumption, we deduce that qualified re-
searchers who obtain public research funds are well positioned to raise private funds.
However, whether the latter transpires depends equally on other factors, in particular, the
researcher’s research focus, as described above. This is intuitive because, as we argued in
the first part of Section 9.2, firms are not interested in general or unpredictable solutions.
Rather, they have a stake in research that is ”less risky and more short-term”(Calvert,
2006, p. 211) in nature. To tap different sources of funding, researchers should behave
strategically. Calvert and Martin (2001) argue that ”increased pressures for instrumental-
ity in research” influences researchers in how they present their research. In this context,
Calvert (2006) argues that scholars try ”to make their work appear more applied to gain
funding and resources. By changing the way they portray their research activities, scien-
tists are engaging in boundary work”. Additionally, the author confesses that ”[...] it is
difficult to tell if many [...] scientists were guilty of this ’applied hypocrisy’ or whether
their work actually did have both basic and applied elements to it, and that it is easy
to make their research appear either basic or applied or both, depending on the circum-
stances”(Calvert, 2006, p. 210).
However, regardless of whether desired elements are only emphasized or overemphasized,
this approach to obtaining funding is subject to a condition: rudimentary applied aspects
must be included. Otherwise, this approach fails. Furthermore, if a researcher works
almost exclusively on basic research, there is little chance of obtaining private funds, al-
though it is not impossible. On the contrary, the more applied aspects that can be empha-
sized, the greater is the opportunity to obtain further funding. As we have demonstrated,
this also holds if public funds complement private funds. Basic aspects must be signaled
to obtain further public funding. The more funding the researcher is able to amass , the
more likely he is to win additional funding. Calvert (2006) refers to this performance as
”tailoring”. While she focuses on basic research and the possibilities of accessing private
funding sources, we claim that these methods could also be adopted by researchers whose
work is applied.
Based on this line of argument, we arrive at our third hypothesis:
H3: The degree of complementary between public and private funding increases
with the degree of research diversity of a researcher, particularly with a deepened
combination of basic and applied elements.
16See also Mansfield (1995), Dechenaux, Thursby, and Thursby (2011), Jensen, Thursby, and Thursby
(2010), and Perkmann and Walsh (2008).
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In the following chapters, we will refer to and revise these hypotheses.
10 Empirical Analysis
10.1 Data Source and Description
Our empirical analysis is based on data from 2010 and 2011, drawn from the Academic
Careers Observatory of the Max Weber Programme, which conducted three separate sur-
veys of economists, sociologists, and political scientists. All participants were asked to
complete an online questionnaire on research funding in the social sciences in Europe to
obtain knowledge of their funding experiences. The sample of economists consisted of
top European economists17 and members of the European Economic Association (EEA).
The sample of sociologists included authors in the Top 10 journals in sociology18 and
members of the European Sociological Association (ESA). The sample of political scien-
tists was composed of authors in the Top 10 journals in political science19 and members
of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR). Overall, out of a sample of
3, 802 respondents, nearly 63 % were economists, approximately 20% were sociologists,
and approximately 17 % were political scientists.
The multiscientific dataset of researchers in 70 countries and residents of more than 50
countries includes information on personal characteristics (e.g., age, gender, nationality)
and institutional characteristics (e.g., position, employer, tenured employment). In ad-
dition, we recorded the change in the Human Development Index (HDI) from 2009 to
201020, used to develop our research design, which takes advantage of several potential
correlates of the structure of internal and external financing.
Our main focus of attention is the scientific characteristics revealed in the survey, en-
abling us to gain insight into the compositions of budgets, the fractions and amounts of
budgets provided by the institutions themselves and by private and public investors, and
the research strategies of the scholars. To address our research questions, we aggregated
several variables. We summarized the percentages of national public, regional public, Eu-
ropean Research Council (ERC), and Framework Programme grants under the category
”fraction public funds”. The shares of national and regional private grants and grants
from consultancies and prizes were categorized as ”fraction private funds”. Most of the
information regarding fractions of specific funding was taken directly from the survey. If
values were missing from this primary source, the fractions were calculated by means of
17Based on RePEc (Repository of Papers in Economics).
18Based on ISI Web of Knowledge.
19Based on ISI Web of Knowledge.
20For further details, see United Nations Development Programme (2011).
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annual budgets in absolute terms. Thus, we obtained information on three different frac-
tions of funds (public, private, and own institution). If a researcher receives no funding at
all, he is assigned a value of 0 in all three cases. Similarly, the variables ”annual amount
public funds”, ”annual amount private funds”, and ”annual total amount” were created.
Additionally, we reconditioned the variables on ”average application success rate public”
and ”average application success rate private” by aggregating the distinct success proba-
bilities stated by the participants.
Another modification of the original dataset concerns the classification of research strate-
gies. Five variables related to research focus (empirical, theoretical, numerical, experi-
mental, and other21). The respondents were asked to quantify their research strategy, and
the levels ”never” (recoded as 1), ”sometimes” (recoded as 2), ”mostly” (recoded as 3),
and ”exclusively” (recoded as 4) were placed at their disposal. To gain a more general
view of strategic direction, we created a new variable called ”research strategy”. Specifi-
cally, we rearranged the four remaining work descriptions in accordance with the variable
research strategy, using the classifications ”pure applied”, ”applied-oriented”, ”balanced”,
”basic-oriented”, and ”pure basic”. Therefore, in an intermediate step, we classified the
work descriptions ”theoretical” and ”numerical” as basic research and the strategies ”em-
pirical” and ”experimental” as applied research22. In particular, we added the different
levels of ”theoretical” and ”numerical” work descriptions and subtracted the sum of the
levels of ”empirical” and ”experimental” work descriptions. If both manifestations coin-
cide (so that there is no discrepancy), the researcher is balanced in his research strategy
(conducts both basic and applied research). If the result is greater than 2, the researcher
works pure basic and in-between basic-orientated. If the result is less than −2, the re-
search can be described as pure applied and as among the applied-orientated researchers.
Therefore, the quantity of the solitary sum is immaterial, and only the difference provides
some indication of the orientation of the researcher. The resulting characteristics are used
as dummy variables in the regressions to highlight the specific effects of the strategy on
the dependent variables.
We confined our analysis to the employer university because these researchers are the
focus of our research interest. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that only EEA Mem-
bers are included because we can assume that all researchers have the same needs with
respect to networking. As we expect differences in requirements, legal regulations, and
accessibility to research funding, we used country dummies to control for country-specific
differences. In so doing, we account for the differential development of higher education
sectors and for both the economic and political status quos, which may lead to diverse
degrees of dependence on external funding and conditions for funding allocation . For
instance, the Anglo-Saxon system, adopted by the UK, Ireland, and the Netherlands, is
21Because of a small number of responses, we did not include this variable.
22Of course, this categorization must be viewed as relative, as scholars in the social sciences do not work
as applied researchers, as engineers do, for example.
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characterized by transparent ex ante and ex post evaluation procedures and a large num-
ber of independent funding agencies allocating financial support to meet specific needs at
different career stages. In contrast, Continental Europe’s higher education systems show
a high level of centralization due to many factors, for example, that funding decisions are
less independent23.
Finally, we checked for any inconsistences (e.g., total fractions not equal to 100%).
A detailed description of the data set can be found in Table 8 in Section 12.
10.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis. The dependent
variables are the fractions and the amounts of external funding raised by researchers com-
missioned by public and private institutions and average application success rates. Public
funds are granted by national and regional institutions and the ERC. Private grants come
primarily from national and regional firms. Hybrid funding sources are considered neither
by the survey nor by us. Not all the grants are subject to specific conditions (they include
all research funds, regardless of whether there exists a contract or a funding scheme).
At first glance, large differences between the characteristics of the response variables are
evident. While the mean of the fraction of public funds is nearly 58%, the mean of the
fraction of private funds is only 13%. The amounts of external funds from these different
sources are widely separated. On average, 60.349 euros are awarded to researchers by
public institutions, while 7.255 euros are awarded on average by private institutions. In
contrast, the average application success rates are only slightly different between public
and private funding sources, averaging 54% and 52%, respectively.
The explanatory variables are indicators of the individual characteristics of the researcher
(such as gender, age, position, years since graduation, and whether the researcher is a
national or a foreigner at his university) and work experience-related characteristics (such
as one’s average application success rate for public funding, average application success
rate for private funding, work time spent on research, work time spent on fundraising,
the rated impact of external funding on the researcher’s career, and work environment).
Finally, we included the percentage change in the Human Development Index (HDI) to
control for the external circumstances of researchers’ locations.
The independent variable of greatest interest is ”research strategy”, as it is fundamental to
all our research questions, given our approach. Concretely, we wish to examine whether
scientific orientation indeed influences a researcher’s ability to obtain funding and the
corresponding amount. To gain initial insight into whether the research strategy affects
23See Marimon (2008).
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on the survey respondents
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
public funding (d) 828 .82 .39 0 1
private funding (d) 828 .40 .49 0 1
fraction public funds 828 57.92 37.86 0 100
fraction private funds 828 13.11 24.15 0 100
annual amount public funds 828 60349 289071 0 4500000
annual amount private funds 828 7255 33662 0 525000
annual budget own institution 828 10862 63124 0 1500000
average application success rate public 686 53.79 31.92 0 100
average application success rate private 326 51.86 38.44 0 100
research strategy 743 2.25 1.16 0 4
gender (d) 828 .36 .48 0 1
age 828 43.64 11.14 22 77
tenured (d) 828 .59 .49 0 1
position 821 4.44 1.66 1 6
years from graduation 803 3.35 1.24 1 5
foreigner/national (d) 828 .28 .45 0 1
work environment 828 2.58 .64 0 3
working time research 828 45.01 20.02 2 100
working time fund raising 828 7.02 7.16 0 60
rated impact of external funding on career1 730 2.34 .77 1 3
HDI growth 828 .309 .117 -.11 .87
(d) indicates dummy variables
1 Respondents assessed the impact of external research funding on their future careers. We inter-
preted this as taking external funds seriously.
the fractions of the research budget provided by private and public sources, we present
the following graphs. The first graph (Figure 13) illustrates the fraction of public funds,
depending on type of research. The second graph (Figure 14) depicts the fraction of
private funds, depending on research strategy.
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Figure 13: Fraction of public funds by research strategy
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Figure 14: Fraction of private funds by research strategy
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The scatter plots illustrate - disregarding all other characteristics - that the more basic is
a researcher’s orientation, the larger is the fraction of public funds and, correspondingly,
the smaller is the fraction of private funds. To validate this finding, we conduct a first
univariate analysis, namely, the Spearman rank correlation test, presented in Table 2.
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Table 2: Spearman rank correlation
Characteristics research strategy
fraction public funds 0.056
(0.130)
fraction private funds -0.094***
(0.010)
Observations 743
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
* p-values in parentheses
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients and the corresponding p-values (in parentheses),
used to test the hypothesis that the research strategy and the fractions of funding provided
by public and private sources are independent, validate the descriptive statistics shown in
Figure 13 and Figure 14. While there is a distinct negative and highly significant trend
from applied to basic research in the fraction of private funds, the correlation between
research strategy and the fraction of public funds is positive and insignificant. Because
personal and work characteristics may have a bearing on the composition of the budget,
we will extend our analysis to a multivariate regression in section 10.4.2.
10.3 Methodology and empirical specifications
Our approach to estimating the structural parameters of our model of interscientific budget
structure rests on the idea that different types of research have different implications for
the sources of external financing. We analyze whether the research strategy adopted is
informative with respect to a researcher’s ability to raise external research funds and the
composition of research budgets. Therefore, we run several empirical regressions.
To begin, we examine whether the research strategy influences access to external research
funding via a Logit regression. We then examine the influence of research focus on the
fractions of funds from the two external funding sources (public and private), employing a
Tobit regression. Finally, we estimate the correlation between public and private research
funds to determine whether the different types of funding are substitutes or complements
and whether success in obtaining research funds positively or negatively influences the
probability of raising additional funds.
For purposes of comparison, we estimate different models using the same sample. Addi-
tionally, to validate our results, we exploit bootstrapped standard errors based on 1, 000
replications.
With respect to endogeneity, reverse causality may be a problem. The absence of a panel
data set or adequate instrument variables does not allow for such tests. However, it is
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unlikely that a researcher orients himself towards a certain strategy only because of a
specific funding possibility, especially in the short term. An arbitrary indication for this
reasoning is given in Section 12.1. There, we restrict the sample up to researchers who
never applied for private funds and show that the results estimated in Section 10.4 still
hold.
10.4 Empirical results
10.4.1 The research strategy and its impact on access to external funding
As outlined above, before addressing the composition of the budget, we investigate whether
the research strategy adopted influences a researcher’s ability to obtain external research
funds. Given the binary nature of the dependent variables ”public funding” and ”private
funding”, we use a Logit regression to predict the relationship24.
Table 3 reports the estimation results for the Logit model, in which public funding is the
dependent variable. ”0” is assigned to respondents who receive no public funds, and ”1”
is assigned to those who are publicly supported (they may receive private funds, but the
relationship between access to private funds and research strategy will be shown in the
next table). Our focus is not on allocations of funding of specific organizations but on
the general relationship. We emphasize that the marginal effects and t-statistics based
on Logit standard errors (in parentheses) and bootstrapped standard errors (in brackets)
(to account for asymptotic normality) are presented25. Column (1) refers to estimation
without any control variables, column (2) refers to individual related variables, and col-
umn (3) refers to work- and experience-related variables. Finally, column (4) merges all
control variables and includes the country dummies.
Overall, we find a positive relationship between the explanatory variable, research strat-
egy, and public funding. Nevertheless, the relationship is only highly significant (at the
5% level) in the case of applied-oriented research. In other words, involvement of slightly
basic research increases the probability of obtaining public funding by approximately
16%. Surprisingly, investing more in basic research is less worthwhile. A further step to-
ward basic-orientated or balanced research yields a 12% increase in funding probability,
an increase that is marginally significant (10%) only if we control for all related factors.
By contrast, a holistic focus on basic research is without value, even if all control variables
are included.
Additionally, other variables have significant effects on whether research is publicly funded.
As expected, time spent fundraising plays a role in access to public funding, with a margin
24Detailed tables are presented in Section 12.
25The marginal effects yielded by the two methods fully coincide.
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Table 3: Multivariate determinants of public funding
research strategy (1) (2) (3) (4)
applied-oriented .1454** .1537** .1646** .1600**
(2.09) (2.17) (2.37) (2.36)
[1.86] [2.01] [2.14] [2.13]
balanced .0837 .0919 .1226* .1201*
(1.20) (1.30) (1.79) (1.80)
[1.08] [1.21] [1.64] [1.65]
basic-oriented .0963 .1049 .1293* .1170*
(1.40) (1.48) (1.91) (1.74)
[1.29] [1.40] [1.74] [1.56]
pure basic .0689 .0700 .0770 .0677
(0.93) (0.93) (1.05) (0.94)
[0.86] [0.90] [0.99] [0.85]
Constant 1.157*** .2626 -.4247 -2.202*
(3.35) (0.38) (0.46) (1.69)
[2.97] [0.36] [0.44] [1.62]
Observations 538 538 538 538
McFadden’s R2 0.012 0.039 0.143 0.181
Country dummies and all variables presented in Table 8 are included in (4).
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
t-statistics based on Logit standard errors are in parentheses; t-statistics
based on bootstrapped standard errors are in brackets.
that is significant at the 10% level. Investing 1% more time in the application process and
in all related fundraising actions increases the probability of public funding by approxi-
mately 0.4%. Furthermore, the variable, average application success rate, is significant at
the 1% level, indicating that successful fundraising in the present has a positive (approxi-
mately 0.3%) effect on future funding prospects.
Table 4 shows the estimation results for the Logit model, in which private funding is the
dependent variable. Again, ”0” is assigned to respondents who receive no private funds,
and ”1” is assigned to those who are privately supported. Our focus, again, is not on
the allocation of private funds of specific organizations. We provide the marginal effects
and t-statistics based on Logit standard errors and bootstrapped standard errors. Column
(1) refers to the estimation without any control variables, column (2) refers to individual
related variables, and column (3) refers to work- and experience related variables, while
column (4) merges all control variables and additionally includes country dummies26.
We find a negative correlation between a basic research orientation and access to private
26This summary also applies to all subsequent regressions
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Table 4: Multivariate determinants of private funding
research strategy (1) (2) (3) (4)
applied-oriented -.1026 -.1053 -.1220 -.1149
(1.05) (1.10) (1.29) (1.17)
[1.00] [1.03] [1.20] [0.99]
balanced -.2273** -.2340** -.2100** -.2056**
(2.34) (2.48) (2.26) (2.16)
[2.16] [2.33] [2.29] [1.86]
basic-oriented -.2708*** -.2870*** -.2342*** -.2209**
(2.88) (3.08) (2.61) (2.33)
[2.73] [2.83] [2.35] [1.94]
pure basic -.1992* -.1990* -.2424** -.2226**
(1.86) (1.91) (2.36) (2.11)
[1.71] [1.74] [2.18] [1.71]
Constant 1.609*** .8481 1.117 1.591
(2.94) (0.98) (1.03) (1.03)
[2.68] [0.94] [0.98] [0.87]
Observations 263 263 263 263
McFadden’s R2 0.025 0.046 0.153 0.167
Country dummies and all variables presented in Table 8 are included in (4).
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
t-statistics based on Logit standard errors are in parentheses; t-statistics
based on bootstrapped standard errors are in brackets.
funding, with an effect that is significant (up to the 1% level) in all cases except one.
Only a move to slightly more basic research does not negatively affect funding proba-
bility. Put simply, the more basic research is, the more difficult it is to access private
funding. Concretely, the probability of being funded by a private organization decreases
by approximately 20.6% if a researcher’s research orientation is balanced, by 22.1% if
the researcher chooses a basic-orientated strategy, and by 22.3% if the researcher adopts
a pure basic strategy. In this regard, it is intriguing that a further shift to a more ba-
sic research orientation does not worsen access to private funding. The probabilities are
consistently lower, independently of the degree of basic research.
Additionally, time spent on research influences the probability of being privately funded.
Surprisingly, the relationship is negative and significant at the 5% level, although the
effect is very small. More time invested in research entails a 0.3% reduction in the prob-
ability of receiving private funding. At first glance, this may appear counterintuitive.
However, referring to the Section 9.2, an explanation is evident. We argued that firms are
generally uninterested in lengthy (that is, not readily applicable) research projects. Thus,
the less time a research project requires, the more likely it is to receive external financing
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from firms. As expected, the success rate of all applications for public funds plays an im-
portant role. Specifically, it is significant at the 1% level. Thus, as in the first regression, a
researcher who has received or continues to receive funding now obtains private funding
in the future with a 0.4% higher probability.
In summary, it can be stated that an applied-oriented research strategy appears to be the
most promising strategy in terms of access to both forms of external funding. On the one
hand, there is no significant decrease in the probability of private funding compared with
purely applied research. On the other hand, a marginal shift toward basic research signif-
icantly improves the probability of public funding. Interestingly, time spent fundraising
appears to have an impact solely on the public side, while time spent on research itself
appears to only impact the private side. Hence, the application procedure and all related
activities are crucial to the allocation of public funds and should be conducted accurately.
10.4.2 The research strategy and its impact on the fraction of external funds
In a second step, we analyze the composition of the budget. Figure 13 and Figure 14 are
examined in a multivariate setting. As the dependent variables (shares of the budget that
come from public and private external sources) are censored to a minimum of 0% and a
maximum of 100%, we apply two-limit Tobit regressions. The results, shown in Table 5
and Table 6, strengthen the implications of the above univariate Spearman regressions.
See the Tobit model for the fraction of public funds.
The results for the Tobit model, including the Tobit standard errors and bootstrapped stan-
dard errors, are summarized in Table 5. In contrast to access to public research funds, the
choice of research strategy has a significant influence on the fraction of public funds.
Consequently, the research strategy adopted is associated (up to the 1% level of signifi-
cance) with the composition of the budget. Changing the strategy from pure applied to
applied-oriented leads to a 23.4% higher fraction of public funds. Each additional move
toward pure basic research increases the share of the external public budget by approx-
imately 20.8, 18.7, and 15.5%, respectively. Of course, this tendency could be due to
a reduction of the fraction of external private funds (an issue examined in the following
table). Nevertheless, the magnitudes of the marginal effects are striking.
With respect to the control variables, we find similarities to the Logit regression. Work
time spent fundraising and the average application success rate have significant effects on
the share of public funds (at the 5 and 1% levels, respectively) . On closer examination, the
first variable increases the share of public funds by approximately 0.5%, and the second
variable raises the fraction of public funds by 0.4%. Therefore, it is somewhat profitable
to invest additional time in applying for research funding.
As promised, we now more closely examine the effects of research focus on the fraction
of private research funds, as seen in Table 6.
63
Table 5: Multivariate determinants of the fraction of public funds
research strategy (1) (2) (3) (4)
applied-oriented 15.48** 15.83** 16.51*** 15.67***
(2.43) (2.47) (2.80) (2.63)
[2.55] [2.58] [2.78] [2.48]
balanced 19.93*** 20.44*** 21.24*** 20.79***
(3.33) (3.39) (3.79) (3.67)
[3.30] [3.38] [3.62] [3.29]
basic-oriented 17.66*** 18.01*** 20.06*** 18.69***
(2.96) (2.97) (3.60) (3.28)
[3.05] [2.92] [3.40] [2.89]
pure basic 15.92** 16.57*** 16.52*** 15.51***
(2.48) (2.57) (2.77) (2.58)
[2.58] [2.49] [2.71] [2.41]
Constant 38.22*** 24.92* -15.64 -41.44**
(4.82) (1.76) (1.00) (2.00)
[4.91] [1.60] [1.01] [2.05]
Observations 538 538 538 538
McFadden’s R2 0.003 0.004 0.023 0.026
Country dummies and all variables presented in Table 8 are included in (4).
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
t-statistics based on Tobit standard errors are in parentheses; t-statistics
based on bootstrapped standard errors are in brackets.
Table 6 shows that not only the decision regarding whether a researcher obtains private
research funds (see the Logit regression presented in Table 4) but also the share of private
research funds depend significantly on research strategy. Accordingly, research strategy
has a considerable effect (up to the 1% level of significance) on the composition of the
budget. The fraction of private funds declines by approximately 19% if applied-orientated
research, rather than pure applied research, is conducted. An additional tendency toward
basic research does not extend this effect. If the researcher chooses a balanced (basic-
orientated or pure basic) strategy, the private fraction of the budget is 23.2% (20.6% or
20%) less compared with pure applied research. Hence, interestingly, the decline is stable
and independent of the proportion of basic research. Once a researcher has shifted to
fundamental research, the fraction of private funding does not change.
Moreover, the success rate of all applications for private funds has a significant (at the 1%
level) influence on the share of private research funds. Specifically, a researcher who has
received or continues to receive positive funding decisions has on average a 0.3% higher
share of private funds. It is particularly noteworthy that some personal characteristics af-
fect the private fraction if we include all control variables. Thus, foreign researchers are
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Table 6: Multivariate determinants of the fraction of private funds
research strategy (1) (2) (3) (4)
applied-oriented -14.92** -16.38** -19.21*** -19.03***
(1.96) (2.17) (2.61) (2.62)
[1.90] [2.13] [2.42] [2.26]
balanced -19.88*** -20.85*** -23.61*** -23.16***
(2.72) (2.88) (3.30) (3.28)
[2.53] [2.79] [2.99] [2.77]
basic-oriented -18.26** -20.74*** -19.91*** -20.61***
(2.53) (2.87) (2.80) (2.89)
[2.26] [2.66] [2.46] [2.41]
pure basic -16.47** -16.32** -21.12*** -20.04***
(2.10) (2.08) (2.79) (2.66)
[1.96] [2.06] [2.46] [2.25]
Constant 36.57*** 39.08** 20.09 43.62*
(4.19) (2.46) (1.06) (1.68)
[3.77] [2.38] [1.09] [1.49]
Observations 263 263 263 263
McFadden’s R2 0.005 0.010 0.023 0.031
Country dummies and all variables presented in Table 8 are included in (4).
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
t-statistics based on Tobit standard errors are in parentheses; t-statistics
based on bootstrapped standard errors are in brackets.
characterized by a 7.0% lower private fraction than national researchers (significant at the
10% level). This could be due to weaker networks or recent changes in residence. Finally,
the fraction of private research funds decreases by approximately 4.8% (which is signifi-
cant at the 5% level) with the attainment of an advanced academic position. Researchers
at the beginning of their careers, by contrast, can obtain a higher fraction of private funds,
possibly due to a smaller total budget und consequently a higher share of external funds
allocated to young researchers.
We feel partially vindicated with respect to hypothesis 1. Indeed, the fraction of the budget
attributable to external private donors is highest when pure applied research is pursued.
In addition, however, it is noteworthy that a stepwise orientation toward basic research
does not result in a linear decrease in the private funding share. The heaviest losses
are observable when a balanced strategy is undertaken, losses that are due, of course,
to a higher share of public funds. This finding in turn raises the question of why this
phenomenon is not observed in the case of pure basic research. As one would expect,
basic research is primarily publicly supported. However, compared with pure applied
research, the fraction of public funds is indeed significantly higher. Even so, it shows the
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smallest effect of all remaining research strategies.
10.4.3 The relationship between public and private research funds
A question that arises from the first multivariate regression is how external funds relate
to each other. Are they complementary or substitutive? We have shown that an applied
research focus increases the fraction of private funds and decreases the fraction of public
funds. Of course, these fractions of academic budgets cannot be used to examine the
relationship, as together they amount to 100% of a university’s budget. Therefore, we use
alternative variables, namely, the application success rates of external funding, to depict
the relationship via a Tobit model27.
The estimation results for the Tobit model with respect to the average application success
rate of public research funds are presented in Table 7. Column (1) refers to the estimation
of the success rate in general, pursuant to hypothesis 2. Moreover, to test hypothesis
3, all other columns show the estimation results for the different categories of research
strategy. The upper part of the table presents the outcome without any control variables,
while the bottom part includes individual-, work-, and experience-related variables and
country dummies. Again, t-statistics based on both Tobit standard errors and bootstrapped
standard errors for the general regression are also shown28.
To reassess hypothesis 2, we first examine column (1), which shows the influence of
the application success rate for private funding on the application success rate for public
funding. We find a positive correlation that is significant at the 1% level. For a 1%
increase in the average application success rate for private research funds, there is a 0.3%
increase in the predicted value of the average application success rate for public research
funds. This is an important finding, as it provides evidence for hypothesis 2. Indeed, the
probability of additional funding increases - if only slightly - with external funding in
the present. We can draw this conclusion without making any assumption regarding the
sequence of support (that is, private or public) because the result holds regardless of the
sequence. Apart from the fact that simultaneous application for both types of funding is
implausible, the grants themselves are highly unlikely to occur concurrently.
Unlike in the previous regression, the work environment is found to positively affect pri-
vate funding, with a marginal effect that is significant at the 5% level. In other words,
more focused and integrated research entails a 9.8% higher average success probability in
obtaining public funds. This could be due to established reputations, efficient networks,
the division of responsibilities, or other similar reasons.
27Theoretically, this could have been done by estimating the effects on the amounts of public and private
funds, but the survey provides less information on specific amounts.
28Unfortunately, the number of observations within the five categories is too small to run a bootstrapped
regression.
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The remaining columns pertain to hypothesis 3, namely, that there exist different degrees
of complementarity, depending on the diversification of research strategies. This hypoth-
esis is both confirmed and rejected . We acknowledge that these results should be treated
with caution, given the small number of observations. As can be observed, the comple-
mentarity is variously severe among the different categories. Contrary to our opinion, the
complementarity is most pronounced in cases of pure strategies. The significance and
the margins are largest if a researcher conducts either pure basic or pure applied projects.
Whereas pure basic and pure applied research are both statistically significant at the 1%
level, the latter implies a 1.7% and the former implies a 0.5% increase in the average
application success rate for public funds if the average application success rate increases
by 1%. These results are highly unexpected. After examining access to both funding
sources by means of a Logit regression (see Table 3 and Table 4), we would expect either
a negative relationship or no relationship. However, the signaling effect of existing fund-
ing appears to be conclusive if there is a sharp focus on either basic or applied research.
On the contrary, if a researcher is balanced in his or her orientation, employing different
research strategies, the private application success rate influences the application success
rate for public funds. An orientation toward applied research enhances the relationship
significantly, but the effect is not as large as in extreme cases. A 1% increase in the private
application success rate induces a 0.3% rise in the probability of obtaining public funding.
Contrary to expectations, focusing on a definite research strategy improves one’s chances
of being reviewed positively by external funding donors. A combination of fundamental
or basic and applied research (here called balanced) leads to a large diversity of outcomes
rather than reducing the probability of success. Additionally, such a combination does not
significantly influence the application success rate positively.
11 Discussion and Conclusions
”Knowledge is considered to be a primary resource for wealth creation and economic
growth and intellectual capital a crucial resource of economic advantage in the knowledge
economy”(Muscio, Quaglione, and Vallanti, 2013, p. 64). This knowledge is traditionally
created in universities where publicly conducted research has ”rested with the national, or
federal, government”(So¨rlin, 2007, p. 1). However, the ”funding of research and higher
education has become an increasingly important concern”(So¨rlin, 2007, p. 1). Therefore,
the new academic funding rationale and the promotion of external orientation of academic
research have raised several theoretical and policy questions regarding the future role of
universities and their future funding options. While we focus on researchers and leave
aside the new requirements of universities, we try to fill a void in the economics literature.
In summary, we obtain striking results, some of which are intuitive and expected, while
others are surprising. Nevertheless, all the results are indicative of a promising choice
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of strategy for obtaining funding within the social sciences. First and foremost, access
to research funding appears to be easiest, given an applied focus involving marginal ba-
sic elements. Compared with a pure applied research focus, the probability of obtaining
private funding is just as strong, whereas the probability of obtaining public funding is
significantly enhanced. Conducting basic research to a greater extent reduces the proba-
bility of obtaining private funding and yields only a minor advantage in obtaining public
funding.
With respect to fractions of external funds, we obtain slightly different results. An orien-
tation toward basic research leads to higher fractions of public funding up to an increase
of approximately 31.2 percentage points. Thus, a pure basic strategy is as worthwhile as
an applied-oriented strategy. In contrast, a deviation from a pure applied strategy causes
a substantial decrease in the share of private funding (approximately 20%), regardless
of whether basic research now constitutes a marginal part of overall research or all of it
. For this reason, we take hypothesis 1 as partially demonstrated and establish that the
fraction of the budget attributable to external private donors is largest when pure applied
research is conducted. Indeed, we also observe smaller fractions of private funding when
researchers mix strategies or conduct pure basic research. However, we did not expect
these effects to decline non-linearly. The minimal fraction of private funding is associ-
ated with a balanced strategy, which in turn exhibits the highest fraction of public research
funds. Thus, a pure basic strategy does not attract the largest fraction of public support.
Hypothesis 2 is confirmed by the significant positive correlation between the application
success rates for private and public funding. Hence, a positive previous evaluation - re-
gardless of whether it occurred publicly or privately - enhances the chances of raising
additional research funds. In accordance with Muscio, Quaglione, and Vallanti (2013) we
state that public and private funds are strategically complementary. Although this relation
is minor in an economic sense (approximately 0.3%), it is statistically significant, and we
use it to more closely examine the linkages between the success rates among the five re-
search strategies. The strongest connection is observed when a researcher conducts either
pure applied or pure basic research. Focusing on a specific research strategy improves the
researcher’s chances of being positively reviewed by external funding donors, whereas
scientific diversification is neither detrimental nor particularly advantageous. Thus, we
arrive at the conclusion that the degree of complementarity is u-shaped and that it is
worthwhile to focus on a specific strategy to exploit the close connections between strat-
egy and funding.
All our results provide a clear answer to our major question raised in the title: Does
research strategy matter in raising research funds? Yes, it does. While we do not wish to
judge whether basic or applied research is more promising (the needs are too diverse), a
sharp focus on one or the other appears to enhance fulfillment of the new requirements
researchers face in obtaining funding. Thus, focusing intently on core competencies rather
than on a wide variety of strategies fosters a higher probability of being successfully
evaluated and funded.
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Table 9: Multivariate determinants of public funding (detailed)
Characteristics (2) (3) (4)
applied-oriented research .1537** .1646** .1600**
(2.17) (2.37) (2.36)
[2.01] [2.14] [2.13]
balanced research .0919 .1226* .1201*
(1.30) (1.79) (1.80)
[1.21] [1.64] [1.65]
basic-oriented research .1049 .1293* .1170*
(1.48) (1.91) (1.74)
[1.40] [1.74] [1.56]
pure basic research .0700 .0770 .0677
(0.93) (1.05) (0.94)
[0.90] [0.99] [0.85]
gender (d) .0158 .0048
(0.48) (0.15)
[0.45] [0.15]
age -.0025 -.0018
(1.02) (0.77)
[0.96] [0.66]
tenured (d) .0173 .0049
(0.41) (0.12)
[0.37] [0.13]
foreigner/national (d) .0178 .0476
(0.50) (1.34)
[0.47] [1.17]
position .0201 .0187
(1.15) (1.07)
[1.09] [0.99]
years from graduation .0315 .0308
(1.19) (1.23)
[1.19] [1.10]
annual budget own institution 4.37e-07 3.50e-07
(0.69) (0.57)
[0.71] [0.56]
work environment -.0112 -.0094
(0.43) (0.35)
[0.40] [0.34]
working time research -.0004 .0005
72
Characteristics (2) (3) (4)
(0.59) (0.63)
[0.56] [0.60]
working time fund raising .0041* .0043*
(1.67) (1.73)
[1.37] [1.34]
average application success rate public .0036*** .0033***
(7.14) (7.03)
[5.75] [5.64]
rated impact of external funding on career -.0128 -.0002
(0.62) (0.01)
[0.64] [0.01]
HDI growth .1357 .1151
(1.01) (0.79)
[0.91] [0.68]
Constant .2626 -.4247 -2.202*
(0.38) (0.46) (1.69)
[0.36] [0.44] [1.62]
Observations 538 538 538
McFadden’s R2 0.039 0.143 0.181
(d) indicates dummy variables
Country dummies are included in (4).
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
t-statistics based on Logit standard errors are in parentheses; t-statistics based on
bootstrapped standard errors are in brackets.
Table 10: Multivariate determinants of private funding (detailed)
Characteristics (2) (3) (4)
applied-oriented research - .1053 -.1220 -.1149
(1.10) (1.29) (1.17)
[1.03] [1.20] [0.99]
balanced research -.2340** -.2099** -.2056**
(2.48) (2.26) (2.16)
[2.33] [2.29] [1.86]
basic-oriented research -.2870*** -.2342*** -.2209**
(3.08) (2.61) (2.33)
[2.83] [2.35] [1.94]
pure basic research -.1990* -.2424** -.2226**
(1.91) (2.36) (2.11)
[1.74] [2.18] [1.71]
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Characteristics (2) (3) (4)
gender (d) .0659 .0192
(1.02) (0.31)
[0.94] [0.26]
age .0017 .0018
(0.35) (0.41)
[0.34] [0.33]
tenured (d) .0740 .0455
(0.93) (0.60)
[0.89] [0.50]
foreigner/national (d) -.0501 -.0957
(0.74) (1.35)
[0.70] [1.15]
position .0026 -.0379
(0.08) (1.10)
[0.07] [0.93]
years from graduation .0144 .0047
(0.28) (0.10)
[0.27] [0.07]
annual budget own institution 1.46e-07 3.55e-07
(0.35) (0.37)
[0.16] [0.16]
work environment -.0124 -.0173
(0.25) (0.32)
[0.23] [0.26]
working time research -.0031** -.0033**
(2.30) (2.15)
[2.11] [1.75]
working time fund raising .0021 .0021
(0.49) (0.47)
[0.44] [0.42]
average application success rate private .0040*** .0042***
(6.86) (6.62)
[5.98] [5.65]
rated impact of external funding on career -.0332 -.0384
(0.88) (0.96)
[0.90] [0.81]
HDI growth .5077 .4895
(1.56) (1.40)
[1.47] [1.23]
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Characteristics (2) (3) (4)
Constant .8481 1.117 1.591
(0.98) (1.03) (1.03)
[0.94] [0.98] [0.87]
Observations 263 263 263
McFadden’s R2 0.046 0.153 0.167
(d) indicates dummy variables
Country dummies are included in (4).
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
t-statistics based on Logit standard errors are in parentheses; t-statistics based on
bootstrapped standard errors are in brackets.
Table 11: Multivariate determinants of the fraction of public funds
(detailed)
Characteristics (2) (3) (4)
applied-oriented research 15.83** 16.51*** 15.67***
(2.47) (2.80) (2.63)
[2.58] [2.78] [2.8]
balanced research 20.44*** 21.24*** 20.79***
(3.39) (3.79) (3.67)
[3.38] [3.62] [3.29]
basic-oriented research 18.01*** 20.06*** 18.69***
(2.97) (3.60) (3.28)
[2.92] [3.40] [2.89]
pure basic research 16.57*** 16.52*** 15.51***
(2.57) (2.77) (2.58)
[2.49] [2.71] [2.41]
gender (d) 3.218 -.4449
(0.95) (0.14)
[0.92] [0.13]
age -.0152 .0766
(0.06) (0.32)
[0.06] [0.32]
tenured (d) 0.9637 -.4642
(0.22) (0.12)
[0.22] [0.12]
foreigner/national (d) 3.704 5.461
(1.04) (1.53)
[1.04] [1.42]
position -.5746 -.0127
75
Characteristics (2) (3) (4)
(0.30) (0.01)
[0.27] [0.01]
years from graduation 2.642 2.618
(0.95) (1.00)
[0.92] [1.02]
annual budget own institution 3.95e-06 -7.20e-07
(0.21) (0.04)
[0.07] [0.01]
work environment -2.975 -2.915
(1.18) (1.11)
[1.14] [1.05]
working time research .0849 .1394
(1.10) (1.64)
[1.03] [1.57]
working time fund raising .4497** .4644**
(2.07) (2.11)
[1.84] [1.91]
average application success rate public .4113*** .4109***
(9.87) (9.82)
[8.57] [8.61]
rated impact of external funding on career 3.342* 3.444
(1.69) (1.63)
[1.77] [1.49]
HDI growth 16.26 17.27
(1.25) (1.27)
[1.15] [1.16]
Constant 24.92* -15.64 -41.44**
(1.76) (1.00) (2.00)
[1.60] [1.01] [2.05]
Observations 538 538 538
McFadden’s R2 0.004 0.023 0.026
(d) indicates dummy variables
Country dummies are included in (4).
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
t-statistics based on Logit standard errors are in parentheses; t-statistics based on
bootstrapped standard errors are in brackets.
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Table 12: Multivariate determinants of the fraction of private funds
(detailed)
Characteristics (2) (3) (4)
applied-oriented research -16.38** -19.21*** -19.03***
(2.17) (2.61) (2.62)
[2.13] [2.42] [2.26]
balanced research -20.85*** -23.61*** -23.16***
(2.88) (3.30) (3.28)
[2.79] [2.99] [2.77]
basic-oriented research -20.74*** -19.91*** -20.61***
(2.87) (2.80) (2.89)
[2.66] [2.46] [2.41]
pure basic research -16.32** - 21.12*** -20.04***
(2.08) (2.79) (2.66)
[2.06] [2.46] [2.25]
gender (d) 7.450** 5.360
(2.07) (1.55)
[1.89] [1.41]
age .1479 .1855
(0.56) (0.73)
[0.56] [0.63]
tenured (d) 1.400 .1864
(0.30) (0.04)
[0.29] [0.04]
foreigner/national (d) -4.075 -7.014*
(1.04) (1.66)
[1.05] [1.48]
position -3.316* -4.801**
(1.69) (2.44)
[1.40] [2.12]
years from graduation 1.937 1.446
(0.67) (0.52)
[0.64] [0.47]
annual budget own institution -1.87e-05 -1.45e-05
(1.22) (0.95)
[0.36] [0.34]
work environment -1.249 -.9721
(0.44) (0.33)
[0.43] [0.30]
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Characteristics (2) (3) (4)
working time research -.0296 -.1270
´ (0.36) (1.42)
[0.32] [1.30]
working time fund raising .2817 .1377
(1.14) (0.55)
[1.05] [0.57]
average application success rate private .2340*** .2560***
(5.77) (6.34)
[5.73] [5.91]
rated impact of external funding on career -.1892 -.6405
(0.09) (0.28)
[0.09] [0.26]
HDI growth 10.81 5.648
(0.58) (0.29)
[0.58] [0.28]
Constant 39.08** 20.09 43.62*
(2.46) (1.06) (1.68)
[2.38] [1.09] [1.49]
Observations 263 263 263
McFadden’s R2 0.010 0.023 0.031
(d) indicates dummy variables
Country dummies are included in (4).
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
t-statistics based on Logit standard errors are in parentheses; t-statistics based on
bootstrapped standard errors are in brackets.
Table 13: Multivariate determinants of the relationship between
public and private application success rates (detailed)
Characteristics with control variables
average application success rate private .2512***
(5.03)
[4.51]
applied-oriented research -15.02*
(1.94)
[1.84]
balanced research -17.41**
(2.34)
[2.12]
basic-oriented research -13.46*
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Characteristics with control variables
(1.81)
[1.68]
pure basic research -13.35*
(1.66)
[1.66]
gender (d) .9598
(0.22)
[0.18]
age -.0993
(0.32)
[0.30]
tenured (d) 4.693
(0.85)
[0.78]
foreigner/national (d) 6.567
(1.27)
[1.14]
position 2.791
(1.14)
[1.00]
years from graduation -.5963
(0.17)
[0.17]
annual budget own institution -1.14e-05
(0.60)
[0.26]
work environment 7.667**
(2.13)
[2.14]
working time research .1606
´ (1.45)
[1.42]
working time fund raising .0125
(0.04)
[0.04]
rated impact of external funding on career -2.791
(0.99)
[0.96]
HDI growth -1.430
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Characteristics with control variables
(0.06)
[0.06]
Constant 17.11
(0.69)
[0.62]
Observations 250
McFadden’s R2 0.028
(d) indicates dummy variables
Country dummies are included.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
t-statistics based on Tobit standard errors are in parentheses; t-statistics based
on bootstrapped standard errors are in brackets.
12.1 Robustness
As argued in Section 10.3 we now present the estimation results for the Logit and To-
bit regression based on the subsample. Although the marginal effects exceed the ones
estimated in Section 10.4, the algebraic sign as well as the levels of significance remain
relatively stable.
Table 14: Test for endogeneity
Characteristics acess to public funding fraction of public funds
applied-oriented research .2000* 22.90**
(1.91) (2.56)
balanced research .1895* 30.55***
(1.84) (3.64)
basic-oriented research .2053** 26.51***
(2.04) (3.10)
pure basic research .2043* 26.30***
(1.93) (3.00)
Constant .6705 -23.34
(0.28) (0.75)
Observations 228 259
McFadden’s R2 0.323 0.039
All control variables and country dummies are included.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
t-statistics based on Logit/Tobit standard errors are in parentheses.
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Part III
Liberty, Equality, Fraternity? How
accessible are Research Funds in
Europe?
13 Introduction
As a result of the continued opening and coalescing of European countries, higher ed-
ucation systems have recently undergone wide-ranging transformations, imposing new
challenges on academics and additional requirements in evaluating scientific researchers’
performance. Today, international competition for research funds demands that aca-
demics have a large degree of cross-border labor mobility, well-conceived research and
network strategies and, of course, considerable scientific output. Thus, academic success
is no longer solely based on publications and citations but is also based on researchers’
fundraising abilities and experience. However, are the conditions for prosperous external
research funding the same throughout the European Research Area (ERA)? Furthermore,
do all researchers face the same access to external funding, or do foreign researchers suf-
fer from an unbalanced allocation of funding compared with their native-born colleagues,
who may benefit from being better acquainted with local research systems, the native lan-
guage and potential funding sources? Although we find a negative answer for the first
question by highlighting the main differences between various funding systems in the
ERA, we focus our attention on the second question in this study and must answer it in
the negative also.
The issue of equal opportunity regarding the allocation of research funds is of vital sig-
nificance not only because of our research questions but also because of the shortage of
non-competitive public money. Specifically, as a result of political pressure (Maastricht
criteria), the lack of competitiveness and the quest for recognition in the scientific com-
munity, a great number of European countries have reformed their funding systems and
implemented a system of institutions to which funds are directly allocated to improve
”the efficiency of research funds and increase the accountability of universities as well
as the pressure to reduce their costs” (Muscio, Quaglione, and Vallanti, 2013, p. 64).
These reforms have been constructed and conducted differently in different countries, but
all are driven by similar general objectives, ”which are promoting a contractual-oriented
approach to university research funding, aimed at indirect control of the behavior of uni-
versities through the introduction of (quasi-market) financial incentive schemes”(Muscio,
Quaglione, and Vallanti, 2013, p. 64). Moreover, sufficient and fairly allocated external
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funding determines how attractive a country is to outstanding scholars, in addition to pro-
jecting its approach to science to the rest of the world. Therefore, a country should design
its research environment and funding optimally.
In this study, we concentrate on the probabilities of external funding (and are not inter-
ested in the concrete amounts of financial support, which is frequently based on the needs
of particular projects) to compare the chances of securing funding for foreign and na-
tional scholars in the social sciences. In doing so, we briefly examine the situation at
the European level and find a significant discrepancy that is biased against foreign re-
searchers. Scholars remaining in their home countries are up to 10.5% more likely to
secure funding. This first result elicits so much interest that we wish to analyze whether
it holds for all regions in the ERA or whether some of these regions manage this issue
in a more balanced way. Indeed, clustering the countries into 4 groups (Western Euro-
pean; Northern European; Continental and Southern European; and Central, Eastern and
Southeastern European) reveals substantial differences among countries. Whereas cer-
tain countries feature no discrimination against foreigners (such as the Western European
countries), others place them at a competitive disadvantage for external funds (mainly
the Continental and Southern European countries) to various degrees. This phenomenon
is the result of the different organizational structures and development levels of higher
education systems. Certainly, all countries in the ERA are making efforts to improve
their competitiveness and openness, but they could and should ”reform their research sys-
tems according to their own strengths and national specificities”29 based on the diversity
of their institutional paths and governance structures. Some states have already accom-
plished their objectives, whereas others are still pursuing their goals. At this point, we
emphasize that we do not want these latter countries to feel pilloried. Instead, we wish to
provide some political implications and learn from the best-performing countries. There-
fore, we go into further detail by examining which group of foreigners is potentially most
adversely affected (if indeed) and which group is treated equally compared with nationals.
We placed foreigners into two groups: related countries (belonging to the same country
group) and distant countries (from outside of the country grouping). Surprisingly, coun-
tries from different regions address the two groups of foreigners in markedly different
ways. Western European countries disadvantage only distant foreigners in terms of pri-
vate funding, and Northern European countries do the same with related foreign scholars
as to public funding. Meanwhile, although the Central, Eastern and Southeastern Euro-
pean countries (CESE) show no discriminatory treatment in general, the Continental and
Southern European group disadvantages both types of foreigners in terms of public fund-
ing. Therefore, both the Northern European and the Continental and Southern European
groups must reconsider the role of public funding, which is the primary external funding
source for social sciences.
We are able to showcase these remarkable results, which would not be possible without
29European Research Area Progress Report (2013).
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the exceptional microdata on individual researchers provided by the Max Weber Pro-
gramme. To the best of our knowledge, these microdata differ from those employed by
earlier research in several ways. By conducting an econometric analysis based on the
foreign status of researchers, we are the first to explore access to specific funding sources
in different countries with data from active scholars. Moreover, this outstanding dataset
allows us to compare the funding possibilities within the ERA through a cross-regional
analysis. Moreover, precise consequences may be drawn due to the distinction between
groups of foreigners. On the one hand, researchers themselves may consider carefully
where to move and where to apply for external funding (depending on their nationality
and country of residence). On the other hand, this approach encourages countries to think
outside the box and improve their national conditions by learning from countries that
perform better.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 13.1 provides a short overview
of the related literature, and in Section 13.2, we formulate our hypotheses on the alloca-
tion of research funding based on a description of the systems of exemplary countries.
Section 14 presents the data description, the descriptive statistics and the methodology
before we address the empirical results for the general European case and for the country
clusters. Section 15 summarizes and elaborates the political implications of our research.
We present the results of our robustness checks, including estimations based on an alter-
native clustering, are presented in Section 16.1.
13.1 Related Literature
My paper, which analyzes a specific characteristic, i.e., access to external research funding
for foreign researchers, fills a void between two strands of literature. In one strand, much
research has focused on academic mobility in general and in Europe, in particular. The
other strand has examined systems of higher education and research funding.
The first strand, which focuses on the international mobility of researchers, is broadly
discussed by Inzelt (2011), Ivancheva and Gourova (2011), Ackers (2009), and Grigolo,
Lietaert, and Marimon (2010). In accordance with these studies, we infer that the mo-
bility of researchers is increasingly important in Europe. This development is crucial
”as people convey knowledge between organisations and countries, brain circulation may
lead to many positive effects on the speed and quality of knowledge transfer, and on the
absorption of new knowledge”(Inzelt, 2011, p. 5). Correspondingly, Inzelt (2011) exam-
ines the flows of researchers from and to different countries and concludes that ”there
are important differences among the EU27 Member States in their attractiveness for re-
searchers”(Inzelt, 2011, p. 17). Furthermore, ”the intra-European flows dominate mobil-
ity in European countries”, whereas ”the process is still strongly characterised by west-
ward mobility”(Inzelt, 2011, p. 17). Grigolo, Lietaert, and Marimon (2010) go one step
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further and investigate the possible reasons for differentiated scientific mobility by exam-
ining salaries, career steps and working conditions. In contrast to these studies, we focus
solely on whether a migration is associated with equal chances of successfully securing
funding, which is a requirement for effective researchers. Grigolo, Lietaert, and Marimon
(2010) find that there are 4 clusters of countries within Europe that are graded accord-
ing to their attractiveness and openness to foreigners (Anglo-Saxon, Central and Eastern
Europe, Continental, and Scandinavian).
In addition, there are several approaches that consider mobility within certain countries
of the EU (see Ackers and Gill (2005), Bala´zˇ and Williams (2004), Mavroudi and Warren
(2013), Oko´lski (2000), Oko´lski (2001), Pelizon (2002) Sretenova (2003)). However, be-
cause we are interested in comparing access to external funding among different regions,
we do not go into detail regarding specific mobility within a country.
The second strand, which focuses on higher education systems and research funding,
may be divided into 2 dimensions. First, there are political publications, mainly edited
by the EU, that describe established systems and progress across Europe (see European
Commission (2011), European Commission (2010), and van Dijk (2011)) and provide
information on the general circumstances in various countries. In addition, there is other
literature that examines certain European regions in greater detail, typically Central and
Eastern European (CEE) countries (see Radosevic and Lepori (2009), and Lepori, Masso,
Jablecka, Sima, and Ukrainski (2009)), with the objective of describing the transforma-
tion of research funding systems since the breakdown of socialism. Other scientific pa-
pers also consider and analyze research funding. Lepori (2011) compares project funding,
vertically integrated funding and core funding in higher education systems and in public
research laboratories in a general setting. By highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of
different systems, he develops propositions based on ”the conditions under which funding
systems can be expected to perform well”(Lepori, 2011, p. 366) and proposes an identifi-
cation and examination of weaknesses in existing funding portfolios and instruments in-
stead of establishing completely new systems and concludes that ”the existence of stable
institutions and expectations on the future is critical for the development of actors’ strate-
gies and thus make a case for a progressive rather than for a radical approach to funding
system’s reforms”(Lepori, 2011, p. 365). Whereas Lepori (2011) focuses on public re-
search funds, Muscio, Quaglione, and Vallanti (2013) examine the relationship between
public and private research funding and find that they are strategically complementary
such that ”public funding can play an important role in stimulating those university-
industry interactions”(Muscio, Quaglione, and Vallanti, 2013, p. 73). This conjecture is
consistent with our previous paper (Friedrici and Hakenes (2014a)) and is another reason
to urgently consider foreigners’ chances of being funded.
Several studies in the previous literature employ methods that resemble our approach and
arrive at similar general results. Auranen and Nieminen (2010) find significant country-
specific differences among European and Asian-Pacific funding environments and do so
by distinguishing between input- and output-oriented funding systems. In addition, they
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establish a connection to publication output and demonstrate that a competitive fund-
ing system (such as that in the UK) appears to increase research activity. This type of
performance-based funding system is also theoretically analyzed by Geuna and Martin
(2003), who compare costs and benefits and are convinced that the former most likely
exceed the latter over time and that a hybrid system that is based on performance and
educational size30 appears to be a promising alternative. However, Mariathasan and Ma-
rimon (2011) and Ivancheva and Gourova (2011), both based on surveys, likewise find
substantial differences in the allocation of research funds in the ERA: ”Unfortunately, the
national actions did not create a homogenous environment and researchers face various
problems when moving between countries”(Ivancheva and Gourova, 2011, p. 196), par-
ticularly with respect to research funding. Nonetheless, the previous research does not
analyze concrete differences in the access to public and private research funding experi-
enced by foreign scholars compared with national scholars.
13.2 Theoretical Background and Motivation
As Europe continues to coalesce and mobility within member states continues to increase,
new challenges that have previously not existed at this level must be confronted. As a re-
sult of blurring boundaries, Europeans are freer to decide where to work and where to
live. This condition affects researchers, in particular, who historically have been more
flexible than other occupation groups. However, this blurring of boundaries also begs the
question as to whether foreign researchers have the same access to work as their native
colleagues who may be more familiar with local systems, are native speakers of the local
language and who tend to have better professional connections in their native country. In
this regard, we emphasize that we do not discuss Europe sensu stricto; instead, we are
focused on the ERA. This region is defined as a ”unified research area open to the world
based on the Internal Market, in which researchers, scientific knowledge and technology
circulate freely and through which the Union and its Member States strengthen their sci-
entific and technological bases, their competitiveness and their capacity to collectively
address grand challenges”31. In defiance of this characterization and due to the great di-
versity of countries, requirements and circumstances for researchers, we assume that the
unification is not yet completed. Existing research systems vary widely from one another
and require researchers from abroad to acquire a taste for the specific situation in the new
country more or less intensively. Therefore, before mastering with the local and national
political structures, bureaucracies and possible funding sources, the research professions
generally must scale a learning curve. Above all, this condition might become conspicu-
ous if external research funding is considered. Therefore, we formulate our hypothesis 1
as follows:
30This type of system has been implemented in the Scandinavian countries.
31European Research Area Progress Report (2013).
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H1: Foreigners in the ERA have more problems than nationals in securing access to
external funding.
As discussed above, we observe a wide range of political and economic differences among
countries in the ERA. Consequently, the higher education sector is heterogeneous in this
region, and conditions for researchers must be considered and evaluated not as a general
matter but on a country-by-country basis. we address this need by describing the higher
education systems, beginning with those systems in the United Kingdom32.
The UK higher education system, which has been adapted by, for instance, Ireland and
the Netherlands, is characterized by having the largest and fastest-growing R&D budgets
(together with Continental Europe) and the largest amounts of foreign funds. In addi-
tion, the UK has the highest degree of competition and openness to external researchers
because of the frequent and transparent ex ante and ex post evaluation procedures, in ad-
dition to unfettered and transparent recruitment procedures. Because foreign researchers
at all levels are understood as representing the primary driver of the dynamic culture of
the UK at its higher education institutions, the UK shows the highest rate of academic
staff from abroad within the EU. These scholars and their colleagues from the UK enjoy
advantages in their academic flexibility, high-quality administration and freedom from
teaching responsibilities. These benefits offer researchers a sharper focus and more time
to spend on research. Consequently, these benefits are reflected in the amount and quality
of scientific performance at UK institutions of higher education, which is internationally
outstanding and leads the ERA. Moreover, the liberalization process over the last 20 years
has engendered a progressive salary tariff that incentivizes researchers to engage in even
more research and to remain within the scientific system. Specifically, salaries are rela-
tively low at entry positions and increase over the span of an academic career, and foreign
researchers have greater access to high positions than in other countries because of few
informal agreements and rules. Likewise, the structure of funding opportunities enables
success. There is a great variety of independent funding agencies that allocate financial
support for specific purposes at different career stages. In particular, programs for young
researchers are open to everyone and foreign scholars are inducted into the academic sys-
tem at early stages.
The Danish scheme, which is also implemented in Sweden and Norway, is typically open,
competitive and meritocratic. Job advertisements are published internationally, local in-
stitutional structures augment an advantageous and efficient research environment and the
funding system is formally open. Nonetheless, this scheme is characterized by informal
rules. Vacant positions are regularly filled with either familiar researchers or scholars
already employed by the university. Therefore, external and foreign researchers are sel-
dom engaged, and the researcher mobility is moderate. Similarly, academic careers are
frequently managed through informal agreements. Therefore, there is a low likelihood
for external and foreign researchers to successfully pursue long-term careers. In addition,
32For further details, see Marimon (2008).
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language barriers may aggravate access to the regime and to universities themselves be-
cause there are teaching obligations, and these classes are held in the native language.
Researchers must perform teaching tasks that demand as much time as research itself;
in addition, many positions (including tenure-track positions) are primarily temporary.
However, as in the case of the UK, there are many independent funding agencies. These
agencies implement their objectives independently and are transparent and competitive.
Meanwhile, funding itself is mainly constructed in a centralized manner, and the govern-
ment prescribes the major targets through a general research agenda. In summary, the
Danish system shows both open and restricted elements, but the system plans on being
more open in the future. To a greater degree, current research structures are expected to be
enhanced through reforms in research strategies and more funding. In addition, the inter-
national qualification of young researchers will be supported through facilely obtainable
funding to grant recognition for scientific outcomes.
Continental Europe consists of highly heterogeneous higher education systems, but all
these systems share a relatively inner-oriented strategy and a high level of centralization
as a result of much formalization. However, informal rules, as emphasized by Grigolo,
Lietaert, and Marimon (2010), also dominated de facto the recruitment procedures such
that vacancies are frequently filled with known colleagues, and external and non-national
researchers face considerably lower chances of employment. Analogously, academic ca-
reers are dominated by seniority rules and determined by positive assessments of scientific
output. In addition, job advertisements are either published in the native language or not
at all. Therefore, countries such as France, Germany, Italy and Spain obstruct foreign
scholars’ access to their academic systems. Moreover, the incentive design is not well
elaborated; in particular, young researchers suffer from low salaries and are thus only
weakly encouraged to increase the quantity and quality of their output and their visibility
in the academic world. The primary funding sources and researchers’ decision making
are somewhat less independent because of ex ante evaluation schemes that involve se-
nior researchers from the same country, which indicates that the allocation of funds may
not correspond to scientific performance or the value of research. In addition, foreign
funds appear to be decreasing. With these conditions in mind, it is clear that the system
is not particularly meritocratic and relatively closed to international competitors. How-
ever, as argued at the beginning of this paragraph, there is a great diversity among the
Continental European countries with respect to how closed they are. In the recent past,
France, Germany and Spain have reformed their systems at different levels to foster more
competitiveness, flexibility and openness.
Poland belongs to a group of countries that is even more heterogeneous than the Conti-
nental European cluster, i.e., the CEE countries. Nonetheless, these countries have sev-
eral common attributes such as small research budgets, low wages and funding amounts
and thus limited competitiveness, in addition to historically authoritarian Soviet academic
structures. This cluster is endeavoring to reform its systems into more flexible, liberal
and competitive academic environments to attempt to reduce the brain drain into Western
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European countries. Therefore, these countries have adapted their curricula to interna-
tional standards, changed the configuration of their universities, increased international
networking and downsized administrative and teaching staffs. The private higher educa-
tion systems in these countries in fact have superior administrative structures compared
with those of other countries within the ERA, and research relies heavily on private fund-
ing. However, these countries face a range of problems. The issues of informal rules,
non-transparency, language barriers and issues with openness and external evaluation are
even more prevalent than in their neighboring countries to the West. As a result, foreign
researchers’ access to the systems is substantially afflicted in spite of the fact that Poland
and other countries are taking auspicious measures.
This short overview of the main characteristics of selected countries urges us to distin-
guish carefully between these groups of countries. National public funding is the major
source of funding, particularly in the UK and in Continental European countries, whereas
private funding is becoming increasingly prominent in the CEE countries. Salaries vary
substantially, and some countries (such as Denmark, Germany, Norway and Spain) are
able to attract more promising junior scientific staff than others. These countries feature a
high share of young researchers, whereas only a few foreign full professors are employed.
Conversely, Switzerland and the CEE countries feature a greater number of foreign full
professors and smaller numbers of foreign junior researchers. Accordingly, we derive
our next hypothesis by assuming that an open higher education system comes along with
balanced funding probabilities:
H2: Countries with an open higher education system tend to have a more balanced
allocation of research funds between national and foreign scholars than countries
with closed higher education systems.
As discussed above, the systems and research environments within the ERA are heteroge-
neous. We suspect that successfully integrating scholars into a new research environment
is sharply affected by differences between the well-known home system and the system
in the country of residence. Thus, we use the example of an English researcher moving to
Croatia, who comes from an open system with efficiently constructed funding schemes,
no teaching obligations, high-quality administration and high salaries. He neither speaks
the local language nor has any points of contact in his new system, which is substantially
different from his own. It would most likely take a long time for him to learn about fund-
ing opportunities, to pursue local networking and to accustom himself to teaching and to
his administrative tasks (even more so if they are conducted in the local language). In
contradistinction to this example, we can examine the same researcher immigrating to
Ireland. He then knows the language and will find many similarities with respect to the
academic structures in his home country. The administrative standard is identical, as is
his teaching flexibility and the language. Accordingly, the integration process should not
be difficult. Ultimately he should cope with the system much better than would in the
Croatian case. Thus, we obtain our third hypothesis:
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H3: A greater distance between the configuration of the higher education systems
in the home country and the country of residence implies that access to external
funding will be more problematic.
In the course of this work, we will repeatedly make reference to and reassess these hy-
potheses.
14 Empirical Analysis
14.1 Data Source and Description
The three surveys conducted by the Academic Careers Observatory of the Max Weber
Programme in the years 2010 and 2011 serve as the basis for our empirical analysis.
At that time, economists, sociologists and political scientists residing in over 50 coun-
tries were separately requested to complete an online questionnaire concerning research
funding in the social sciences in Europe. The objective was to learn about their funding
experiences.
My main concern is with the probability of successfully being externally funded. There-
fore, we created new variables using the data from the survey; we were not interested
in the concrete amounts of the financial support. Instead, we focused on whether a re-
searcher secures funding. Therefore, we created a dummy variable and assigned the value
1 to all researchers who indicated either a positive amount of the annual budget or a pos-
itive fraction of funds stemming from external funding sources. To all other researchers,
we assigned 0. In addition, we distinguished between public and private funding. In the
same manner, we managed the particular funding sources, including funds from national
and regional institutions, the European Research Council and the Framework Programme
with respect to public funding and national and regional firms and firms awarding prizes
and conducting consultancy contracts regarding private funding. If a researcher stated,
for example, that he/she secured a positive fraction of funds allocated by a national public
institution, he obtains 1 and 0 otherwise. The overall and single characteristics, inter-
preted as success probabilities, have each finally been accumulated and separated into the
funding probabilities for nationals and foreigners33.
In addition to information about individual funding, the multiscientific dataset also gathers
personal and institutional characteristics. More precisely, the researchers were exempli
gratia asked to provide their age, gender, position, employer, department, the allocation
of their working time and the years that have elapsed since they received their highest
33We did not use the variables ”Application Success Rate” given in the survey because there were too
few answers given.
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degree. We interpreted the last as academic age and assume that this measure is more
important than ”true” age. Therefore, we substitute the first for the second. The variables
”employer” and ”position” have been modified. Because we are primarily interested in
the academic sector, we only included universities and research institutes34 into our esti-
mations and omit private organizations, governments and central banks (which represent
only 7% of the participants). For purposes of our research questions, we believe that the
nature of employment is crucial. Therefore, we split ”position” by using non-tenured (0)
and tenured as characteristics (1). On a related note, the most important individual vari-
able is foreign status. We used information on the 70 different nationalities and countries
of residence to compare both. If they coincide, the researcher is classified as being a na-
tional; if not, he is a foreigner. Similarly, we classified ”soft” and ”distant” foreigners. If
nationality and residence are identical, we denote the researcher as being national; if the
researcher is non-national but from a country belonging to the same cluster, he is a ”soft”
foreigner and otherwise is a ”distant” foreigner.
Furthermore, we included a set of national-level variables to control for country-specific
conditions and to conduct an alternative classification of countries35 in addition to the
regional clustering36. Namely, these are the H-Index, the net yearly remuneration averages
as measured by Purchasing Power Standard (PPS), the gross domestic expenditure on
R&D (GERD) as a percentage of GDP, and the affinity of the national language as related
to English, which is commonly considered the scientific language. The H-Index and the
GERD are implicitly integrated in the estimations, whereas all of these measures are used
to generate the alternative country groups.
We now want to describe the applied key figures in detail. Therefore, we begin with the
H-Index, which is an index that measures the efficiency and relevance of a researcher’s
published work. This index is based on the most cited papers and the amount of cita-
tions that they have received in other publications (such as books, reports, etc.). Thus, a
researcher with an index of x has published x papers, and all of these papers have been
cited in other journals at least x times. Instead of using this individual index, we apply it
in a country setting. This approach is driven by the lack of information (we do not have
information on the personal H-Index of the participants of the survey, so we entrusted the
country H-Indices to the countries of residence). The second national measure we em-
ployed is the set of net yearly remuneration averages based on PPS, which represents the
rate of exchange that accounts for price differences across countries, that is transformed
into a standardized form with the EU region as a base37. The third feature is the rather
structurally political GERD as a percentage of GDP38. Finally, we included the affin-
34Such institutions are the second most important employer for research economists (see Research Fund-
ing for Economics in Europe).
35This classification may be found in the Appendix.
36See Section 14.2.1.
37Marimon (2008).
38This information is collected from the databases of Eurostat, the OECD and the World Bank.
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ity of native languages related to English with the aid of the Maximum clade credibility
tree. In the survey, we find 4 linguistic families: Caucasian, Afroasiatic, Uralic and Indo-
European. The Uralic is itself split into 3 groups (Finnish, Estonian and Hungarian), and
Indo-European is split into 4 groups (Germanic, Italic, Balto-Slavic and Hellenic).
We constrained our analysis to the researchers who applied for external funding (except
for the means of consultancy contracts, which do not require an application) to ensure
that we depict the real differences between nationals and foreigners. To further ascertain
this finding, we only included scholars who received any funding and/or stated that they
applied for funds during the last 10 years and/or did not answer that they never applied
for funding in relation to the question how long they needed to apply for funding. Again,
we accomplish this finding for every specific funding source just as with the general case
of public and private funding. Moreover, all of the participants are either high-quality
economists, sociologists or political scientists39. Through the determination of this qual-
ity, an exacting comparability is guaranteed.
Finally, we seek and correct any inconsistences (e.g., total working time not amounting
to 100%).
A detailed description of the dataset is showcased in the Section 16.
14.2 Descriptive Statistics
To test our hypotheses, we use a wide range of variables requested in the survey as our
variables of interest, such as the particular funding probabilities and the foreigner variable,
as one group, and we involved a set of explanatory variables as another grouping, which
may be categorized into 3 smaller groups: the indicators of individual characteristics of
the researchers, work- or experience-related characteristics and countrywide information.
All of these variables and their main features are presented in Table 15.
In short, the variables of interest and the dependent variables are public funding and pri-
vate funding. In addition, we take a closer look at the sponsors who finance research
externally, such as national and regional institutions, the European Research Council, and
national and regional firms. We must note that we do not have any information on funding
schemes and include all research funds unconditionally.
At first glance, we find great variations between the features of the secured funds. Whereas
the probability of public funding in general is on average approximately 80 %, private
funding accounts for only 40 %. Upon a closer examination of the different funding
sources, certain significant differences are obvious. Within the public sponsor group, the
probability of being funded by the European Research Council accounts for only 5%,
39This determination is based on RePEc (Repository of Papers in Economics) and ISI Web of Knowledge.
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Table 15: Descriptive Statistics on the survey respondents
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max t-test
public funding (d) 1601 .80 .40 0 1 3.94***
public funding national (d) 1599 .68 .47 0 1 4.72***
public funding regional (d) 1594 .16 .37 0 1 4.45***
public funding ERC (d) 1592 .05 .21 0 1 0.36
public funding FP (d) 1593 .22 .41 0 1 0.34
private funding (d) 1597 .40 .49 0 1 3.29***
private funding national (d) 1596 .19 .39 0 1 2.24**
private funding regional (d) 1593 .04 .21 0 1 1.69*
private funding prizes (d) 1592 .06 .24 0 1 0.49
private funding consultancy (d) 1593 .20 .40 0 1 2.61***
foreigner/national (d) 3539 .26 .44 0 1
gender (d) 3539 .33 .47 0 1
years from graduation 3360 3.11 1.30 1 5
tenured (d) 3539 .42 .49 0 1
position 3539 5.50 2.34 1 8
department 3539 1.55 .77 1 3
employer university (d) 3539 .81 .39 0 1
employer research institute (d) 3539 .12 .33 0 1
work environment 3539 2.51 .71 0 3
working time research 3539 49.24 22.17 0 100
working time fund raising 3539 5.10 6.88 0 70
EEA/ESA/ECPR membership (d) 3539 .68 .47 0 1
H-Index (c) 34 289.29 202.36 53 802
affinity of native language (c) 34 1.85 1.46 0 5
net yearly remuneration (PPS) (c) 30 23775.13 8456.14 9801 46432
GERD (c) 34 1.57 .98 .22 3.87
(c) indicates country wide information
(d) indicates dummy variables
We test, whether the mean of the funding probabilities differs between foreigners and nationals.
t-statistics are displayed, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
whereas national funds are offered at a probability of 68 % on average. Similarly, the
probability of being privately funded by regional institutions (4%) differs substantially
from the probability of securing funding from a consultancy (20%). However, these dis-
parities do not appear only between funding sponsors. Indeed, through a mean compari-
son test (t-test), we find significant differences in the allocation of funds between foreign-
ers and nationals. In this univariate attempt, general public funding, general national and
regional public funding and general private funding, national and regional private fund-
ing and funding from consultancies are moderate to highly unbalanced. This finding is
consistent with our hypothesis 1 and thus requires further examination in a multivariate
setting to exclude any bias, which is conducted in the following sections.
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For our approach, we focus specifically on the individual feature if the researcher is a
national or foreigner in his state of residence. As appears from Table 15, the European
countries examined show an average proportion of 26% of foreign researchers, whereas
there is wide variation among individual countries. This foreigner variable is essential to
all our research questions.
The individual information is split into gender (33% of the researchers are female) and
academic age (on average between 5 and 9 years40). The work-related characteristics con-
sidered are, e.g., the time spent on research, which accounts on average for 49% and the
time applied to research funding, which is only 5% of the entire working time. Most of the
participants (81%) are employed at universities, whereas almost all of the rest (12%) are
salaried at research institutes. Approximately 61% are either assistant, associate or full
professors, whereas only 42% are tenured. The majority conduct integrated research41.
Approximately 62% of the researchers are located in economics departments, whereas
the remaining researchers are split almost evenly between sociology and political science.
Finally, 68% are members of either the European Economic Association (EEA), the Euro-
pean Sociological Association (ESA) or the European Consortium for Political Research
(ECPR).
In addition, we included such country-level features as the H-Index, the net yearly re-
muneration averages as measured by PPS, the GERD as a percentage of GDP and the
affinity of languages to English. Within the ERA, the medium share of financial support
to R&D amounts to 1.57% of the particular GDP. On average, the H-Index is approx-
imately 289, and the average researcher has yearly 23, 775 euros at his disposal. The
number of countries with a distant affinity with English is relatively large, which is why
the average language index is only 1.85 (distance is measured from 0 to 5).
14.2.1 Clustering of countries
With regard to our hypothesis 2, we wish to show that some countries treat foreign re-
searchers less favorably when external funds are allocated than others. In this way, we
assume that there is a relation between the openness of a higher education system and
access to external funding. However, what is meant by ”open”? Certainly there are many
possible starting points. The authors of the survey, Marimon, Guardiancich, Mariathasan,
and Rossi (2011), rely on the key figures presented by Lietaert and Marimon (2009) and
are revisited in Section 13.2. The authors show that the mobility of researchers (and thus
openness to foreign researchers) depends on academic salary, recruitment procedures,
promotion along the career ladder and funding conditions.
40Academic age is characterized in intervals.
41the given value 2.51 reflects this behavior.
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The authors find evidence that there are as many as four systems in the ERA: the Anglo-
Saxon, the Continental, the Scandinavian and the CEE systems. Lietaert and Marimon
(2009) argue that among these systems, the Anglo-Saxon system is the most open to for-
eign scholars and thus stands in stark contrast to the Continental system and (in part) to
the Scandinavian system. This proposal is based on the fact that the Anglo-Saxon model
attracts foreign researchers and creates enormous scientific output, whereas the Conti-
nental and Scandinavian models are characterized by relatively restricted openness. Ac-
cording to Lietaert and Marimon (2009), this phenomenon affects performance-oriented
evaluations and thus international competition. Because of the region’s recent past and
its different academic tradition, CEE countries must cope with brain drain to the West.
To prevent further scientific migration, these countries themselves are becoming more
dynamic and competitive.
Although the argumentation of Lietaert and Marimon (2009) is clear, we use a regional
grouping. The reason for this clustering is the assumption that neighboring countries
tend to have similar systemic conditions and develop in the same direction (such as the
CEE countries). By deduction, we also grouped countries into four clusters with slightly
refined distinctions compared with Lietaert and Marimon (2009).
• The Western European group includes Ireland, the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom.
• The Northern European group consists of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and
Sweden, which is consistent with Lietaert and Marimon (2009).
• The Continental and Southern European region represents the major cluster and
contains Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain and
Switzerland.
• The last group is the Central, Eastern and Southeastern European countries (CESE),
which consists of Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia,
Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia,
Slovenia, and Ukraine.
As discussed above, the regional clustering is based on the assumption that adjacent coun-
tries feature similar systematic requirements. Nevertheless, it is possible that there are
differences regarding research environments and how financial support of research is ad-
dressed even when there is surface resemblance. Like Lietaert and Marimon (2009), we
suppose that ”international openness and integration of research are tightly connected
to the attitudes toward funding opportunities of researchers in a particular country”42.
Although we assume that individual openness and attractiveness act as indicators for bal-
anced funding probabilities and vice versa, we construct another clustering-not based on
42The authors even find evidence for that relation exists.
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regional figures but corresponding to the each country’s accessibility to research funding.
We take this alternative approach because we wish to validate our results and guess that
there are certain features depicting the indicator. These key figures are the H-Index, the
net yearly remuneration averages as measured by PPS, GERD as a percentage of GDP,
and the affinity of languages to English. In addition, we involve the number of scien-
tific workers in a country in proportion to published articles. All of the indices used are
premised on country levels because of the lack of individual-level information.
We now wish to provide rationales for the used key figures and, after discussing them
thoroughly, we examine whether an alternative clustering has some influence on the ex-
pected effects43. As argued in Section 14.1, the H-Index is an improvement on or at least
alternative to, established journal impact factor measures to evaluate a researcher’s work.
It is the most important key figure for the grouping of our units. we use it in all graphics
presented hereafter. We reason that countries with a higher H-Index are more competitive
and thus attract more foreign researchers. The second measure we employ is the net yearly
remuneration averages based on PPS. Following this logic, we assume that countries with
a high net yearly remuneration average are considered attractive.
Figure 15: Net yearly remuneration averages (PPS)
In Figure 15 great differences between countries are obvious. Because most of the Cen-
tral and Southeastern European countries are below the average of both key figures, the
43This question is addressed in the Robustness Section (see the Appendix).
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remainder of the other countries are mostly above them. This finding suggests that the
remunerations and, equally, the H-Indices are small in this group. Therefore, we assume
that they are less attractive and open than the rest. With the exception of Finland, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Sweden, all other residual countries exhibit a higher-
than-average H-Index and above-average remuneration. Iceland and Portugal are similar
to the CESE countries in that they are below average in both measures. Finland, Italy
and Sweden show comparatively low remuneration averages, and Ireland and Malta have
comparatively low H-Indexes.
In considering the attractiveness of a country, we also include political parameters. We
decided to use the structural measure GERD as a percentage of GDP in the year the
survey was conducted (2010)44. We suppose that this finding is indicative of attractiveness
even for foreign researchers. Therefore, a higher fraction invested in R&D implies better
underlying monetary circumstances. This treatment is presented in Figure 16.
Figure 16: GERD (as % of GDP)
Indeed, the countries under consideration vary widely. The northern countries, except
Norway, show the highest shares of investment (approximately 3.4%) and the CESE coun-
tries the lowest (on average 0.9%). Malta and Portugal are also in this group. The highest-
ranking country in the CESE countries is Slovenia with a share of 2.11%. The Continental
44Unfortunately, Georgian, Greek, Icelandic, Serbian and Ukrainian data are only available for the years
2005, 2007 and 2009.
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and Southern European countries remain more or less closely behind the Northern Euro-
pean countries, although Spain and Italy are in fact substandard in terms of GERD. The
remainder of countries in the Continental and Southern European countries show approx-
imately average levels of GERD.
Finally, we closely examine the affinity of native languages related to the generally ac-
cepted scientific language, English (see Figure 17). We suppose that a closer affinity to
English might facilitate mobility, access to other academic systems and funding sources
as a consequence. Therefore, we match the H-Index and the affinity of languages to iden-
tify which nationalities make it easier to change residence and which might make such a
change more difficult.
Figure 17: Affinity of native languages
Using the Maximum Clade Credibility Tree, we classify the relation of languages to En-
glish from 0 to 5, as shown in Figure 1545. 0 corresponds to the languages that are fur-
thest from English, which are the Uralic, Afroasiatic and Caucasian languages. All other
languages are Indo-European languages but are related to English to different degrees.
Within the Indo-European linguistic family, Greek and the Balto-Slavic languages are the
least related to English and are thus classified as 1. The Italic linguistic family is classi-
fied as 246. With the Northern European languages, we enter in the Germanic linguistic
45An overview of the accurate classification of languages is provided in Section 16.
46We here included Belgium because Dutch and French are almost pari passu. We could even put Bel-
gium in the West Germanic group. In the end, it is indiscriminative either for grouping or for our results.
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family and encoded them as 3. A minor group are the West Germanic languages, to which
English belongs47. The last class, assessed as 4, covers the Old High German languages,
which are vernacularly also spoken in Switzerland48. Recapitulating the relation between
the H-Index and the affinity of the native language to English, an interesting observation
may be made. We could draw a notional line at an angle of 45 degrees. Thus, a closer
linguistic distance to English, which might be indicative of affinity, appears to be linked
to a higher H-Index.
Conclusively, we may declare that the regional clustering should be an efficient method
to prove our second hypothesis that there are some countries that display similar degrees
of openness and attractiveness with regarding external funding and thus vary significantly
from other countries, which in turn are relatively similar. In addition, we find some out-
liers that do not appear to fit in their group. For this reason, we provide an alternative
clustering, which is considered in Section 16, where we compute the effects of foreign
status on the accessibility of external funding in 4 slightly different groupings based on
the key figures presented, which are the following:
• The new Western European Group, including the Netherlands, Switzerland and the
United Kingdom, with high H-Indices, net yearly remuneration averages and affin-
ity with the English language and above-average GERD.
• The new Northern European Group, including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Fin-
land, Iceland, Ireland, Norway and Sweden. All of these countries are characterized
by medium remuneration averages, moderate H-Indices, a moderate to high affinity
with the English language and a medium to very high GERD.
• The new Continental and Southern European Group, which contains France, Ger-
many, Italy and Spain. These countries have average features in almost all disci-
plines. Only with regard to the H-Index are these countries relatively high. Admit-
tedly, Germany features a comparatively high GERD and affinity with English, but
in general, it harmonizes with the other countries in this grouping.
• In the new Central, Eastern and Southeastern European group are again all the
CESE countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine)
in addition to Malta and Portugal. These countries are distinguished by low remu-
neration averages, a low H-Index, little affinity of the native language to English
and small GERD fractions (except for Slovenia, as discussed above).
47Here, the UK and Ireland are rated at 5 because, in addition to Irish Gaelic, which is a Celtic language,
the Irish speak English fluently and use it in their everyday lives.
48Approximately two out of three Swiss, thus the large majority, are native German speakers.
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14.3 Methodology and empirical specifications
Utilizing this approach, we wish to estimate the parameters of the interscientific accessi-
bility of different funding sources and funding in general to foreign researchers compared
with national researchers. This approach is based on the idea that there might be barriers
that prevent foreign researchers from immigrating or residing in specific countries with
the result that these countries are believed to be closed. It is our aim to identify these
countries and identify those that are improving in this regard. In the course of this study,
we distinguish between public and private funding (the fact if a researcher obtains any
funds at all), and we closely examine sponsors themselves to determine which of these
tends to have an unbalanced allocation result.
First, we assess whether the fact of being a foreigner influences access to public and pri-
vate research funding at all and to the various sources of external funding (hypothesis 1).
Consistent with our hypothesis 2, we perform approximately the same assessment for each
of our defined country groups. Ultimately, we examine whether all foreign researchers are
treated as equals or whether foreigners coming from similar countries are at an advantage
or disadvantage relative to researchers coming from distant countries (hypothesis 3).
Hereinafter, the tables featuring no significant effects are shown in Section 16, as is a
validation of our results by dint of an alternative clustering based on the presented key
figures.
14.4 Empirical results
14.4.1 Accessibility of external funds in Europe
As outlined above, we first closely examine funding in Europe in general. In detail,
we investigate whether the fact of being a foreign researcher in the country of residence
influences the possibility of funding. Given the binary nature of the dependent variables,
we use a Logit regression to predict whether there is a link49.
Table 16 reports the estimation results for the Logit model with public funding in general
and the different sources of public funding as the dependent variables. Column (1) refers
to the estimation of public funds in general, column (2) refers to funding from national in-
stitutions, column (3) to regional sponsors, column (4) to funds granted by the European
Research Council (except for the Framework Programmes) and column (5) to Framework
Programme funds. Note that the marginal effects and the z-statistic based on robust stan-
dard errors (in parentheses) to account for heteroskedasticity are presented. We run three
regressions on each dependent variable. The first includes estimation without any control
49The results are also robust if we use a Probit model. These results are available upon request.
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variables, the second includes country dummies, and the last merges all country dummies
and control variables.
Evidently, there is indeed some general disadvantage for foreign researchers seeking to
obtain public funds. The probability of funding is significantly lower for such researchers
(approximately 4.3%) if we control for all countries and possible influencing factors. We
suppose the reason why the significance level is strongly decreasing if control variables
are included primarily results from heterogeneity between the funding framework condi-
tions in the countries under examination. Therefore, we will more closely examine the
groupings and analyze which countries drive this effect in Section 14.4.2.
The individual funding of institutions differs widely with respect to the allocation of their
resources. At the national and regional levels, the probability of a foreign researcher
obtaining funds is approximately 9.0%, which is 10.5% lower than for nationals. In refer-
ence to the extent of disadvantage, we regret to say that both values are economically and
statistically significant (at the 1% level).
At the European level, we observe the opposite effect. The funds stemming from the Eu-
ropean Research Council and from the Framework Programme are provided without dis-
crimination and show tendentially positive marginal effects. In other words, a researcher
from abroad does not fear that he will suffer from any discrimination because he has the
same probability of being funded by the European institutions.
Table 1750 presents the estimation results for the Logit model, where private funding and
the funds allocated by the different organizations are the dependent variables. Overall,
there is a negative relationship among the explanatory variable, foreigner, and national and
private funding. A foreign researcher receives private funds with a 6.9% lower probability
than nationals. This effect is significant (at the 5% level) if we control for all countries and
possible features. As observed in the detailed regressions, the foreigners’ disadvantage
with respect to the access to private funds stems from national sources. All other donors
treat foreign and national researchers equally, whereas the probability of finding access to
national private funds is significantly lower (7.9%) for foreigners (at the 5% level).
In summary, we have offered strong evidence that there are indeed economically and sta-
tistically significant differences between foreign and national researchers, which corrob-
orates our hypothesis 1. Although we argued in a rather general way and did not specify
the certain sources, we find here that it is primarily the national sponsors that are the cause
of discriminatory treatment.
50This and all following tables are constructed similarly to Table 2.
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14.4.2 Accessibility of external funds within the country groups
After resolving the question of whether there are problems for foreign researchers in
finding access to external funding, we now wish to refer to our hypothesis 2 and as-
sess whether certain countries are more open, and perhaps more attractive, to foreign
researchers than others. Therefore, we clustered the European countries into 4 groups
as previously discussed in Section 14.2.1. The Western European group is established as
open. Because of the international reputation of their universities, particularly English and
Dutch universities, their relatively high net remunerations and their affinity with English,
these countries might attract many foreign researchers.
Lietaert and Marimon (2009) reason in their work that this group-they name it Anglo-
Saxon-is the most open in Europe. Although we slightly deviate from their grouping,
we make an educated guess and agree with the authors. Therefore, there should be no
significant difference in the competitive tendering procedure. Table 34 summarizes the
results for the Western European group.
Indeed, no public institution is found to engage in significant discriminatory treatment
of foreign researchers in an economic or statistical manner. In other words, foreign and
national researchers are treated as equals. If there are identical results for private funds,
we feel vindicated with regard to our clustering and to the assumption of an extremely
open group. Therefore, we will present the private sponsors in the following table.
Table 18 clearly shows that the significant negative relationship between the foreign status
and the allocation of private funds is caused primarily by the significant lower probability
of obtaining national funds. This probability is approximately 14.8% (at the 5% level)
lower for foreign researchers if we control for all factors. In addition, firms appear likely
to conclude consultancy contracts with an 8.8% lower probability with foreigners, which
is weakly significant at the 10% level. These effects give rise to a 15.6% reduced proba-
bility (significant at the 5% level) of receiving private research funds at all. The remaining
funding sources make no distinction between nationals and foreigners.
In fact, we take as demonstrated that this first group is relatively open to foreign re-
searchers, especially if we assume public funds to be the primary financial support of
researchers grounded in the social sciences. Although there is a major disadvantage in
awarding national private funds and a minor disadvantage regarding concluding consul-
tancy contracts, every researcher has the same opportunity to receive almost all external
funds. On a related note, the Western European group appears to be quite attractive to
international academic immigrants.
The next group, which contains the Scandinavian countries, is supposed to be moderately
open. According to Lietaert and Marimon (2009), it is a type of hybrid between the West-
ern European and the Continental and Southern European groupings. As in the first group,
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the Northern European countries tend to have competitive systems and international ten-
dering for academic jobs, but, similarly to the third group, they are characterized by many
informal rules. With respect to openness and attractiveness, we classify them in this group
because of their affinity with English, their medium net remuneration and scientific out-
put as slightly behind the first group. If our reasoning is correct, there should be a few
differences between nationals and foreigners. Therefore, we analyze the public funding
possibilities for foreign researchers and show the results in Table 19.
At first glance, we find some interesting phenomena. Most notably, it is the economic
and partially statistical significance that is most pronounced if we include only the coun-
try dummies. More precisely, the marginal effect (12.8) is relatively high regarding the
general allocation of public funds. Likewise, we find a 16.1% lower probability that
foreign researchers are nationally supported (significant at the 5% level). Nevertheless,
both effects disappear if we control for all variables. One reason-at least for the general
case-might be related in part to the particularly advantageous allocation of funds from
the Framework Programme. The probability of obtaining funds from the Framework Pro-
gramme is approximately 20% higher for foreign than for national researchers (at the 5%
level) if we subtract out all other possible impact factors. This having been said, the
Framework Programme might be regarded as a compensatory funding source. Another
reason is the significant positive influence of the academic position and the time spent
on research, which are included as control variables in the third regression. Because of a
small number of researchers being funded by regional sponsors and the ERC, we regret
to say that it is not possible to estimate any results for these funding sources.
We ultimately find that estimating the allocation of private funds is somewhat problematic
(see Table 35). Regrettably, we are unable to estimate the relation between foreign status
and the probability of obtaining funding from regional institutions and from institutions
awarding prizes. All other private funding sources are divided almost equally or, to be
precise, are granted with nearly identical probabilities to foreigners and to nationals.
As a whole, the Northern European group presents differentiated effects. At first glance,
we find a substantial difference mainly in the provision of national public funds. Closer
examination reveals that this initial result is driven by other impact factors and that the
allocation is rather indistinct. in addition, the balanced overall probability for foreign
researchers is mainly driven by an advantageous European distribution of public funds,
whereas the private funds are completely indiscriminative. These facts support our hy-
pothesis 2 that there are indeed differences among the European countries and that it made
sense to cluster them. However, because of the unsuspicious granting of private funds, we
cannot affirm the assessment of Lietaert and Marimon (2009) at this point. Therefore, we
classify the Northern European group, right ahead-and not behind-the Western European
group with respect to openness and attractiveness for foreign scholars.
The third group, i.e., the Continental and Southern European Group, contains the majority
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of researchers51. In compliance with Lietaert and Marimon (2009), we classify this cluster
as being moderately closed. The first evidence for this reasoning lies in the moderate ratio
of foreign researchers compared with the Western European group52. The next tables will
indicate whether this categorization could be confirmed. First, we will examine the public
allocation of funds in Table 20.
In this group, the funding decision appears to be a double-edged sword. On the one
hand, the funds allocated at the European level exhibit no differences between foreign
and national researchers in an economically relevant or a statistically significant manner.
Conversely, we observe a dramatically disadvantageous situation for foreign researchers
at the national and regional levels. The probability of obtaining national funds is ap-
proximately 13.2% lower for foreign scholars (significant at the 1% level), even when we
control for all variables. Furthermore, the chance of securing regional funds is in fact
18.1% lower than for nationals (also significant at the 1% level). Both effects are by far
the most powerful we have found until now. Not surprisingly, the overall probability for
foreigners to receive funding is likewise substantially lower. Specifically, the probability
is approximately 8.5% smaller for foreign scholars (at the 1% level). As in the Western
European group, the indifferent allocation of European funds is advected.
After finding a badly lopsided situation on the public side, we are deeply interested in the
distribution of private funds. If these are similarly unfavorable, the combined effects of
these two phenomena may critically influence the attractiveness of these countries.
Table 21 indicates that the Continental and Southern European group does not suffer from
unequal conditions with regard to private funds. Without controlling for any variables,
we find a significant disparity in the overall probability between foreigners and nation-
als. However, this disparity disappears if we include all possible impact factors. All
other donor firms distribute their financial support equally. In the aggregate, this finding
identifies a balanced allocation of private funds.
However, the Continental and Southern European group shows large deficits regarding
openness on the public side, which is the most important funding source for researchers
in the social sciences, but it is not only primarily the level of unequal treatment but also
the significance that is worth considering. Likewise, it is worrisome that only the national
and regional sponsors, who typically provide the majority of external funds, engage in
discrimination.
The last group embraces all CEE countries, which is consistent with Lietaert and Marimon
(2009). We vary slightly from the grouping in that previous study because we add Cyprus
and Greece into this group. Of course, at first glance, the countries have little in common
51see Section 14.2.1.
52These figures are calculated from the data out of the survey; we find an average proportion of for-
eign researchers of 46.32% in the Western European group and 22.50% in the Continental and Southern
European group.
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with the CEE countries53 and are typically not clustered together with CEE countries.
Nonetheless, we count them in this fourth group because they appear to fit more closely
(not only regionally but also structurally, e.g., in terms of expenditures for R&D) than
with the Continental and Southern European group. We expect this group to attempt to
be open. Obviously, thus far, this group is not as attractive as the other clusters to foreign
researchers. To prevent the brain drain to western countries of junior scientific staff and
to attract foreign researchers, we suppose a rather balanced distribution of external funds.
Whether we are correct in making this assumption is assessable in Table 22.
The case of public funding in the CESE group is exceptional. First, we observe much
lower access to public funding in general for foreigners in the fourth group, which is
mainly characterized by a far smaller chance for them to obtain national public funding.
If we control for all variables, we find 37.5% and 23.2% lower probabilities for foreign
researchers, respectively. Similarly, funding from the Framework Programme appears to
show a slight preference for scholars who are nationals, which indicates that nationals re-
ceive these funds with a 10.9% higher probability than their foreign colleagues, in effect.
Altogether, this outcome actually surpasses the disadvantage with regard to the allocation
of public national funds in the Continental group. However, this difference is not statisti-
cally significant. The lack of significance might be explained by the great variance within
this group that could not be averted by the small subsample. For this reason, we assume
an economically relevant difference between foreign and national researchers, but we can-
not confirm it by distant facts. Conversely, a favorable distribution of regional funds is
noticeable and thus slightly compensates for the negative relationship regarding national
funding. Although we find that being a foreigner is accompanied by a 33.5% higher prob-
ability of receiving regional support (indeed, at the 5% significance level), funding from
ERC is unfortunately not specifiable. Next, we will examine private funding.
In Table 36, we find no statistically significant effects. Nonetheless, we are again as-
tounded by the level of marginal effects. Whereas foreign researchers tend to have a
13.5% higher probability of receiving private funds, they are affected adversely in terms
of funds from consultancy at a 15.2% lower probability. All other funding sources are
less prominent and not specifiable. Consequently, it is clear that it is difficult to make
a statement regarding the CESE group. On the one hand, we observe high bidirectional
marginal effects; on the other hand, only the advantageous provision of regional funds
is significant. Therefore, our assumption is supported-although not completely-that the
fourth group is attempting to overcome brain drain and to attract non-national researchers
by attempting to grant equal accesses to external funding.
In summary, it may be stated that the constructed groups effectively contrast strongly with
one another. Whereas the Northern European group is relatively open and hence attractive
(presenting almost no differences between foreigners and nationals), the Continental and
53This lack of commonality is in reference to the fact that neither has a communist history.
110
Ta
bl
e
22
:C
E
SE
G
ro
up
(p
ub
lic
)
Fo
re
ig
ne
r/
N
at
io
na
l
fu
nd
in
g
pu
bl
ic
fu
nd
in
g
pu
bl
ic
na
tio
na
l
fu
nd
in
g
pu
bl
ic
re
gi
on
al
fu
nd
in
g
E
R
C
fu
nd
in
g
FP
N
o
co
nt
ro
ls
M
ar
gi
ns
-.0
89
0
-.0
54
2
.0
12
4
/
.0
14
7
z-
va
lu
e
(0
.6
9)
(0
.3
1)
(0
.0
8)
/
(0
.0
8)
N
18
9
18
7
14
9
/
16
3
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
00
2
0.
00
4
0.
00
01
/
0.
00
0
C
ou
nt
ry
du
m
m
ie
s
M
ar
gi
ns
-.2
00
0
-.1
16
4
.1
32
9
/
.0
16
2
z-
va
lu
e
(0
.9
3)
(0
.4
9)
(0
.6
8)
/
(0
.0
9)
N
16
1
16
7
12
9
/
16
1
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
06
6
0.
12
0
0.
05
5
/
0.
08
4
A
ll
co
nt
ro
ls
M
ar
gi
ns
-.3
74
9
-.2
32
2
.3
35
2*
*
/
-.1
09
4
z-
va
lu
e
(1
.4
7)
(1
.5
1)
(2
.1
3)
/
(0
.6
4)
N
15
1
15
7
12
1
/
15
4
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
24
1
0.
25
0
0.
21
8
/
0.
18
6
*
p
<
0
.1
0
,*
*
p
<
0.
05
,*
**
p
<
0
.0
1
z-
st
at
is
tic
s
ba
se
d
on
ro
bu
st
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
A
ll
co
nt
ro
lv
ar
ia
bl
es
as
m
en
tio
ne
d
in
Se
ct
io
n
14
.2
ar
e
in
cl
ud
ed
.D
et
ai
le
d
re
su
lts
ar
e
av
ai
la
bl
e
up
on
re
qu
es
t.
/i
nd
ic
at
es
no
es
tim
at
io
n
re
su
lt
be
ca
us
e
of
an
in
su
ffi
ci
en
tn
um
be
ro
fo
bs
er
va
tio
ns
111
Southern European group may be classified as contrary (enormous differences in pub-
lic funding to the disadvantage of foreigners). The Western European group trails the
Northern European group slightly (featuring enormous differences with respect to private
funding, to the disadvantage of foreigners) and the CESE group comes thereafter (with
differentiated results). The reason for these results (Northern, Western, CESE, Conti-
nental) is that we assume that public funds are the primary external funding source for
researchers in the social sciences because of the rather ”basic” nature of this field of
study54. In Table 23 and Table 24, the qualitative results based on the estimation with all
control variables are summarized to provide a short overview of the main findings.
Table 23: Recapitulatory results (public)
Group general national regional ERC FP
West + - + + +
North - - / / +**
Continental/South -*** -*** -*** - +
CESE - - +** / -
Table 24: Recapitulatory results (private)
Group general national regional prizes consultancy
West -** -** + + -*
North - - / / +
Continental/South - - - + -
CESE + / / / -
Returning to the European level, we may basically conclude that the negative relationship
with respect to public funds mainly stems from the Continental group and as to private
funds primarily from the Western European group. Therefore, hypothesis 2 is partially
confirmed. Indeed, there are differences in access to external funds and in the attrac-
tiveness among the country groups. Nevertheless, we expected the Western European
countries to be ranked highest due to their having the highest degree of openness in their
higher education system. These findings mainly coincide with the results of Lietaert and
Marimon (2009), although we clustered in a marginally different manner. In contrast to
54This finding is shown through the survey data, with which we ascertain beyond doubt that the pro-
portions of researchers’ budgets stemming from public institutions represent the largest share of external
funds.
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that study, we classify the Northern European countries as being the most open and thus
changed the sequence of the Western and Northern European groups.
14.4.3 Accessibility of external funds for related and distant foreigners within the
country groups
We now turn to testing our hypothesis 3 and examine whether the ”distance” (not only
the regional but also the linguistic and systemic distances) is crucial to access to external
funding. We proposed that a greater distance leads to more difficulties in integrating into
the foreign scientific community and thus in achieving an equal opportunity to obtain
external funding. Therefore, we designed 2 specific groups of foreigners for each cluster,
denominated them as ”distant” and ”related” and compared them to scholars who are
nationals. ”Distant” foreigners in this sense hail from countries that are in another country
group, and ”related” foreigners originate in the same cluster but not in the country of
residence. For purposes of clarity, we refer to the first group as an example. Nationals
are researchers who have the same residence and nationality (e.g., a Dutch researcher
working in the Netherlands, etc.). ”Related” foreigners reside in a country belonging to
the same group but are not nationals there (e.g., a Dutch researcher working in Ireland).
”Distant” foreigners come from outside the group (e.g., a German researcher working in
Ireland). Again, we begin with the allocation of public funds in the Western European
group.
Table 37 presents the estimation results for the Logit model where public funding and
the precise funds are the dependent variables. Not surprisingly, we yield results broadly
similar to the case where we did not distinguish among different foreigners, shown in
Table 34. Nonetheless, it is extremely interesting that ”related” and ”distant” foreigners
tend to have a higher probability of receiving public funds than nationals. Even if we
control for all possible influences, they have a slightly higher probability in general and at
the European level (although this effect is not statistically significant). The only exception
is the allocation of national public funds. In this case, we observe a relatively high-but
statistically insignificant-negative marginal effect regarding ”related” foreigners, which
at its most pronounced is 13.7 %. However, analyzing the magnitude and significance of
most of the marginal effects, we conclude that the discriminatory treatment is not relevant.
In summary, we do not observe any disadvantage for foreign researchers but the contrary.
The following table provides the outcome for private funding in the Western European
group.
In Table 18, we find a significant negative relation between being a foreigner and the
probability of receiving private funding. This general result is confirmed by Table 25. We
wish to know whether both groups of foreigners are similarly disadvantaged. We find that
only the ”distant” foreigners suffer from a significant lower funding probability. If we in-
clude all the control variables, the general probability is approximately 17%, the chance to
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obtain national private funds is 15.1% and the probability of gaining consultancy funds is
approximately 11% less than for nationals (significant at 1% and 5% levels, respectively).
Therefore ”distant” foreigners are highly likely to be funded considerably less and are
disadvantaged to a relatively great extent. The remaining funds are allocated equally, al-
though we cannot, unfortunately, specify the differences between ”related” foreigners and
nationals with regard to private regional funding and the granting of prizes.
Overall, the Western European group presents itself again as a comparatively open and
attractive research cluster. Only the allocation of private funds partially discriminates
against ”distant” foreigners compared with nationals, and ”related” foreigners do not suf-
fer from any discrimination.
Next, we will have a detailed look at the Northern European group. In Section 14.4.2,
we learned that the funds from the Framework Programme offset the slightly unfavorable
distribution of national funds to the extent that the overall probability is at least fairly
balanced.
Clearly, this compensation does not work for all foreigners. Whereas the overall prob-
ability for ”distant” foreigners is insignificantly higher than for nationals, which is in-
fluenced by a statistically significant 21.8% higher probability of receiving funds from
the Framework Programme, general access to public funds among ”related” foreigners is
substantially diminished. These individuals suffer from more than 34.6% lower proba-
bility of public support (significant at the 5% level). This finding stems mainly from a
dramatically lower probability (42%, which is significant at the 5% level) of obtaining
national public funds. We observe that the related foreigners are similarly disadvantaged.
Bearing in mind that public funding is the most important external support for researchers
working in the social sciences, this result is alarming. Moreover, this finding stands in
contrast to our first result (in which we noticed a rather balanced allocation) and thus to
our expectations. Now we must realize that this result is accomplished only by an ad-
vantageous situation for ”distant” and a strongly disadvantageous situation for ”related”
foreigners. Regrettably, the estimation results for the regional public, ERC and (for the
”related” foreigners) Framework Programme funds are not specifiable. Whether our first
classification concerning the openness of the Northern European group remains correct
or is refuted by the outcome is presented in Table 38.
To briefly summarize, we observe no unequal treatment among nationals, ”related” and
”distant” foreigners in an economically relevant or statistically significant way. Up to the
grave situation regarding the discrimination against ”related” foreigners of national public
funds and (consequently) public funds in general, the Northern European group appears
to be rather open, although we now characterize them as substantially lagging behind the
Western European group. Why there is such a discrepancy in the success rate between a
Swede and a Dane, both of whom live in Denmark and are applying for national public
funds, is unclear to us.
115
Ta
bl
e
26
:N
or
th
E
ur
op
ea
n
G
ro
up
(p
ub
lic
)
Fo
re
ig
ne
r/
N
at
io
na
l
fu
nd
in
g
pu
bl
ic
fu
nd
in
g
pu
bl
ic
na
tio
na
l
fu
nd
in
g
pu
bl
ic
re
gi
on
al
fu
nd
in
g
E
R
C
fu
nd
in
g
FP
N
o
co
nt
ro
ls
M
ar
gi
ns
di
st
an
t
-.0
90
6
-.1
37
4*
/
/
.1
01
9
z-
va
lu
e
(1
.2
2)
(1
.7
5)
/
/
(1
.5
9)
M
ar
gi
ns
re
la
te
d
-.3
52
8*
-.3
57
8
/
/
/
z-
va
lu
e
(1
.7
6)
(1
.5
4)
/
/
/
N
17
0
17
0
/
/
12
7
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
02
4
0.
02
5
/
/
0.
02
4
C
ou
nt
ry
du
m
m
ie
s
M
ar
gi
ns
di
st
an
t
-.1
05
2
-.1
43
3*
/
/
.0
90
1
z-
va
lu
e
(1
.4
3)
(1
.8
8)
/
/
(1
.3
6)
M
ar
gi
ns
re
la
te
d
-.3
27
0*
-.3
28
2
/
/
/
z-
va
lu
e
(1
.7
0)
(1
.4
7)
/
/
/
N
17
0
17
0
/
/
12
7
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
04
5
0.
04
8
/
/
0.
06
7
A
ll
co
nt
ro
ls
M
ar
gi
ns
di
st
an
t
.0
40
3
.0
21
6
/
/
.2
18
1*
*
z-
va
lu
e
(0
.4
8)
(0
.2
5)
/
/
(2
.5
8)
M
ar
gi
ns
re
la
te
d
-.3
46
3*
*
-.4
20
1*
*
/
/
/
z-
va
lu
e
(2
.4
2)
(2
.4
7)
/
/
/
N
16
4
16
4
/
/
12
2
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
21
9
0.
21
2
/
/
0.
30
2
*
p
<
0
.1
0
,*
*
p
<
0.
05
,*
**
p
<
0
.0
1
z-
st
at
is
tic
s
ba
se
d
on
ro
bu
st
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
A
ll
co
nt
ro
lv
ar
ia
bl
es
as
m
en
tio
ne
d
in
Se
ct
io
n
14
.2
ar
e
in
cl
ud
ed
.D
et
ai
le
d
re
su
lts
ar
e
av
ai
la
bl
e
up
on
re
qu
es
t.
/i
nd
ic
at
es
no
es
tim
at
io
n
re
su
lt
be
ca
us
e
of
an
in
su
ffi
ci
en
tn
um
be
ro
fo
bs
er
va
tio
ns
116
The Continental and Southern European group is not only the major cluster but also the
cluster with the largest gap in success probability between national and foreign scholars.
Now we are interested in whether all foreign scholars-regardless of their home countries-
are disadvantaged in their access to public and private funding.
As previously suggested in Table 20, there are substantial differences in funding prob-
abilities. Above all, this finding is unique to ”distant” foreigners in the general case.
These foreigners possess a 13.4% lower probability for public support (significant at the
1% level). Even so, the ”related” foreigners are also treated less favorably. With re-
spect to the allocation of national public funds, both foreign groups suffer from lower
probabilities compared to nationals. ”Related” foreigners have a 10.2% (significant at
the 5% level) lower probability, and ”distant” foreigners have a 17% (significant at 1%
level) lower probability. There is even a sharper distinction in regional public funds. We
find that a foreigner in the same cluster has a 15% lower success probability and that
”distant” foreigners are even more punished by a 23.5% lower success probability (both
significant at the 1% level). At the European level, we observe no distinctions. This dif-
ference is dramatic and leads us to the conclusion that the third group is in fact relatively
closed-particularly toward foreigners from other groups. In no other group is there such a
consistent and severe discriminatory treatment against both types of foreigners.
Consistent with Table 21 in which we found no significant negative probability for for-
eigners compared with nationals in terms of private funding, we now-as we split up the
group of non-nationals-see little distinction between nationals and related foreigners and
nationals and ”distant” foreigners. Admittedly, the probabilities are clearly lower in most
cases but not in a statistically significant way.
In summary, it may be said, that because of the great extent of the marginal effects of most
notably national public and regional public funds, this group may be classed as being less
attractive to foreign researchers. In addition, the overall probability of public funding is
simply blanched over by the equitable allocation of European funds.
Finally, we wish to provide an answer to the question of whether our hypothesis 3 is
correct by analyzing the last group, CESE countries. In Table 29 and Table 39, the results
of the estimations are presented.
Table 29 reveals similarities to the Logit regression without any distinction among the
groups of foreigners (see Table 22). Again, we only accomplish statistical significance by
controlling for all variables. Notably, the ”related” foreigners feature the sharpest effects.
Although we cannot specify any results for the ”distant” foreigners, related foreigners are
afflicted by a 35.5% lower probability (significant at the 5% level) of obtaining national
public funding. This dramatic situation is partially offset by a 41.7% higher probability
(significant at the 1% level) with respect to the access to regional public funding. This
finding is aggravated by a 23% lower chance of receiving funding from the Framework
Programme. Although the effect is not statistically significant, the economic relevance is
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considerable and surely has some influence on the overall probability, which is likewise
not statistically significant. However, this finding does not belie the economic relevance
of the remarkable negative marginal effect (39.4%) compared with nationals.
The allocation of private funds in the CESE group appears to be quite advantageous
for ”related” foreigners55. Although we do not observe any statistical significance, the
marginal effects are relatively large compared with their national colleagues. The overall
chances of funding for ”related” foreigners are 33.7% higher than for national researchers.
This effect might be interpreted as an offset to the poor allocation of public funds, but the
result must be treated with caution because of the small subsample and a relative great
variance within this group, as previously discussed in Section 14.4.2.
Aside from the statistically irrelevant outcome, there is an enormous negative discrimi-
natory treatment for ”related” foreigners with respect to the allocation of public funds.
Meanwhile, we observe a positive tendency for them regarding the distribution of private
funds. For these reasons, we can neither negate nor affirm our hypothesis 3 for this group.
To reassess our hypothesis 3 universally, we summarize the computed results and focus
on the general probabilities (see Table 30 and Table 31 for the qualitative results). In
the Western European group, the public funding conditions for ”distant” foreigners are
as good as for ”related” foreigners and for nationals, whereas these distant foreigners
are at a substantial disadvantage in terms of private funding. In the Northern European
group, the opposite is true: ”related” foreigners are treated less favorably by public funds,
whereas we find no disadvantage regarding private funds. My supposition is most directly
confirmed by the Continental and Southern European group in that we learn that ”distant”
foreigners have more difficulty obtaining any national or regional funding and have a
significantly lower probability of gaining public funding than their ”related” foreigner
counterparts. ”Related” foreigners are discriminated at the national and regional levels,
whereas no differences are observable for private funding. The last group appears to
be torn. On the public side, there is significantly lower access for ”related” foreigners to
national public funding and higher access to regional funding compared with the nationals
and on the private side, we ascertain a much higher (if not significant) probability of
receiving private funds. Accordingly, it is difficult to make an absolute declaration, and
we must leave open the confirmation of hypothesis 3 in which we stated that the regional,
linguistic and systematic distance is the responsible factor for access to external funding.
In Table 10 and Table 11, the qualitative results based on the estimation with all control
variables are summarized to provide a short overview of the main findings.
Referring back to hypothesis 2, we turn to another classification of the country groups.
The Western and the Northern European groups swap places because public funding
serves as the more important financial support to social scientists, and we did not find
any differences between nationals and both types of foreigners with respect to public
55The estimation for ”distant” foreigners is not possible here.
121
Table 30: Recapitulatory results (public)
Group general national regional ERC FP
West
distant + + - + +
related + - + / +
North
distant + + / / +**
related -** -** / / /
Continental/South
distant -*** -*** -*** + +
related - -** -** - +
CESE
distant / / / / /
related - -** +*** / -
Table 31: Recapitulatory results (private)
Group general national regional prizes consultancy
West
distant -*** -** + + -**
related - - / / +
North
distant - - / / +
related - + / / /
Continental/South
distant + - + + -
related - - - + +
CESE
distant / / / / /
related + / / / -
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funding in the first group. Immediately lagging behind this group is the CESE group,
which shows some changing effects. In last place is the Continental and Southern Eu-
ropean group, which is the only group that is substantially disadvantaging ”distant” and
”related” foreigners in their access to public funding. Ultimately, the sequence proposed
by Lietaert and Marimon (2009) is consistent with mine, although the reasoning and the
considered key figures in that study deviate from mine.
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15 Discussion and Conclusions
This approach examines the relationship between the foreign status of researchers within
the ERA and their access to different sources of public and private funding. We pro-
vide empirical evidence that there are indeed significant differences between nationals
and foreigners regarding the allocation of public and private funds at the European level.
Therefore, hypothesis 1 may be affirmed. A closer look reveals that these effects mainly
stem from national funding sources, which is crucial because these are the donors who
are issuing most of the funds.
These first results give rise to a further investigation to find whether all regions in the EU
suffer from the problem of unbalanced allocations of external research funds. We find this
situation not to be the case. Regrettably, it is the largest group of countries, the Continental
and Southern European countries, that treats foreign scholars particularly less favorably
in terms of the public funding offered. Alternatively, we find significant evidence of lower
access to private funding in the Western European countries. In the Northern European
countries, funding from the Framework Programme appears to compensate for the slightly
inadequate allocation of national public funds such that both types of scholars have more
or less equal access. Within the last group, the CESE countries, great differences between
nationals and foreigners regarding public funding are found. However, except for an
advantageous allocation of regional funds, these differences are not significant, which
may be attributed to large variations within the group.
We extended our empirical analysis to a precise distinction among different types of for-
eign scholars, which had interested us. In this way, we wish to reassess our hypothesis
3 and consider which region is the most promising for researchers with certain nation-
alities. Therefore, we classify foreigners into the category ”related” if they stem from a
neighboring country that exhibits similar characteristics (in such areas as higher education
systems) and is consequently clustered into the same country group and ”distant” foreign-
ers as those scholars coming from other country clusters. As we compare both types of
foreigners to nationals and obtain various results, we find that we cannot conclusively
confirm hypothesis 3. Within the Western European countries, the effects coincide with
our expectations: only the ”distant” foreigners are disadvantaged regarding private fund-
ing. By contrast, in Northern European countries, ”related” foreigners have significantly
lower access to public funds. Although the CESE countries feature significant positive
and negative effects for ”related” foreigners with respect to public funding, the Continen-
tal and Southern European countries are even more discriminatory. In that group, both
types of foreigners face significantly lower public funding probabilities.
Finally, we are able to formulate some concluding remarks and related policy and individ-
ual implications. First, our empirical analysis supports the ongoing processes performed
by some governments in Continental and Southern Europe to increase the openness and
competitiveness of their higher education systems and to attract more scholars away from
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the Northern and Western European countries. Obviously, the established systems there
grant a more balanced allocation of external resources. However, there remains much
work to do. For instance, an installation of independent funding agencies and ex post and
ex ante evaluations of research projects should be pursued. Both types of projects appear
to be promising strategies to improve the intended targets.
For the individual researcher, our results signify that a move abroad entails a significant
need to raise external funds successfully. In making this statement, we do not wish to
dissuade scholars from moving to other countries, but we do want to point to a factor
that is an issue apart from more apparent conditions (such as salaries and endowment,
reputations of various universities). It seems to be good advice for each scholar to review
his/her financial needs. If there is a high interest in private funds, the Western European
countries are not the best choice-so long as they are not in one’s home cluster. Meanwhile,
Scandinavians should leave their own cluster or alternatively remain within their home
country to find the most ideal public funding conditions. Unfortunately, moving from
anywhere abroad to a Continental or Southern European country entails a disadvantage in
gaining public funding compared to nationals.
However, once coming to the conclusion to go abroad, it must be considered carefully
where to apply. The European funds (from the ERC and the Framework Programme) are
always non-discriminating or even advantageous for foreigners. A scholar residing in a
Western European country may comfortably tap all public funding sources, whereas those
in all other country groups will find similar advantages in seeking private funding sources.
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Table 33: Classification of languages
linguistic family subgroup subgroup subgroup countries code
Afroasiatic Semitic Central Semitic Arabic Malta 0
Caucasian Kartvelian Georgia 0
Uralic Finno-Ugric Finno-Permian Estonia 0
Finland 0
Hungary 0
Indo-European Balto-Slavic Baltic Latvia 1
Lithuania 1
Slavic Bulgaria 1
Croatia 1
Czech Republic 1
Poland 1
Russia 1
Serbia 1
Slovakia 1
Slovenia 1
Ukraine 1
Hellenic Cyprus 1
Greece 1
Italic Romance Eastern Romance Romania 2
Gallo-Iberian Belgium 2
France 2
Italy 2
Portugal 2
Spain 2
Germanic North Germanic Denmark 3
Iceland 3
Norway 3
Sweden 3
West Germanic Central German Austria 4
Germany 4
Switzerland 4
Low Franconian Netherlands 4
Anglo-Frisian UK 5
Ireland 5
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16.1 Robustness
To test the robustness of our estimations, we use the partitioning around medoids (PAM)
algorithm to generate alternative clusters that are based not on regional classification but
on the standardized key figures we presented in Section 14.2.1. In addition to the above-
mentioned indicators (H-Index, net yearly remuneration averages (PPS), GERD ratios and
language index), we included the number of scientific workers in the considered countries
in proportion to the articles published. With the help of the PAM algorithm, which is more
robust than K-means because it minimizes the sum of dissimilarities instead of the sum
of squared Euclidean distances and accepts a dissimilarity matrix, we again obtained 4
clusters.
Overall, we find results that are tendentially similar to those presented in Section 14.4, al-
though the marginal effects and the significance levels differ slightly, as expected. Indeed,
the algebraic signs of the effects that were found to be significant in both approaches are
consistent with those found with the other method.
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